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INTRODUCTION
[Y]ou [the jury] must determine the facts from the evidence received in the
trial and not from any other source. A "fact" is something proved directly
or circumstantially by the evidence.'
[L]egal facts are made not born, are socially constructed ... by everything
from evidence rules, courtroom etiquette, and law reporting traditions, to
advocacy techniques, the rhetoric of judges, and the scholasticism of law
school education ....
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,3 the Supreme Court held that peremptory
juror challenges exercised on the basis of the juror's sex violate the Equal
* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. I am grateful to Michael Frost,
Isabelle Gunning, Norman Garland, Anne Lombard, and the participants in Southwestern's faculty
works-in-progress workshop for assistance, encouragement, and criticism. John Newell and Soo Kim
contributed very able research assistance. Generous financial support was provided by a Southwestern
University School of Law summer research grant.
1. CALJIC No. 1.00 (5th ed. 1988).
2. CLIFFoRD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LOCAL
KNOwLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIvE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 173 (1983).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision was only the
most recent in a series of cases dating from the mid-1980's that have
gradually expanded the applicability of equal protection principles to the final
and decisive stage of jury selection. The first case in the series, Batson v.
Kentucky,4 held that an African-American defendant in a criminal case can
object to the prosecution's peremptory dismissal of African-American jurors
when the dismissal is based on race or inferences drawn from race. In
subsequent cases the Court extended the rule to criminal cases involving
Caucasian defendants and African-American jurors,5 to the exclusion of racial
minorities in civil cases,6 and to the peremptory challenge of African-
American jurors by criminal defendants.7
The Court's recent interest in jury selection coincides with the popular
debate regarding juries that has been fueled by a series of highly publicized
and controversial jury trials These cases have raised a number of difficult
questions about the use of juries,9 but none as persistent or divisive as the
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
6. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
7. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
8. It is not coincidental that Los Angeles, the most diverse and polyglot of American cities, has
been the scene of the largest number of controversial jury trials, all of which have been closely watched
around the country. See, e.g., Alan Abrahamson, Lyle Menendez Case Ends in a Mistrial; D.A. to Retry
Brothers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al (reporting on the trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez for the
murder of their millionaire parents); Alan Abrahamson, Mistrial Declared in Case Against Erik
Menendez, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1994, at Al (reporting on the trial of one of the Menendez brothers);
Edward J. Boyer & Jesse Katz, Jury Convicts Denny Defendants on Reduced Charges, Acquits on
Others, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al (reporting on the 1993 trial of two African-American men for
assaulting a truck driver and others at the beginning of the L.A. riots); Andrea Ford & Jim Newton,
Judge Cites "Ample Evidence," Orders Simpson to Stand Trial, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at Al
(reporting on the 1994 preliminary hearing into the evidence against OJ. Simpson in the murders of his
former wife and her friend); Jim Newton, 2 Officers Guilty, 2 Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at
Al (reporting on the 1993 trial of the Rodney King defendants on federal civil rights charges); Richard
A. Serrano-& Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted: Violence Follows Verdicts; Guards
Called Out, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al (reporting on the 1992 state trial of four police officers
charged with assaulting Rodney King and the subsequent civil unrest). Other highly publicized recent
trials include: the trial of William Kennedy Smith for rape; the trial of Lorena Bobbitt on malicious
wounding charges for severing her husband's penis; the 1989 and 1993 trials of a Hispanic Miami police
officer charged with homicide in the deaths of two African-Americans; and the 1990 trial of
Washington, D.C. mayor Marion Barry on drug charges. See, e.g., Barry Convicted on I Count; Jury
Deadlocks on 12 Others, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, at Al (reporting on the Marion Barry trial); Anne
Gearan, Lorena Bobbitt Found Innocent; Jury Cites Temporary Insanity, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1994, at
Al (reporting on the Bobbitt trial); Key Events in Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at A22 (reporting
on the Kennedy-Smith trial); Larry Rohter, Miami Police Officer is Acquitted in Racially Charged
Slaying Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at I (reporting on the trials of the Hispanic Miami police
officer).
9. Among the many questions raised by these cases are (1) the effect of a fear of civil unrest on
the integrity of jury decision-making; (2) the possible impact of daytime television talk shows on juror
evaluations of individual responsibility; and (3) the apparent, systematic pollution of the jury pool by
the parties and the media. See Lozano v. State, 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (overturning
the conviction of a Hispanic police officer because of, inter alia, the possibility that fear of riots in the
event of an acquittal influenced jurors); Bill Boyarsky, A Cynical Game of Leaks, Denials, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1994, at A20 (discussing attempts by attorneys in the OJ. Simpson case to shape public
opinion on the merits of the case through leaks to the media); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Fault Lines,
A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 40 (discussing whether media popularization of psychological theories of excuse
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one that has occupied the Court: whether the social identity of a juror is or
should be relevant to the juror's performance."0
Moreover, this public debate regarding jury composition mirrors a larger
controversy over how to imagine the American community. The disagreement
over definitions of a qualified jury parallels the broader controversy over
whether or how far we should publicly recognize and even cultivate cultural
difference in society at large." At issue is the fundamental question of what
it is that constitutes the American identity. 2 Given the historic importance
of the jury as both the symbol and embodiment of American democracy,'3
it is only natural that our collective self-identity crisis should find expression
in a reevaluation of how to draw the profile of the jury.
In its decision that the peremptory dismissal of jurors based on gender
violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court divided 6-3. The
majority, through Justice Blackmun, recited the long history of exclusion of
women from jury service and concluded that "gender, like race, is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."' 4 The
dissenters, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, disputed the majority's
assumption that a juror's gender is unrelated to her performance, and argued
that, because both sides will challenge jurors deemed undesirable, the process
as a whole results in no systematic discrimination against anyone."
The opinions in J.E.B. suggest a deep cleavage among the Justices. Justice
Scalia sarcastically accused the majority of following fads rather than the
Court's precedents. 6 The majority, in more measured tones, claimed that it
was the dissent who was ignoring the law.' 7 But while the Court
emphatically disagreed on the narrow issue about which it wrote-whether the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges-the
has influenced juror decisions); Seth Mydans, A Jury's Trials: Will Memories of Riots Influence a
Verdict?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, § 4, at 7 (discussing the possible impact of riots following a state
trial on federal jurors considering charges against the same defendants).
10. See, e.g., McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing the frequent
mention of the racial composition of the jury in press accounts of trials). Not everyone agrees that
emphasis on jury composition is a welcome development. See Andrew Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by
Cross Section, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992, at 17, 20 (arguing that emphasis on racial composition
of juries rests on the "destructive premise" that one person cannot fairly judge another unless he is of
the same race).
11. As summed up in two widely used metaphors, the question is whether we should imagine
American society as a "melting pot" through which a distinctive American identity emerges from the
combination of a variety of cultural and ethnic ingredients, or as a "salad bowl" in which linguistic and
cultural diversity is fostered and celebrated. See generally MICHAEL D'INNOCENZO & JOSEF P.
SIREFMAN, IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY: AMERICAN SOCIETY---"MELTING POT" OR "SALAD BowL"?
(1992) (exploring this tension).
12. For an example of one recent exchange on these issues, see Richard Rorty, The Unpatriotic
Academy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, § 4, at 15, and Richard Sennett, The Identity Myth, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1994, § 4, at 17.
13. See, e.g., ALEXIs DE TOQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lemer
eds., 1966) (1835) ('The jury is both the most effective way of establishing the people's rule and the
most efficient way of teaching them how to rule.").
14. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
15. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 1436.
17. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28 n.12.
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Justices were in implicit accord on the broader issue that has divided the
public: what constitutes a fair and qualified jury. With the possible exception
of Justice O'Connor, the entire Court endorsed a vision of juror impartiality
according to which the social identity of the juror has no bearing on her
performance. For the majority, this conception of impartiality requires the
prohibition of gender-based exclusions because, as a factual matter, one's
gender is unrelated to her performance as a juror.'8 According to the Court,
therefore, a peremptory challenge on the basis of (invalid) inferences drawn
from the juror's gender does not advance the goal of seating an impartial
jury.' 9 The dissent reached a different conclusion on the relation between
impartiality and peremptory strikes only because it began with a different
factual premise. Because gender might influence one's performance as ajuror,
it is permissible-if not necessary-to dismiss a juror based on gender to
prevent the identity of the decision-maker from infecting the decision.2" For
both the majority and the dissent, however, impartiality is sexless.
The popular debate over the relation between juror identity and juror
judgment has not achieved the same degree of resolution. 2' This conclusion
is evident in the most notorious of recent cases-the prosecution of four white
Los Angeles police officers for assaulting Rodney King, an African-American
motorist who attempted to evade arrest. The officers' acquittal on state assault
charges 22 triggered the nation's worst urban violence in this century. 23 The
outcome of the case and the violent reaction it touched off were popularly
attributed to the removal of the case from ethnically-mixed Los Angeles
County to predominantly white suburban Ventura County.2" The view that
18. Id. at 1426-27.
19.1d.
20. Id. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Carla Rivera, Majority Say Denny Verdicts Too Lenient, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993,
at Al (reporting that 28% of Los Angeles whites agreed with the verdict in the Denny beating case
compared with 51% agreement among blacks).
22. Serrano & Wilkinson, supra note 8, at Al. The notoriety of the case resulted from the fact that
the beating of Rodney King was filmed by an onlooker and broadcast to television viewers around the
country. For a comprehensive review of the evidence presented at the trial, see Roger Parloff, Maybe
the Jury Was Right, AM. LAW., June 1992, at 7.
23. Greg Braxton & Jim Newton, Looting and Fires Ravage L.A., L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at Al.
At least 45 people died during the civil unrest and some 5000 buildings were damaged or destroyed.
Louis Sahagun & Carla Rivera, Jittery L.A. Sees Ray of Hope, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1992, at Al.
24. See Frank Tuerkheimer, Forum: The Rodney King Verdict: Why and Where to from Here?, 1992
Wis. L. REv. 849; Mark Hansen, Different Jury, Different Verdict?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1992, at 54, 55;
David Margolick, The Verdict; Switching Case to White Suburb May Have Decided Outcome, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A20; Timothy P. O'Neill, Observer; Wrong Place, Wrong Jury, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1992, at A23; Henry Weinstein & Paul Lieberman, Location of Trial Played Major Role, Legal
Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al8; see also Adrianne Goodman, NAACP Head Criticizes
Site of King Trial, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at BI (quoting the head of the Ventura County chapter
of the NAACP, who predicted after the case was moved to Ventura County that "the officers will win').
But see Parloff, supra note 22, at 7 (defending the verdict as based on the evidence). For in-depth
discussions of jury composition issues raised by the change of venue in the King case from racially
diverse Los Angeles County where the crime occurred to the more homogeneous Ventura County, see
Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533
(1993), and Note, Out of the Frying Pan or into the Fire? Race and Choice of Venue after Rodney King,
106 HARV. L. REv. 705 (1993).
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the officers' acquittal resulted from the absence of African-Americans on the
jury panel seemed to be confirmed by the conviction of two of the four
officers when they were tried the following year for federal civil rights
crimes,25 this time in Los Angeles County before a racially mixed urban
jury.26 Though hardly of one mind as to what extent race and gender should
be taken into account in assembling a fair and impartial jury, there appears
to be widespread popular agreement that the Court's embrace of colorblind
and sexless jury decision-making is unrealistic.27
The Court's answer in J.E.B. to the question of the relevance of group
identity to juror qualification is only the latest statement in a long running
debate over how to draw the profile of a qualified jury. It signals the current
ascendance of one vision of impartiality, defined as individual, psychological,
and negative, and the consequent decline of that vision's chief rival, which
views impartiality as irreducibly plural, social, and substantive. Although the
position taken in J.E.B. has always been the dominant view, that decision is
remarkable for a number of reasons. First, the triumph of a definition of
impartiality which takes the juror rather than the jury as the unit of measure
marks a significant departure from the case that is the doctrinal font of
J.E.B.-Batson v. Kentucky.25 Although the precise rationale for the Batson
decision is obscure, its spirit is decidedly pluralist. Increasing the participation
of black jurors as blacks was among the principal reasons for the Court's
decision to prohibit race-based peremptory challenges. When J.E.B. was
decided eight years later, the emphasis on expanding jury participation had
been transformed to an almost exclusive concern with non-discrimination in
selection.
Second and more significantly, the decision in J.E.B. is based on premises
about the nature of truth and means of acquiring knowledge that are now
largely rejected. The Court's belief that it is possible to view events outside
of any perspective-gendered, racial, educational-has come to be seen as
naYve. Rather, all perception is filtered through preexisting expectations about
the world that shape perception as it occurs. Moreover, recent research on
juror decision-making confirms that the identity of the decision-maker is
inseparable from, and an ingredient in, the decision. The Court's efforts to
implement an impartiality stripped of subjectivity are therefore misguided.
25. Newton, supra note 8, at Al.
26. The jury consisted of eight men and four women, two of whom were African-Americans and
one of whom was Latino. Jim Newton, Racially Mixed Jury Selected for King Trial, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1993, at Al. Though the presence of minority jurors was seen as partially responsible for the
different result, there were other significant differences between the two trials that also contributed to
the different outcomes. See Jerome H. Skolnick & James J. Fyfe, A Case for Federal Prosecution, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at B7; Henry Weinstein, Jury Relied Heavily on Tape of King Beating, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al.
27. See David Margolick, As Venues are Changed, Many Ask How Important a Role Race Should
Play, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, § 1, at 7 (discussing proposals to take into account demographics in
venue changes, in light of the widespread perception that the transfer to Ventura County of the state trial
of the L.A. police officers accused of assaulting Rodney King "ordained its outcome").
28. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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This Article examines constitutional doctrine regarding juror qualifications
in light of current philosophical debates about the process of interpretation
and the means of acquiring knowledge. Part I is a broadly drawn discussion
of the philosophical views that inform legal conceptions of the ideal
factfinder. Current definitions of juror impartiality are rooted in and reflect
the Enlightenment belief in the fundamental separability of the subjective
mind and the objective world, and the identification of truth with neutral
objective reality. Central to this conception of truth is the belief in the
possibility of a neutral vantage point purged of subjective distortion. These
beliefs, however, have been increasingly called into question. Recent
scholarship from a wide range of disciplines argues that all perception is
mediated by subjective knowledge structures. Our expectations about the
world based on our past experiences and our beliefs about what typically
occurs shape our understanding of what we see. Because all knowledge is
shaped by a priori beliefs, there is no vantage point entirely outside of any
perspective from which the truth of a picture of events can be reliably judged.
Part II traces the influence of these beliefs in constitutional doctrine
concerning the qualifications of legal factfinders. The dominant conception of
juror qualifications reflects the view that knowledge acquisition is largely
passive and that true beliefs are caused by the effects produced by the object
of belief on a receptive mind. There is, however, a persistent sub-tradition
that rejects individualistic definitions of juror qualifications in favor of a
"diffused impartiality" that results from the inclusion of a diverse variety of
outlooks on the jury. Significantly, the minority position that emphasizes the
relevance of the decision-maker's perspective to the decision-making task is
the orthodox view in cases where the jury departs from its traditional
factfinding role to decide the appropriate sentence in death penalty cases.
Part III argues that juror beliefs and attitudes influence decisions in all
types of cases. The discussion focuses on recent research into juror decision-
making, which shows that jurors' previously held views about what constitutes
an adequate explanation of the litigated event play a central role in their
understanding and evaluation of the evidence. These findings bear out the
importance of preexisting belief structures in the process of human cognition.
The Conclusion briefly comments on various current proposals to change our
jury selection procedures.
I. CHANGING VIEWS ABOUT THE FOUNDATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE
A. The Empiricist Tradition
Our contemporary understandings of the ideal qualifications for judicial
.factfinders are built on premises that have their source in the Enlightenment.
Although our factfinding procedures are the result of a long historical
process, 29 their present character was largely shaped in the eighteenth
29. See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 1-2 (1985) (noting
uncertainty over the beginnings of the law of evidence). For example, some aspects of the law of
[Vol. 70:405
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century.3" Legal professionals interested in refining the techniques for
establishing the truth about historical events in judicial trials were naturally
drawn to currently popular philosophical theories about the nature of truth and
the methods for attaining it.3 As a result, the premises that are the founda-
tion for Anglo-American evidence law are largely those of seventeenth-
century British empiricism.32 The assumptions that underlie our factfinding
procedures about what there is and how it can be known are directly traceable
to the ideas of the leading empiricist thinkers: John Locke, Jeremy Bentham,
and John Stuart Mill.
33
The core premise of empiricist thinking about reality and truth is the
assumption of a fundamental cleavage between mind and matter.34 Although
evidence, such as rules governing proof of documents, are as old as the jury. 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 8, at 607 (1983) [hereinafter WIGMORE, EVIDENCE]. The rest
developed unsystematically and largely as isolated responses to particular problems. TWINING, supra,
at I.
30. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). John Langbein has linked the development of the law of
evidence in the 18th century to the increasing autonomy of the jury from the judge. John H. Langbein,
The Criminal Trial Before the Lmwyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 306 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, The
Criminal Trial]. By that time the transformation of the role ofjurors from witnesses to factfinders was
already several hundred years old. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 129-30 (5th ed. 1956); Langbein, The Criminal Trial, supra, at 306; see also John M. Mitnick,
From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J.L.
& HIsT. 201,205 (1988) (fixing the date of the transformation as the 17th century, if not substantially
earlier). It was not until the latter part of the 17th century, however, that the jury gained substantial
independence from the judge. Prior to that time, the judge, through his power to comment on the merits
of the case, to terminate a case if the jury's views differed from his own, and to inquire into the jury's
reasons before accepting its verdict, "exercised so much influence over the jury that it is difficult to
characterize the jury as functioning autonomously." Langbein, The Criminal Trial, supra, at 285; see
also THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800, at 270-71 (1985). It was the decline of these more direct control
mechanisms in the period before and after the turn of the 18th century that provided the impetus for the
fuller development of evidentiary rules designed to control the jury's decision by restricting what the
jury could hear.
31. This theme has been most thoroughly developed by Barbara Shapiro. See BAR3ARA J. SHAPIRO,
"BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT]; BARBARA
J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION, HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE (1983);
Barbara J. Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-
1850, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 153 (1986) [hereinafter Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty].
32. See William Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON LAW 62,
70 (William Twining ed., 1986) [hereinafter Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory]; William Twining,
The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in WELL AND TRULY TRIED 211, 243-46 (Enid
Campbell & Louis Waller eds., 1982) [hereinafter Twining, The Rationalist Tradition], reprinted &
revised in WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 32, 71-74 (1990)
[hereinafter TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE]; William Twining, Some Scepticism About Scepticisms
11 J.L. & Soc. 137, 149 (1984) [hereinafter Twining, Scepticisms], reprinted in TWINING, RETHINKING
EVIDENCE, supra, at 92, 101; see also SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, supra note 31, at 25-40
(discussing thoroughly the history in this area).
33. Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, supra note 32, at 70. For instance, the authors of the first
treatises on evidence, writing in the early 18th century, explicitly grounded their discussion in then-
current epistemological thought. See GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1 (Garland Publishing
Inc. 1979) (1754) (quoting John Locke on the first page); see also Shapiro, To a Moral Certainty, supra
note 31, at 175-76.
34. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 796 (1989). Although
this ontological dualism is most closely associated with another Enlightenment thinker, Ren& Descartes,
1995]
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some form of mind-body dualism has been part of Western philosophy since
Plato,35 the dichotomy between subject and object received added signifi-
cance at the time of the Enlightenment with the development of modem
scientific notions of physical causality. During this period people first began
to see the world as "causally closed. 3 6 The medieval belief in an essentially
"qualitative" universe in which almost anything could exert an "influence" on
anything else gave way to a rigorously "quantitative" world stressing
mechanical cause and effect over "the essence of material bodies" in
explaining phenomena.37 The external objective world of nature came to be
seen as a neutral realm of bodies and forces exhibiting discoverable
regularities or laws, a realm that was wholly independent of the internal
mind.38
The belief in a neutral reality external to the mind and possessed of a form
and logic of its own, coincides with a theory of language and reference that
assumes a direct and non-problematic correspondence between the world and
the categories of thought. According to this "causal" theory of language, there
is or can be an exact fit between language and the entities that make up the
world because the meaning of words is fixed by the nature of the thing to
which they refer. 39 The world consists of a fixed and determinable set of
self-identifying "natural kinds"; words are simply the names for objects in the
world.40
According to empiricist thought, although mind and matter inhabit discrete
realms, the mind has access to the external world through the senses. Indeed,
as their name suggests, the empiricists4 regarded "experience" acquired by
see RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBjEcrivIsM AND RELATIVISM 115-16 (1983), the belief in a
dualistic world is a pervasive feature of post-Enlightenment Western culture. For instance, unlike some
other cultures, we use two kinds of healers, one for the mind and one for the body.
35. Grey, supra note 34, at 796. It is not, however, a universal human intuition. One example
among many of a non-dualistic world view is the mystical monism of Islamic Sufism. See FAZLUR
RAHMAN, ISLAM 141-49 (2d ed. 1979).
36. HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY 75 (1981).
37. Id. Another author, discussing the change from a qialitative to a quantitative view, wrote:
Before Newton was born the "new science" of the century had at last succeeded in rejecting
Aristotelian and scholastic explanations expressed in terms of the essences of material bodies.
To say that a stone fell because its "nature" drove it toward the center of the universe had been
made to look a mere tautological word-play, something it had not previously been. Henceforth
the entire flux of sensory appearances, including color, taste, and even weight, was to be
explained in terms of the size, shape, position, and motion of the elementary corpuscles of base
matter. The attribution of other qualities to the elementary atoms was a resort to the occult and
therefore out of bounds for science.
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONs 104 (2d ed. 1970).
38. JOYCE APPLEBY ET AL., TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORY 15-16 (1994).
39. Compare Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?
41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 876 (1989) (defending this view) with PUTNAM, supra note 36, at 51-54
(criticizing this view).
40. As A.W. Brian Simpson mockingly described the realist view of language, "[T]he only function
of words is to stab at things, after the fashion of kebab skewers." A.W. Brian Simpson, The Analysis
of Legal Concepts, 80 L.Q. REv. 535, 537 (1964).
41. The implications of the belief in a mind-body dualism do not all point in the same direction.
The continental European rationalists led by Ren6 Descartes used the premise of an ontological
separation of mind and matter to elaborate an epistemology that privileged the mind side of the
[Vol. 70:405
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contact with the external world through the senses as the foundation for
virtually all knowledge.42 As John Locke, the leading systemizer of Empiri-
cist epistemology, argued in the famous passage from his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding:
Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all
Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence
comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has
painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the
materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From
Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it
ultimately derives it self.43
dichotomy. For them, the foundations of knowledge are to be found in those rational intuitions that,
despite the thinker's earnest efforts, simply cannot be doubted. As Descartes wrote in the beginning of
his Meditations:
It is now some years since I detected how many were the false beliefs that I had from my
earliest youth admitted as true, and how doubtful was everything I had since constructed on
this basis; and from that time I was convinced that I must once for all seriously undertake to
rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew
from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the
sciences.... Today, then since very opportunely for the plan I have in view I have delivered
my mind from every care [and am happily agitated by no passions] and since I have procured
for myself an assured leisure in peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously and freely address
myself to the general upheaval of all my former opinions.
Ren6 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (1642), in HuMAN KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 111 (Paul K. Moser & Arnold Vander Nat eds., 1987).
This "method of doubt" led Descartes to embrace two fundamental truths. Because he could not doubt
his own or God's existence, those two beliefs served as the foundation for the elaboration of his entire
philosophy. Because of its emphasis on abstract reason, the model for all rationalist knowledge is
mathematics. See Dennis Patterson, PostmodernismlFeminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 264
(1992). An example of this style of thought which would be familiar to lawyers is the French Civil
Code. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADrION 28-30 (2d ed. 1985).
42. D.W. Hamlyn, Empiricism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 499-505 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967).
43. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 104 (Peter H. Nidditch ed.,
1975). Locke goes on to explain that the "experience" which is the fountain of all knowledge derives
from two sources. The first, which is the source of most of our ideas, is sensation. The sensations
conveyed to the mind from external objects produce our ideas of "Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft,
Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities." Id. at 105. The second source of our
ideas is our perception of the internal operation of the mind, or "reflection' From reflection the mind
is supplied with another set of ideas that includes "Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing,
Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds." Id. at 105.
Locke distinguished between simple and complex ideas. In the reception of simple ideas the mind
is mostly passive. "mhe Objects of our Senses ... obtrude their particular Ideas upon our minds,
whether we will or no." Id. at 118. Once supplied with a store of simple ideas, the mind has the power
"to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new
complex Ideas" Id. at 119.
The qualities of objects that produce ideas are of two types. Primary or original qualities are "such
as are utterly inseparable from the Body, in what estate soever it be." Id. at 134-35. Thus, no matter how
many times a grain of wheat is divided, each part retains the qualities of solidity, extension, figure, and
mobility. The ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities themselves, and actually exist in the
bodies themselves, whether or not they are perceived. Id. at 137.
Secondary qualities, by contrast, are not qualities in the objects themselves, but powers to produce
various sensations, such as color, sound, and taste. Objects produce sensation through their bulk, figure,
texture, and the motion of their insensible parts. Id. at 135. Though no less real than primary qualities,
secondary qualities bear no resemblance to the ideas they produce. Id. at 137.
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Having posited external reality as the source and foundation for knowledge,
specifying the mechanism by which the world communicates itself to the mind
proved something of a problem for the empiricists. Locke proposed that
bodies in the world produce ideas in the mind through "impulse."" For
example, "a Violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of
peculiar figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their
Motions, causes the Ideas of the blue Color, and sweet Scent of that Flower
to be produced in our Minds. 45 Clearly, however, crediting "impulses" from
"insensible particles" with the generation of sensation does not resolve the
issue of how we access the external world, but serves only to flag the
problem. Explaining just how "a ghostly mind [can] be linked to the material
world through the bodily machine it somehow haunts"'46 remained an.
embarrassment to empiricist thought.
Nonetheless, for the empiricists the measure of the adequacy of any inquiry
is the extent to which it successfully penetrates and represents the true nature
of reality. Accordingly, truth is a correspondence relation between the world
and our symbolic descriptions.4 7 Statements are true if they accurately depict
the world as it really is. As James Mill, grandfather of John Stuart Mill,
summed it up in a nineteenth-century version of Empiricist epistemology,
ideas are "copies" of sensations delivered to the mind through the senses.48
Or, in John Locke's famous formulation, knowledge is "real only so far as
there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. 49
The primary significance of the empiricists' view for purposes of this
Article is its implication for the proper relation between the knower and what
is known. Truth, in a realist world, is "objective." A proposition is objective
to the extent that it is connected to or caused by5" an "object," something
"out there" detached from the observer." The true representation of the
world (and there is only one) is the representation that the world would give
if it could describe itself12 It follows, of course, that to arrive at truth, the
observer must be free from or able to set aside her personal or subjective
44. Id. at 135-37. As Locke put the problem,
If, then, external objects be not united to our Minds when they produce Ideas in it, and yet we
perceive these original Qualities in such of them as singly fall under our Senses, it is evident,
that some motion must be thence continued to our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by some parts of
our Bodies, to the Brains or the seat of Sensation, there to produce in our Minds the particular
Ideas we have of them.
Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 136.
46. Grey, supra note 34, at 797.
47. PUTNAM, supra note 36, at 49.
48. JAMES MILL, ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE HUMAN MIND 52 (John S. Mill ed., 1869).
49. LOCKE, supra note 43, at 563.
50. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 157 (1979).
51. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1990) (observing that
objectivity, as the word itself suggests, has traditionally been understood as ontological).
52. RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 194 (1982).
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attributes. 3 Indeed, objectivity, the complete effacement of the human
observer, is the qualification sine qua non for the realist truth seeker. For to
the extent that the description reflects the interests, assumptions, goals, or
biases of the investigator, it will not be a faithful image of its object, and by
hypothesis will be less than true. 4
The success of the natural sciences, especially Newtonian physics, in
identifying an inherent order in the external world and symbolically
representing that reality in the precise language of mathematics, induced
confidence that the same assumptions and techniques could be usefully
employed in other disciplines.5 The premises and techniques of natural
science came to dominate all realms of inquiry, and the objectivity of the
world came to be regarded as a matter of common sense.56 The mind was
conceived as an essentially passive receiver of impressions from the external
world,57 a mirror reflecting the image of objective reality.58 As Rorty states,
"To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind ....
B. The Contextualist Critique
In recent years, the premises of empiricism (or, as it is more commonly
called, realism or positivism) have been subjected to sustained attack across
all of the disciplines they once held. Some of the leading figures in the
history of science,60 philosophy, 61 literary studies,62 linguistics, 63 history,'
53. Jeffrey Alexander, General Theory in the Postpositivist Mode: The "Epistemological Dilemma"
and the Search for Present Reason, in POSTMODERNISM AND SOCIAL THEORY: THE DEBATE OVER
GENERAL THEORY 322, 330-31 (Steven Seidman & David G. Wagner eds., 1992).
54. Thus, the preferred perspective of a realist metaphysics is "the God's Eye point of view,"
PUTNAM, supra note 36, at 49, or, as in the title of Thomas Nagel's book, "a view from nowhere."
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
55. As Richard Posner observes:
Through perception, measurement, and mathematics, the human mind would uncover the
secrets of nature (including those of the mind itself, a part of nature) and the laws (natural, not
positive) of social interaction-including laws decreeing balanced government, economic
behavior in accordance with the principles of supply and demand, and moral and legal
principles based on immutable principles of psychology and human behavior.
Richard A. Posner, What has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1655 (1990).
56. PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN
HISTORICAL PROFESSION 524 (1988).
57. As a sociologist from the 1940's put it, "The stars have no sentiments, the atoms no anxieties
which have to be taken into account. Observation is objective with little effort on the part of the scientist
to make it so...." APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 38, at 16.
58. RORTY, supra note 50, at 12 ("The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that
of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations.").
59.Id. at3.
60. See, e.g., KUHN, supra note 37.
61. See, e.g., NELSON GOODMAN, OF MIND AND OTHER MATTERS (1984); W.V. QuiNE, PURSUIT
OF TRUTH (1990); RORTY, supra note 50.
62. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983); STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
63. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
64. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS; AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (Ronald D. Laing ed., 1970); HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1975); HAYDEN WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN
CULTURAL CRITICISM (1978).
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sociology, 5 and anthropology" have raised doubts about the belief in an
unproblematic relation between external reality and the representations by
which it is modeled. Common to all of these critiques is a blurring of the
once-clear line between the subjective mind and the objective world. The
mental mirrors onto which reality is reflected have come to be seen as social
artifacts, a product of their time and place. 7 Or, to adjust the metaphor to
accommodate the change, the mind has come to be seen not as a mirror
reflecting exact images of reality, but as a lens through which external reality
is refracted. While no one denies the value of clearing the mind of presuppo-
sitions and looking out into the world to see what is there, mounting evidence
suggests that this is not possible." Observation cannot serve as the bedrock
for knowledge, as the Empiricists believed, because human beings lack the
kind of direct access to the phenomenal world that an epistemology based on
experience requires.69 All experience is mediated by preexisting knowledge
structures, constellations of assumptions, interests, and purposes that filter and
organize perception as it occurs.70 And because the minds that take the world
65. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LucKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
(1967); HAROLD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY (1967).
66. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); VICTOR TURNER, THE
FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL (1967).
67. APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 38, at 173.
68. The impetus for this change in outlook is open to debate and ultimately not of primary interest
for purposes of this Article. Hermeneutics, the favored or occasional rubric of various strands of post-
positivist thinking, has ancient roots in efforts to find objective and stable meanings in sacred scripture.
One eligible opinion searching for the roots of post-positivist thought in philosophy credits Kant with
raising doubts about the intelligibility of the view that the world is composed of self-identifyng objects
that are captured by language. PUTNAM, supra note 36, at 60-64. American philosophical pragmatism
has been traced to 19th-century evolutionary thinking, which suggested a functional approach to thinking
and knowledge as an evolutionary adaptation to the environment, and 19th-century historicism, which
had undermined the belief in a single set of categories for understanding the world through its
demonstration of the ubiquity of historical and cultural diversity. Grey, supra note 34, at 796-98. The
emergence of doubts about the possibility of arriving at objective truth within history has been plausibly
linked to the democratization of the profession. See APPLEBY ET AL., supra note 38, at 146-59. More
important than the origins in the change in view is the ubiquity of the questioning of received views
about the foundations for truth.
69. As Charles Sanders Peirce put it:
[T]here is but one state of mind from which you can "set out," namely, the very state of mind
in which you actually find yourself at the time you do "set out"--a state in which you are
laden with [a]n immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest
yourself if you would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would not have made all
knowledge impossible to yourself?
Grey, supra note 34, at 799 (quoting Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is (1905), in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 272, 278 (Charles Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds.,
1934)).
70. See generally NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978). In an amusing illustration
of the way unarticulated assumptions influence interpretation, Goodman tells the story of a woman who
chose a swatch of cloth from an upholsterer's sample book to have her sofa reupholstered. When
ordering the material from the textile shop, she emphasized that she wanted the material to be exactly
like the sample. When her order was delivered it contained several hundred 2-inch by 3-inch pieces cut
with zigzag edges, just like the sample. To the woman's protests, the seller responded that he had kept
his employees up half the night cutting the fabric to match the sample. Some months later, in
preparation for a party, the same woman went to a bakery and selected a cupcake from those on display,
ordering enough for fifty guests. On the date of the party the bakery delivered a single huge cake. In
response to the woman's complaint, the proprietor of the bakery said, "You have no idea how much
POST-POSITIVIST JURY
in are a product of their time and place, their representations of reality are
likewise socially conditioned and partial to some degree. Models of the world
are never simply prints of a fully formed external reality.7' Rather, represen-
tations of reality are shaped by the values and purposes of their human
creators. How the world appears will to some degree be a product of the
categories that inform perception.
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,72 perhaps the most
influential statement of post-positivist thinking,73 illustrates how subjective
belief structures shape perception and knowledge. Kuhn's account reconceptu-
alizes the history of science, thus upsetting the realist view of the authority
of fact over theory. The received account, grounded in a metaphysical realism
and a correspondence theory of truth, views science as an accumulation of
knowledge or a linear progression toward ever more faithful theories about the
true nature of the universe. Kuhn relocates the reference point relative to
which the history of science is drawn. Instead of telling the story by reference
to a supposed mind-independent external reality, Kuhn describes scientific
activity in relation to a cultural phenomenon that he calls a "paradigm." 74
Though not susceptible of simple definition, paradigms are the matrix of
assumptions, standards, values, goals, and practices that serve to organize the
activity of a particular scientific community. They are not the kind of self-
consciously held and contingent theories that divide members of, for example,
the legal academy, who might organize their research on law around law and
economics, critical race theory, or one of several other available frameworks.
Paradigms are instead "quite unself-conscious and unquestioned convictions
about the way things are."7"
Paradigms serve both a cognitive function and a normative function. In their
cognitive function, paradigms provide the community with its assumptions
about the nature of the field of inquiry. They tell working scientists about "the
entities that nature does and does not contain and about the ways in which
those entities behave. 76 In their normative function, paradigms provide the
scientific communities with a conception of their enterprise and its legitimate
problems and standards. They are "the source of the methods, problem-field,
and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any
trouble we went to. My husband runs the textile shop and he warned me that your order would have
to be in one piece." Id. at 63-64. For an example in which the ambiguity is more patent, see STANLEY
FisH, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the
Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLAss?:
THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE CoMMuNmES, supra note 62, at 268, 274-77 (discussing a sign hung
over a door reading: "PRIVATE MEMBERS ONLY").
71. As evidence that belief influences perception, note that it feels as if we are able to perceive
mathematical facts such as the fact that every whole number has a successor. See PUTNAM, supra note
36, at 145-46.
72. KUHN, supra note 37.
73. The reason Kuhn's book has proven so controversial and influential is that it challenges the
premises of realism in the domain where they had been most successful-experimental science.
74. KUmN, supra note 37, at 10.
75. NovicK, supra note 56, at 528.
76. KUHN, supra note 37, at 109.
1995]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
given time."" This normative work is performed in a variety of ways. It is
done through, among other things, shared values-such as the value of
prediction 7 8-and through paradigmatic "exemplars"-notable scientific
achievements and model experiments.79 It is also done partly through
cognitive assumptions, which help to specify the outstanding questions and
their relative importance, as well as what counts as a permissible solution.8"
For instance, the seventeenth century's commitment to the mechanico-
corpuscular view of nature gave rise to some new questions and resolved
others. The belief that neutral corpuscles could act on each other only through
contact directed the attention of scientists to the question of how the motion
of particles is altered by collisions." There followed a reinterpretation of
well-known observations that Newton embedded in his laws of motion.
According to the hypothesis of a mechanical universe, those laws must (and
did) explain interactive motion mechanically. Thus, "the corpuscular paradigm
bred both a new problem and a large part of that problem's solution."82
Most scientific work, what Kuhn calls "normal science," takes place within
a stable paradigm. Kuhn illustrates the essentially closed character of normal
science by comparing it to puzzle solving. 3 According to Kuhn, what
characterizes puzzles-jigsaw puzzles, crossword puzzles-is that there be
both an assured solution and a set of criteria or rules which define what
counts as a right answer and the permissible steps that may be taken in order
to achieve it.84 Paradigms, like puzzles, both set the problems and specify
the means and range of solutions. 5 Scientists working within a stable
paradigm "check off examples against criteria; they fudge the counter-
examples enough to avoid the need for new models; they try out various
guesses, formulated within the current jargon, in the hope of coming up with
something which will cover the unfudgeable cases."86 What scientists never
do is hold the solution up to external reality to assess the fit.
"Extraordinary science" is what occurs during periods of paradigm shift.
The most important precondition for a paradigm shift is the availability of an
alternative paradigm to replace it.8 7 The choice between two competing
paradigms is not, however, accomplished by comparing each to the facts and
selecting the one that presents the best fit.88 Nor can two competing
paradigms be directly compared to each other.8 9 The nature of a paradigm
makes both types of measure impossible. For one thing, there can be no test
77. Id. at 103.
78. Id. at 184-85.
79. Id. at 187.
80. Id. at 104-05.
81. Id. at 104.
82. Id. at 105.
83. Id. at 36-42.
84. Id. at 38.
85. Id.
86. RORTY, supra note 52, at 193.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id. at 145.
89. Id.
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of which of two paradigms has the greater explanatory power, since the
criteria for what passes as a satisfactory explanation are internal to the
paradigm.9" Furthermore, it is only within a paradigm that any facts exist.
For example, there can be no direct comparison between an account which
describes the world in terms of dephlogisticated air and one which describes
the world in terms of oxygen.9 Both accounts are closed systems in that
they define what there is and then generate from those very definitions the
tests and measures for identifying and describing it. Even when a subsequent
paradigm incorporates the terms and concepts of its predecessor, closer
inspection shows that they are in fact using the same terms to label different
realities. For example, while both Newtonian physics and Einstein's general
theory of relativity used the concept of "space," Newton's concept of space
as "flat, homogeneous, isotropic and unaffected by the presence of matter"
was completely transformed in Einstein's theory.92 As Kuhn observed: "To
make the transition to Einstein's universe, the whole conceptual web whose
strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid
down again on nature whole." 93
Thus, at least according to some interpretations of Kuhn, scientific
paradigms construct both the scientific enterprise and the reality that is its
object. In describing the transition that occurs when one paradigm is replaced
by another, Kuhn invoked analogies to political revolutions which alter "the
modes of community life,"94 and to visual gestalt switches documented by
cognitive psychologists whereby "[w]hat were ducks in the scientist's world
before the revolution are rabbits afterwards." 95 Kuhn further observed:
Lavoisier... saw oxygen where Priestly had seen dephlogisticated air and
where others had seen nothing at all. In learning to see oxygen, however,
Lavoisier also had to change his view of many other more familiar
substances.... At the very least, as a result of discovering oxygen,
Lavoisier saw nature differently. And in the absence of some recourse to
that hypothetical fixed nature that he "saw differently," the principle of
economy will urge us to say that after discovering oxygen Lavoisier
worked in a different world.96
Just what Kuhn meant and, more importantly, what if anything is left of
objectivity in the post-Kuhnian, post-positivist world, has been the subject of
much debate and disagreement.9 7 One view, widely aired in the legal
90. Id. at 148.
91. Id. at 118, 126.
92. KUHN, supra note 37, at 149.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 94.
95. Id. at I11.
96. Id. at 118. Kuhn's description of the scientific process is subject to the same qualifications
implied by his arguments against the truth claims of science. That is, the history of science, like science,
is hermeneutic rather than epistemological, see RORTY, supra note 50, at 322, and Kuhn's own account
of that history is no less dependent upon assumptions and standards that have produced, rather than
simply rendered "visible," the paradigm shifts that he now sees.
97. Kuhn has rejected the most far-reaching interpretations of his work. He has forcefully denied
the accusations of his critics that his skepticism about the possibilities for identifying a neutral algorithm
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community by Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish, concludes that the demise of
(what is now called) naive realism requires the abandonment of any effort to
ground knowledge in external reality. Because perception is shaped by the
categories of understanding, "[p]erception is never innocent of assumptions,
and the assumptions within which it occurs will be responsible for ... what
is perceived."98 We may assume that something other than us exists,99 but
we know it only within the contours of a purely social and historical-a
human-apparatus. It is not possible to pierce or transcend our conceptual
categories and touch that other directly, because, as is often stated, language
and culture "go all the way down." Though one can change interpretive
frameworks or move back and forth between frameworks, it is not possible to
shed or look beyond one or another culturally specific interpretive matrix.
Reality cannot have a form that is its own, much less one that is knowable,
because form, like language, is an entirely human creation. Thus, whatever
form we attach to reality belongs to us, not to it °00 As a result, an appeal
to "the facts" cannot resolve competing truth claims.
Partisans of this strong form of interpretivism emphasize that while reality
does not itself rule out any interpretations as implausible, interpretation is not
unconstrained. On the contrary, the range of imaginable constructions of
reality is narrowly circumscribed by the interpretive framework of the
observer. Rejecting neutral external reality as the arbiter of truth does not
mean there are no foundations for truth, only that "whatever foundations there
are... have been established by persuasion, that is, in the course of argument
and counter-argument on the basis of examples and evidence that are
themselves cultural and contextual."'0 ' Because all perception is dependent
on the interpretive apparatus of the observer, truth is invariably relative to a
community that shares the same conventions of interpretation.' 2 No
perspective can claim priority on the basis of privileged access to the truth.
for theory choice inescapably entails an irrational relativism. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 51-108
(discussing the controversy generated by Kuhn's work).
98. STANLEY FISH, Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:
CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 78 (1989)
[hereinafter DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY].
99. In making this assumption, we put aside the logical possibilities that we are all brains in a vat,
that the world was created yesterday complete with memories and fossils, etc.
100. As Stanley Fish puts it, "What can be seen will be a function of the categories of vision that
already inform perception, and those categories will be social and conventional and not imposed upon
us by an independent world." FISH, supra note 98, at 82.
101. STANLEY FISH, Introduction: Going Down the Anti-Formalist Road, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY, supra note 98, at 32.
102. The idea of interpretive communities is most often associated with Stanley Fish. See, e.g., FISH,
supra note 62. The idea has been aptly described as "a way of speaking about the power of institutional
settings, within which assumptions and beliefs count as facts." Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory
Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns ofan Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 115, 122 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds.,
1988).
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The only ground on which any point of view can assert superiority is on the
basis that it commands the greatest agreement.
0 3
Another response to the recognition of the role of the social in the
construction of knowledge regards the choice between credulous realism and
unmoored relativism as false.'04 This response does not see the demise of
a strictly dichotomized view of reality as requiring the total abandonment of
the search for objective knowledge, because recognizing that subjective
knowledge structures influence perception does not mean that they determine
entirely the shape of reality. Despite the fact that we lack direct, pre-linguistic
access to the world outside the self, there nevertheless remains a sense in
which the world can be comprehended. 15 Objectivity or general theory,
however, is not identified exclusively with external reality, but results from
an interactive relation between persons and things in the world.'0" The mind
neither mirrors an independent external reality nor wholly makes it up; rather,
"the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world."'1 7
Whether acknowledging the salience of perspective excludes all possibility
of objective knowledge is probably insoluble-at least based upon the current
state of our understanding. But for present purposes it is not necessary to
choose sides on this issue, since the only point to be made here is one on
which both parties to the controversy agree: that the facts never speak for
themselves. There is no transcendent perspective, no God's eye point of view,
from which the world appears as it really is.' Though efforts to apprehend
a "decentered" world may not be entirely fruitless, all inquiry proceeds out
of a set of socially and historically determined interests and assumptions that
more or less shape its final product.
103. See GOODMAN, supra note 70,'at 139 ("[The] tests for rightness [of descriptions of reality] may
consist primarily in showing not that they are reliable but that they are authoritative.').
104. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 34; NAGEL, supra note 54; POSNER, supra note 51; PUTNAM, supra
note 36.
105. Alexander, supra note 53, at 329.
106. APPLEBY ET AL, supra note 38, at 259.
107. PUTNAM, supra note 36, at xi.
108. For instance, Richard Posner, acknowledging that "objectivity as correspondence to external
reality" is not tenable, proposes two weaker senses of the word. "Scientific objectivity" exists if
conclusions can be independently replicated. According to Posner, "A finding is objective in [the
scientific] sense if different investigators, not sharing the same ideological or other preconceptions
(except--maybe a big 'except'-that they would have to share the scientific worldview), would be
bound to agree with it." POSNER, supra note 51, at 7. The weakest sense of objectivity is "as merely
reasonable-that is, as not willful, not personal, not (narrowly) political, not utterly indeterminate though
not determinate in the ontological or scientific sense, but as amenable to and accompanied by persuasive
though not necessarily convincing explanation." Posner calls this third sense "conversational." Id.
Stanley Fish has argued that scientific and conversational objectivity are indistinguishable. Stanley Fish,
Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1448-49 (1990) (book
review). Whether or not the two are indistinguishable, Posner acknowledges that the two types of
objectivity are similar in that both describe an objectivity that is "cultural and political rather than
epistemic." POSNER, supra note 51, at 26.
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II. EMPIRICISM AND THE QUALIFICATIONS OF LEGAL FACTFINDERS
A. The Premises of Judicial Factfinding
The Enlightenment belief in the fundamental separability of mind and matter
and the independence of the external world is now widely discredited.
Skepticism about realist assumptions has not, however, had a significant
impact on judicial factfinding.' °9 Conventionalist theorizing has had a deep
impact on scholarly thinking about legal texts;" 0 yet it has barely penetrated
thinking about facts. As a consequence, the underlying metaphysical
assumptions upon which Anglo-American evidence law is built have been
regarded as largely unproblematic for two hundred and fifty years.' The
predominant attitude is that "[f]aw is what needs to be interpreted, but facts
are simply true or false.'..
109. Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, supra note 32, at 61, 69-70; Twining, The Rationalist
Tradition, supra note 32, at 243-47; cf. TWINING, supra note 29, at 125 (commenting on Wigmore's
concern with the practicalities of proof rather than fundamental questions about epistemology).
110. For a collection of views on the problem of interpretation of legal text, see INTERPRETING LAW
AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER, supra note 102.
111. Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, supra note 32, at 61, 69-70; Twining, The Rationalist
Tradition, supra note 32, at 243-47. There has, however, been a recent surge of interest among evidence
scholars in basic epistemological questions and the premises of our factfinding system. See, e.g., Ronald
J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 33 (1988)
(observing that while the jury is presumed to operate on a relativist or communitarian theory of
knowledge, the epistemology of judges is realist); Ann Althouse, Beyond King Solomon's Harlots:
Women in Evidence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1265 (1992) (illustrating the contingent and gendered character
of the assumptions that underlie relevance determinations through analysis of the King Solomon story);
Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REv. 107
(1994) (putting forward an antifoundationalist theory of jury decision-making); Gary Goodpaster, On
the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987)
(discussing various alternative understandings of the criminal trial); Nancy J. King, Postconviction
Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 63 (1993) (arguing for a redefinition of truth that recognizes the impact ofjury discrimination in
jury decision-making); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413 (identifying
gendered assumptions in evidence doctrine); David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct:
Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1986) (arguing that a
character evidence ban fulfills a "cathartic" function by legitimizing outcomes); Charles Nesson, The
Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357
(1985) (arguing that evidence rules serve to promote the acceptability and stability ofjury verdicts); Kim
Lane Scheppele, Facing Facts in Legal Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 42 (1990) [hereinafter
Scheppele, Facing Facts] (arguing that law and fact are used to construct law and fact); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Just The Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth,
37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 123, 125 (1992) [hereinafter Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am) (observing that
"the production of facts as an accomplishment of legal practitioners is only now beginning to be
examined"); Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 995 (1994) (criticizing the positivist orientation of legal scholarship); Adrian A.S. Zuckerman,
Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1986) (deconstructing the law-fact distinction). The kind
of skepticism now being expressed is not, moreover, altogether new. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON
TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949) (containing a classic statement of legal realist
fact skepticism); Charles P. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 150 (1952) (arguing
that "trial courts are more usually concerned with conflicting characterizations of the facts than with the
facts themselves').
112. Scheppele, Facing Facts, supra note 11, at 43. This belief in "[a] combination of cognitive
objectivism and moral relativism" is widespread outside of thinking about law. BERNSTEIN, supra note
34, at 13. The comment of literary theorist Wolfgang Iser exemplifies this view:
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To be sure, the practical difficulty of achieving certain knowledge of legal
facts has been more or less consistently acknowledged." 3 Significantly,
however, the skeptical tradition, such as it is, has focused primarily on the
impediments to arriving at the truth,1 4 without questioning the coherence
of the concept of truth itself. That is, it is recognized that truth is hard to
achieve, but rarely doubted that it is out there if we only had the means to
discover it. As a result, the virtually unquestioned premises that have
informed what William Twining calls the "Rationalist Tradition" of evidence
scholarship include the following: (1) "[e]vents and states of affairs occur and
have an existence independent of human observation"; and (2) "true
statements are statements which correspond with facts, i.e. real events and
states of affairs in the external world."'"5
"My interpretation of the world may well be as much a product of linguistic acts as my
interpretation of a literary text, but I maintain that there are substantial differences between the
things being interpreted. First, the real world is perceivable through the senses, whereas the
literary text is perceivable only through the imagination-unless one believes that reading the
words sunset, music, silk, wine, and scent is the same as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and
smelling the real things. Secondly, all known experience suggests that the real world
(uninterpreted) lives and functions independently of the individual observer, whereas the
literary text does not. Thirdly, our contact with the real world has immediate physical or social
consequences, whereas our contact with the literary text need not, and indeed rarely does have
any such consequences."
FISH, supra note 98, at 81 (quoting Rudolf E. Kuenzli, Interview: Wolfgang Iser, DIACRITICS, June 1980,
at 57, 72). Contrary to Iser's position, however, Fish argues that
mediated access to the world is the only access we ever have; in face to face situations or in
the act of reading a novel, the properties of objects, persons, and situations emerge as
consequences of acts of construction that follow ... from a prestructured understanding of the
shapes any meaningful item could possibly have.
Id. at 80-81.
113. See Twining, The Rationalist Tradition, supra note 32, at 211,244 (noting that the "Rationalist
Tradition" that has characterized Anglo-American evidence law since the 18th century has recognized
that "[p]resent knowledge about past events is typically based upon incomplete evidence; it follows from
this that establishing the truth about alleged past events is typically a matter of probabilities or
likelihoods falling short of complete certainty.").
114. The leading contemporary statement on the matter is found in Henry M. Hart, Jr. & John T.
McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48 (Daniel Lerner ed.,
1958). Wigmore's view of the conditions which differentiate a courtroom from a scientific laboratory
are contained in JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 925-32 (3d ed. 1937).
One frequently mentioned obstacle to achieving certainty in judicial trials is that unlike scientific
investigation, legal proof deals with unique historical events not susceptible to controlled experimenta-
tion. Hart & McNaughton, supra, at 44. It has also been recognized that the discovery of truth is not
the only value being pursued. Most notably, the ends of the enterprise-dispute resolution-require that
disputes be resolved in an immediate and definite way, even if that means that the outcome will
invariably be based on something short of certain knowledge. Id. at 50-5 1; WIGMORE, supra, at 925-26.
Even if judicial factfinders had the leisure to investigate as thoroughly as possible, the importance
attached to other social goods involved in the process, including respect for the dignity of the individual,
and promotion of certain social relationships, would result in according less than absolute priority to the
discovery of truth.
115. Twining, The Rationalist Tradition, supra note 32, at 244. For a discussion of the various
brands of skepticism the Rationalist Tradition has weathered, see TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE,
supra note 32, at 92, and Twining, Scepticisms, supra note 32, at 285. As Professor Twining recognizes
in a note in the reprinted version of his essay, his map of prominent skeptical traditions omits some
significant contributors, including Foucault, Geertz, Putnam, Ricour, and Rorty. TWINING, RETHINKING
EVIDENCE, supra note 32, at 134. For a less optimistic view of the possibility of achieving historical
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While the formal rules that govern judicial factfinding reflect empiricist
assumptions, the premises that inform the rules do not necessarily guide the
practice of lawyers. The working understanding of the aims and limitations
of judicial proof held by those involved in the process is much more subtle
and complex than the premises of the Rationalist Tradition of evidence
doctrine." 6 Many of those involved in judicial factfinding would agree with
Richard Uviller that the scientistic treatment of truth about human events as
a "flat fact" fails to capture its "plural forms and multifaceted aspects.""' 7
Notwithstanding the realist assumptions that underlie the rules of evidence and
procedure, "'pragmatism [not realism] is the implicit working theory of most
good lawyers.""' 8
This orientation of lawyers is reflected in the widespread belief that a case
is won or lost at the jury selection stage."19 Moreover, the importance
truths, see Paul Bergman, Of Bentham, Wigmore, and Little Bo Peep: Where Evidence Lost Its Way, and
a Map for Scholars to Find It, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 951-52 (1991) (reviewing TWINING,
RETHINKING EVIDENCE, supra note 32) (observing that our reliance on epidemiological studies to prove
that environmental hazards cause human diseases may one day seem as misguided as colonial Salem
courts' reliance on evidence of "sick cows" and "lumps of earth in the hearth" to prove witchcraft seems
today).
116. The same contrast can be found between scholarly writing about evidence, which betrays
Rationalist assumptions, and the much more varied, often skeptical, literature about litigation, legal
process, and procedure. See William Twining, Hot Air in the Redwoods, a Sequel to the Wind in the
Willows, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1523, 1531 (1988). For examples that rely on theories used here, see Gerald
P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The
Articulation and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 611
(1987); and Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv.
273 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Trial by Schema].
The contrast between the realist orientation of the rules and the more pragmatist bent of practitioners
is nicely illustrated by two contrasting views on the propriety of using the techniques of behavioral
science in trials. Professor Victor Gold, whose professional interest has been primarily in the realm of
evidence doctrine, criticizes the use of persuasion techniques developed by social scientists on the
general ground that such advocacy "induce[s] juries to employ legally irrelevant or improper
considerations in their decisionmaking." Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of
Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 483 (1987). Professor
Alex Tanford, a law professor whose focus is trial practice, and Professor Sarah Tanford, a psychology
professor, defend the use of social science in the courtroom, and criticize the assumptions underlying
Gold's argument. J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741 (1988). They reject the assumption that a jury
can "'in good faith put aside its biases and logically choose which evidence and arguments to accept
and which to reject,' id. at 743 (quoting Gold, supra, at 501), and instead favor the view that "[i]n a
complex task such as deciding on a verdict in a trial, cognitive biases are a natural consequence of the
decision process. They serve as a means of simplifying and organizing information, and they reflect the
way all persons think." Id. at 749.
117. H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (1975).
118. Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1590 (1990); accord Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry
of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811, 1811 (1990) (quoting Thomas C. Grey, supra, at 1590); see also
Allan C. Hutchinson, The Three "R's: ReadingRorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555, 575 (1989)
(reviewing RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)) ("Legal theorists have
learned well from their practicing colleagues."). Admittedly, these comments probably relate to the way
lawyers' thinking about law rather than about facts.
119. See, e.g., Herald P. Fahringer, "Mirror, Mirror on'the Wall... ": Body Language, Intuition,
and the Art of Jury Selection, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 197 (1993) (stating that "experts in the field
believe that eighty-five percent of the cases litigated are won or lost when the jury is selected.").
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attached to the composition of the jury is grounded in a popular understanding
of decision-making that emphasizes the importance of the views and outlooks
of jurors to their evaluation and acceptance of the trial evidence. Whether in
the form of courthouse folk wisdom or the somewhat more refined version
offered by litigation experts,'20 winning at trial is regarded more as a matter
of persuasion than proof. During voir dire attorneys attempt to identify and
seat jurors who hold beliefs that allow them to accept the lawyer's version of
events as plausible. In addition, lawyers endeavor during voir dire or in
opening statements to provide jurors with a framework that is compatible with
the trial evidence. 2 ' Implicit in both strategies is a recognition that preexis-
ting, nonevidentiary beliefs or interpretive frameworks are ingredient in,
rather than polluting of, the ultimate decision.'22
A contextualist view of the process of belief formation is also apparent in
prevalent views among practicing lawyers on how best to organize and present
their case. Lawyers resist seeing a case as a series of discrete propositions
validated through their connection to real world events. It is an elementary
principle of trial advocacy that a successful case must be more than the sum
of the individual elements comprising the claim. Documenting the legal
requirements with credible evidence is not sufficient. The evidence as a whole
must satisfy criteria of acceptability different from simple point-by-point
evidentiary verification. The lawyer's presentation must form a coherent
"theory of the case" according to nonevidentiary standards of what constitutes
an adequate or plausible explanation of the litigated event. As a leading
manual on trial technique advises, "[y]ou must integrate the undisputed facts
with your version of the disputed facts to create a cohesive, logical position
at trial."' 23 That same manual recognizes that the adequacy of the structure,
Contrary to Mr. Fahringer's claims, there is no such consensus that jury composition is the crucial
variable in the trial's outcome. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social
Scientists Know and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (1990) (reviewing research and concluding that
the quality of evidence is more important in determining the outcome than the composition of the jury);
Michael J. Saks, "Scientific" Jury Selection; Social Scientists Can't Rig Juries, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan.
1976, at 48 (reviewing research and concluding that the quality of evidence is more important to the
outcome of the case than the composition of the jury).
120. See generally Morton Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1982, § 6
(Magazine), at 70 (discussing social science trial consultants).
121. See, e.g., Cathy E. Bennett & Robert B. Hirschhorn, Voir Dire in Criminal Cases: Choosing
Jurors to Judge Your Client, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 68 (reviewing aims and techniques of voir dire);
Susan E. Jones, Voir Dire and Jury Selection: Strategies for Success, TRIAL, Sept. 1986, at 60, 66
(boasting that "[i]f you handle voir dire well, by the tirme you reach opening statement, you will be
preaching to the converted"); Gerry Spence, A Voir Dire Masterpiece, TRIAL DIPL. J., Fall 1980, at 8
(including a transcript of a mock voir dire conducted by the author).
122. As support for this and the following paragraph, it should be sufficient to observe that the
founder of the successful southern California-based trial consulting firm Litigation Sciences came to the
job from the chairmanship of the marketing department at the University of Southern California. See
Lori B. Andrews, Mind Control in the Courtroom, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1982, at 66, 73. For
pragmatists there is no disgrace in the fact that the methods for selling soap are so easily adapted to
selling jury verdicts. Cf. GOODMAN, supra note 70, at 129 (observing in reference to disputes over the
validity of one or another scheme of explanatory categories that "what is called for in such cases is less
like arguing than selling").
123. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 9 (1980).
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not just the documentation of its parts, determines the persuasiveness of the
presentation. Proof is not a matter of instantiating individual elements, but of
presenting "the more plausible explanation of 'what really happened.""
'12 4
But the skeptical attitude of lawyers has not had a significant influence on
the generation of formal factfinding procedures. In the realm of doctrine, the
influence of unstated philosophical commitments from the Enlightenment is
recognizable.'2 5 However suspect they are in the day-to-day workings of the
124. Id. This working understanding contrasts with the formal structuring of the jury decision-making
task by the rules of proof. Those rules define the decision-maker's task as a series of judgments about
whether a set of discrete propositions of fact have been established to some degree of probability. For
instance, in a criminal case, the prosecution will be deemed to have satisfied its burden of proof if it
has established beyond a reasonable doubt a set of criterial features defining criminal liability. These
features, defined by the substantive law, include identity, culpability, conduct, circumstances, and result.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (1962) (defining the elements of an offense to include conduct,
attendant circumstance, or result); id. § 2.02(1) (requiring proof that the actor acted purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to all material elements of the offense).
In the decision-making model implicit in the rules of proof, the juror is essentially a "judgmental
accountant" whose task is to weight and sum up the evidence to arrive at a bottom line evaluation. See
Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models of Juror Decision Making Processes, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 84 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); see also Martin F. Kaplan,
Cognitive Processes in the Individual Juror, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 197, 199
(Norbert L. Keff & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). What is significant about this depiction is that it
implements an essentially "bottom up" epistemology. Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof
13 CARDoZO L. REV. 373, 383, 384 n.35 (1991). According to this view the case is proven by verifying
the legal requirements, which is achieved by instantiating them with credible evidence point by point.
This is distinguished from a "top down" approach in which the acceptability of the case depends on
whether it coheres according to some standards of plausible acceptability.
125. See Mark Cammack, Evidence Rules and the Ritual Functions of Trials: "Saying Something of
Something", 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 783 (1992) (discussing how evidence rules both construct and utilize
realist distinction between law and fact); cf Seigel, supra note 111 (noting the realist orientation of
evidence scholarship).
It has, of course, long been recognized that determinations of relevancy questions require importation
of extralegal intelligence. At the end of the last century James Bradley Thayer observed that "[t]he law
furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logical and general experience." JAMES B.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 265 (Augustus M. Kelley Books
1969) (1898). This recognition, however, is not ordinarily thought to be subversive of realist premises.
The law's use of extra-legal principles of logical and general experience remains "tacit" precisely
because those principles are thought to be so widely accepted and self-evidently true as to be beyond
dispute. For example, Wigmore believed the doctrine of "jury notice"-which recognizes the jury's use
of nonevidentiary facts-to be "strictly limited to a few matters of elemental experience in human
nature, commercial affairs, and everyday life" and to extend only to "matters notorious and
unquestioned." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 2570, at 726-28 (emphasis in original).
Likewise, Wigmore was sufficiently complacent about the validity of the premises on which relevancy
decisions are made to deny that there was anything to be gained from exposing them. IA WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, supra note 29, § 27; see also TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 29, at 146
("Although [Wigmore was] not a crude positivist, he tended to underplay the extent to which
'evaluating' the evidence is in practice not a matter of estimating likelihoods, but also involves value
judgments on the part of adjudicators."). The same confidence in a high level of societal consensus on
the tenets of common sense is present today. See TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS
OF EVIDENCE: How TO Do THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF
369-72 (1991) (noting and criticizing this assumption); see also L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE
AND THE PROVABLE 275 (1977) ("The main commonplace generalizations [used by jurors] are for the
most part too essential a part of our culture for there to be any serious disagreement about them. They
are learned from shared experiences or taught by proverb, myth, legend, history, literature, drama,
parental advice, and the mass media.").
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factfinding process, assumptions rooted, in the Enlightenment nonetheless
guide the authoritative definition of the project. 6
B. The Qualifications for Jurors
A realist outlook has also dominated constitutional doctrine regarding juror
qualification. Today's guiding image of the ideal juror has its source in
Enlightenment beliefs about the independence of the objective world and an
assumed opposition between the objective world and the subjective mind. True
beliefs are those that are connected with and caused by the object toward
which they are directed. Bias or other subjective qualities of the factfinder are
thought to function instead of or in the face of the facts.'27
To be sure, this realist tradition has not been unchallenged; an enduring
counterdoctrine vindicates the trial lawyer's intuition that subjective
characteristics of the decision-maker play an inevitable role in the decision-
making task. Moreover, the complex character of the jury's role has prevented
the translation of the clean implications of realist assumptions into precisely
defined and agreed upon qualifications for jurors.'28 To take the most
obvious point, it is accepted that jurors do more than simply determine the
facts.' 29 Even the most narrowly defined conception of the role of jurors
126. See Twining, Evidence and Legal Theory, supra note 32, at 70 ("The Rationalist Tradition is
simplistic; much of specialized evidence discourse postulates one law of evidence, one type of process,
one kind of enquiry, and a single purpose or end to litigation.") (emphasis in original).
127. See James J. Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269,279-
80 (1988) (acknowledging that while "a person's political, moral, social, and economic views... are
viewed as indispensable qualities of the ideal juror" and should be given full play in making "value
rather than factual judgments," "[j]urors should not be permitted to base votes on their biases rather than
on the evidence").
128. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images
and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 529 (1986) (noting that the Court has not defined impartiality
directly but has subsumed the question under the more general inquiry into the attributes of a
constitutionally acceptable jury).
129. Over the past two centuries, the acknowledged function of the jury has been progressively
narrowed. Recognizing a broad role for jurors was central to anti-federalist acceptance of the
Constitution. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE U. 1131, 1190 (1991).
The anti-federalists who pressed for a constitutional guarantee of the right to trial by jury regarded the
jury as an indispensable protection against the twin deficiencies of centralization of power: remoteness
from local conditions and corruption of specialized officials. Though ordinary citizens could not hope
to make the law as national legislators, they could modify and adapt it to suit local needs and customs
through their role as jurors. Id. at 1140, 1187. Consistent with this view, jurors in the 18th century were
generally accorded a much more expansive role to decide both law and fact than is true today. Mark
D. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Note, The Changing Role
of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE U. 170 (1964). Likewise, juries could protect against
overreaching or corruption in the exercise of power. Juries not composed of permanent government
officials were deemed better able than judges to monitor prosecutorial discretion, and could punish
governmental overreaching directly through a civil damage suit against government officials who
violated the Fourth Amendment. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 31 (1975) (describing the
1760's case of Erving v. Cradock in which a smuggler who had settled with the customs official in
admiralty court successfully sued the same official in the common law court for trespass, on the ground
that the official's seizure of the contraband under the Navigation Acts violated the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); JOHN P. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE
CONDrIONS OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30-32 (1977) (describing the Erving case). It is ironic that the progressive
restricting of the jury's role occurred simultaneously with a general expansion of the juror franchise.
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recognizes that they supply the tribunal with quasi-legal standards, such as
reasonableness, that the law incorporates as standards for judgment.3 0
Indeed, a principal justification for the use of a panel of lay decision-makers,
rather than a single professional, is that jurors represent the values of the
community and express community values in their decisions. 13  Moreover,
the use of juries as legal decision-makers is defended on grounds other than
their capabilities as factfinders. Though perhaps not as compelling a
justification as it once was, the distrust for professional decision-makers is
still cited as a reason for employing juries 32 and reflects deeply ingrained
cultural disinclination for a hierarchial organization of authority.'33 Even so,
and despite the fact that no one really believes that the type of juror that
realist assumptions require actually exists, 34 the ideal of an independent,
detached, and impartial decision-maker is the reference point against which
the rules for selecting jurors are judged, rationalized, and extended.
1. Definitions of Constitutional Impartiality
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right to an "impartial jury"
in criminal cases. Indeed, impartiality is the only defining feature of the jury
that is mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. 3 1 Whatever additional
130. This infusion of juror values into the decision is reconciled with a realist view of facts as
objective by categorizing standards such as reasonableness as a hybrid mixture of objective fact and
subjective value.
131. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1968) (recognizing as among the purposes of
the jury the granting of the accused "the common-sense judgment of the jury" and citing approvingly
the conclusion from a major empirical study of juries that "when juries differ with the result at which
the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very purposes for which
they were created and for which they are now employed"). Though not officially sanctioned, there is
a tacit recognition that it is part of the jury's role to nullify unjust laws or to refuse to apply just laws
to reach unjust results. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (praising the
jury's equity-dispensing function while at the same time upholding the refusal to inform jurors that they
have equitable powers). The scholarly literature on jury nullification is enormous. Among the leading
defenses of the jury's nullification right are William M. Kuntsler, Jury Nullification in Conscience
Cases, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969), and Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). For a critical view, see Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the
American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TaX. L. REV. 488 (1976).
132. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (identifying the prevention of government
oppression as one purpose of the jury); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (stressing the need to protect against
"the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"). For an
argument that the need to protect the public against judges has lessened over time, see Gobert, supra
note 127, at 281-82.
133. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTrHORTY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
134. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 551 (1975) ("All people have biases and opinions that will inevitably influence their decisions and
perceptions, including those on jury duty."); Massaro, supra note 128, at 543 ("Everyone has
preconceived notions or opinions that incline him or her to decide one way or another."); Hans Zeisel
& Shari Siedman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment
in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 530-31 (1978) ("'[P]rejudice' is not only
ineradicable but often indistinguishable from the very values and attitudes of the community that we
expect the jurors to bring to the trial.").
135. The Seventh Amendment, which extends the constitutional jury right to civil cases, does not
explicitly require impartiality, though the courts have held that the Due Process Clause requires an
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characteristics are to be attributed to the institution must be derived from the
meaning of the word "jury'13 6 or inferred from some conception of the
jury's proper role.'37
Despite the attention given to the right to a jury at the time the Constitution
was drafted,'38 there is little direct evidence of the original understanding
of the requirement that the jury must be impartial. 3 9 Nevertheless, in giving
content to the -constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury, the Supreme Court
has not shrunk from definitive sounding formulae, though these pronounce-
ments have not been entirely consistent. The most commonly stated defini-
tions of what constitutes an impartial jury are individual and psychological,
rather than social. An especially clear articulation of this standard, which is
traceable to the earliest Supreme Court pronouncements on the subject, is
contained in a twentieth-century case involving a constitutional challenge to
a federal statute that permitted federal employees to serve as jurors. 40 In
that case, the Court rejected the argument that the Constitution mandates
specific qualifications for jury service or any particular mode of selecting
jurors.' 4 ' Rather, according to the Court, impartiality is "a state of
mind." 42
The mental attitude to which the law aspires is one of "appropriate
indifference."' 143 This definition of impartiality as indifference has been
repeatedly invoked in a wide range of contexts. In language from Lord Coke
quoted frequently by the Court, a juror must be "indifferent as he stands
impartial tribunal. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
271 (1970); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (finding that the right to an impartial
judge is inherent in the Due Process Clause).
136. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 493-95 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
that race-based peremptory challenges violate Sixth Amendment "impartial jury" protection not because
they result in juries that are partial, but because they produce a body that falls short of a constitutional
"jury').
137. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that a six-person jury in a criminal
case does not violate the Sixth Amendment because it does not compromise the essential function of
the jury, which is to prevent government oppression).
138. The absence of explicit protection of the right to trial by jury in civil cases was a principal focus
of anti-federalist opposition to the draft Constitution without the Bill of Rights Amendments. THE
FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Complex Case:
Observations About the Current Debate, Address Before the 1986 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference
on Advocacy (June, 1986), in THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY, 1987, at 70.
139. JON VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 46 (1977) ("Little attention was given to the specific meaning of the words
'impartial jury' during the ratification debates, so we cannot say for certain what they meant.").
140. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
141. Id. at 146.
142. Id. at 145; see also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1887) (defining bias as "'the existence
of a state of mind, on the part of a juror, which leads to a just inference in reference to the case that
he will not act with entire impartiality"') (quoting § 241 of the act governing criminal proceedings in
the Utah Territory).
143. Wood, 299 U.S. at 145-46.
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unsworne."' 44 The Court has also stated that "a juror who has formed an
opinion cannot be impartial."'
41
In other formulations of the standard, the Court has explicitly linked its
conception of juror qualifications to the effective performance of the jury's
function. Rather than focusing on an idealized conception of the proper
psychological disposition of the juror at the time of selection, these cases
emphasize the qualifications which are necessary in order to accomplish the
legal system's aims. As Justice Holmes said, "The theory of our system is that
the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private
talk or public print."1 46 The accomplishment of this objective is thought to
require something short of absolute indifference in the decision-maker. A
juror is impartial so long as she is willing and able to abide by her oath to
"conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."'' 47 This specification of
juror qualifications-demanding that decisions be based on the law and the
facts-brings the requirements of the Sixth Amendment into line with the
demands of due process. Both require "a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it."'' 4s
The class of cases that adheres most closely to these verbal definitions of
impartiality are those involving challenges based on claims that jurors were
biased toward one of the parties because of their relation to the parties or the
issues and on claims that exposure to extrajudicial information about the case
caused jurors to prejudge its merits. In these cases, the Court has found the
psychological definition of juror qualifications adequate and has based its
decisions about whether a particular extrajudicial influence rendered a juror
unqualified on an assessment of the strength of that influence and whether it
prevented the juror from reaching a decision based on the law and the facts.
The early case of United States v. Burr 49 established the approach for
treatment of claims of juror bias based on prejudicial pretrial publicity that
remains in effect today. Chief Justice Marshall presided over Aaron Burr's
trial for treason. At the trial, Burr's counsel sought to disqualify jurors who,
though professing no opinion on Burr's guilt or innocence, admitted
knowledge of the facts of the case.
144. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 225 n.1 (1982); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
551 (1976); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 (1976); Ross v. Massachusetts, 414 U.S. 1080, 1081
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 531 (1973); Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131, 154 (1887); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 154 (1878).
145. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at
155.
146. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
485 (1978) ("[O]ne accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on
the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on... other circumstances not adduced as proof
at trial.").
147. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
148. Smith, 455 U.S. at 217.
149. 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
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Marshall's ruling on the defense motion challenging the jurors is more
revealing of his views about the process of belief formation than most
opinions dealing with juror bias. He defined an impartial jury as one
"composed of men who will fairly hear the testimony which may be offered
to them, and bring in their verdict according to that testimony, and according
to the law arising on it." S In describing the state of mind required for a
juror to be impartial, Marshall said, "The jury should enter upon the trial with
minds open to those impressions which the testimony and the law of the case
ought to make, not with those preconceived opinions which will resist those
impressions.'' According to Marshall, the distinction between disabling
opinions and preconceptions that do not prevent a juror from serving is based
on the degree to which prior opinions will shut out the impact of the
testimony:
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony
that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration
of that testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror; but ...
those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the
testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat
that testimony, and resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to
him. 52
By using the words "impress," "force," "resist," "yield," and "combat,"
Marshall portrayed a mechanical metaphor for the process of belief formation.
Beliefs are depicted as "impressions" on the mind. The literal meaning of
"impress" is to press, to apply force. An "impression" is "[t]he effect, mark,
or imprint made on a surface by pressure,"'53 like a footprint in the sand or,
an example probably more familiar to Marshall, the imprint of a seal in wax.
Preconceived opinions that disqualify potential jurors from service are
impressions that exist before the trial begins. If those preexisting impressions
are "strong and deep," they will resist the force of the trial testimony, which
will be incapable of re-forming the mind by producing its own impressions.
"Light impressions," though, can be expected to yield to the testimony. Such
impressions will give way to the superior force of the testimony. The shape
of the juror's conviction will then have been determined entirely by the
contours of the law and the testimony, which is the whole aim of the
factfinding process.'54
150. Id. at 50.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 51.
153. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 661 (William Morris ed.,
1975).
154. The similarity of this depiction to the process of pressing a signet having a raised or incised
emblem into hot wax to produce a seal is inescapable. Marshall, moreover, was no doubt familiar with
Aristotle's theory of memory, which explicitly relied on a metaphor of the mind as a wax tablet.
Memory, according to Aristotle, belongs to the faculty of "sense perception" rather than the faculty of
"intelligence." ARISTOTLE, The Parva Naturalia, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO
ENGLISH 436a, 450a (John I. Beare & George RT. Ross trans., 1931) (1908). It consists of"a picture"
created when "perception stamps.., a sort of impression of the precept [on the mind], just as persons
do who make an impression with a seal." Id. at 450a-450b. And, like Marshall, Aristotle understood the
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More recent decisions rely on different imagery but embody a comparable
view of the passive role of the mind in the process of belief formation. The
contemporary standard for determining when a juror's exposure to pretrial
publicity renders her ineligible to serve on a jury was stated in Irvin v.
Dowd.'5 Though not as precisely delineated as Marshall's portrayal, the
contemporary image of belief formation as reflected in Irvin is also based on
a mechanical metaphor of displacement. A juror will be deemed impartial
notwithstanding her prior knowledge about the case "if the juror can lay aside
[her] impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court."' 56 Accordingly, the line between previously held views
that are disabling and those that are not depends on how securely those views
are fastened in the mind. A juror will not be allowed to serve if she has "such
fixed opinions that [she] could not judge impartially.""' If, however,
because of the passage of time, the juror "had let the details of the case slip
from [her] mind[],'"" or if she is capable and affirmatively willing to "put
aside earlier prejudice," she will not be disqualified."
What is significant about this formulation of juror qualification is that it
conceives of true beliefs as caused by the effect of evidence on a receptive
mind. 60 By contrast, bias and other subjective tendencies are regarded as
impediments to the generation of knowledge from the evidence. Since the
theory of our law requires that the juror's conviction "be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print,'' such influences must be
eliminated.
From an interpretivist perspective, this theory of cognition premised on a
clean separation between subjective and objective inputs to knowledge is
unfortunate for several reasons. On the one hand, the view that bias and
evidence operate independently in producing belief has resulted in a wholly
unrealistic approach to the problem the Court was addressing-eliminating
impediments to arriving at a true mental picture as deriving from defects in the "receiving surface":
[I]n those who are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no mnemonic impression
is formed; just as no impression would be formed if the movement of the seal were to impinge
on running water, while there are others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed,
as happens to [stucco on] old [chamber] walls, or owing to the hardness of the receiving
surface, the requisite impression is not implanted at all.
Id. at 450b.
155. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
156. Id. at 723.
157. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984).
158. Id. at 1033.
159. Id. at 1034.
160. These decisions are consistent with the contemporary psychological view of the mind imagined
as "a central processing device" that is "context and content independent" and "stands over and above,
or transcends, all the stuff upon which it operates." RICHARD A. SHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH
CULTURES: EXPEDrIONS IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 80 (1991). Shweder rejects this conception of the
mind in favor of the view that "the life of the psyche is the life of intentional persons, responding to,
and directing their action at, their own mental objects or representations and undergoing transformation
through participation in an evolving intentional world that is the product of the mental representations
that make it up." Id. at 97.
161. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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those inputs to the decision that we deem improper. For instance, in its most
recent pretrial publicity decision, the Court left to the juror the determination
of whether she was capable of setting aside what she knew.'62 If, as
contextualism teaches, cleaving the juror and the evidence is not possible, the
Court's solution will not work.'63 For instance, though a juror might
honestly and sincerely accept the judge's admonition to disregard her
knowledge of the defendant's inadmissible pretrial confession and base her
decision strictly on the evidence introduced in court, her awareness of the
confession will inevitably play a role, for what the evidence is will in part be
a function of what the juror knows.' 6'
Moreover, the realist premise that it is possible to eliminate all subjective
inputs from the decision distorts the priorities in jury selection. For instance,
it is universally agreed that a juror's exposure to pretrial publicity is not a
proper basis for her decision and that, other things being equal, a juror who
has not read or heard about the case is to be preferred over one who has.
There are, however, some cases in which, because of the amount of pretrial
publicity, there will be few, if any, potential jurors totally unaware of the
facts and the issues. 65 The realist ideal of a juror as a blank slate tends to
equate ignorance with impartiality and results in a misguided search for jurors
who are ignorant of the facts and the issues on the false assumption that those
jurors will be able to decide based entirely on the evidence introduced at
trial. 66 Accepting the notion that it is neither possible nor desirable to
eliminate subjective juror attributes from her decision leads to a recognition
that "extensive voir dire and challenges-permitting attorneys to de-select
their way to a panel less representative of the community-may prove a far
greater threat to the fundamental fairness of the verdict than exposure to any
media coverage."'
1 67
More generally, the Court's realist psychology delegitimizes the role of any
so-called "general" or "interpretive bias"16--the background beliefs
162. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 430 (1991).
163. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14
LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 409 (1990) (concluding, based on mock jury studies, that neither judicial
admonitions nor jury deliberations are effective in eliminating the effect of exposure to pretrial publicity,
but that a continuance has some minimal effect).
164. See Stanley Sue et al., Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CRIM.
JusT. 163, 170 (1974) (concluding, from a mock jury study, that adverse pretrial publicity is not simply
another piece of information added to the prosecution's case, but interacts with and affects the jury's
evaluation of the evidence to produce a verdict).
165. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Impartial Jurors Can Be Found, Court Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, July
9, 1994, at Al (discussing the problems of finding impartial jurors to serve on the OJ. Simpson case).
166. See Bruce Fein, Uninformed Jurors Put Justice at Risk, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1989, at 8A.
167. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 660 (1991).
168. A number of authorities have distinguished "specific" bias, which is case-specific information
or relations to the issues or the parties, from "general" bias, which is the broader interpretive framework
of the juror. The distinction was apparently first drawn by a student author, Note, Limiting the
Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977), and was
later used by the California Supreme Court as the basis for its rule limiting group-based peremptory
challenges. People v. Wheeler, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902 (Cal. 1978). For a discussion of the difference
between general and specific bias similar to the one presented here, see Brown, supra note 111.
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deriving from the juror's context and experience through which the juror will
interpret the evidence. For if the decision is to be induced by the evidence
alone, then extrajudicial social factors have no more role in the decisional
process than case-specific information or a stake in the outcome. Indeed, this
precise line of reasoning underlies much of the Court's jury selection doctrine.
The individual and psychological conception of juror qualifications is not
monolithic. A persistent subtradition has recognized the inevitable role of the
social in the decision-making process. Cases that address the constitutionality
of smaller and non-unanimous juries, establish the doctrine that juries must
be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, and limit the
state's power to exclude jurors opposed to the death penalty from capital
sentencing juries, reflect the tension between the ideal of the juror as a neutral
template for the evidence and the jury as an assembly of diverse perspectives
actively processing the evidence. Recent limitations on the exercise of the
peremptory challenge initially seemed to portend the ascendance of a social
and pluralist view of jury qualification, but the early promise of those cases
has not been realized. Though the tension persists between the view that there
are qualitative differences among jurors and the view that jurors are fungible,
the recent trend clearly favors the traditional individual and psychological
conception of impartiality over one that emphasizes the social and public
character of decision-making.
2. Jury Size and Decision Rule
On one hand, the use of juries as legal factfinders seems to implement an
epistemology that recognizes the inescapable role of perspective in the
factfinding task. 169 Bringing together a group of lay decision-makers to
deliberate over the meaning of the litigated event seems at odds with the naive
169. Brown, supra note 111, at 107. Although the very idea of a jury suggests the relevance of
perspective and experience, the process by which the jury is selected appears to cut the other way. No
one in the legal system actually "picks" trial jurors, despite the common practice of referring to the
process of impaneling jurors as '"jury selection." The petit jury is arrived at by default; it consists of
those who have not been excluded. Consistent with this negative selection mechanism, the qualifications
for jurors are all individual and negative. Massaro, supra note 128, at 529-30. Furthermore, while the
concept of an assemblage of factfinders suggests the importance of diverse perspectives to the
factfinding task, the actual makeup of the jury has historically been anything but diverse. See generally
HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE (1993); VAN DYKE, supra note 139.
A variety of causes has contributed to the relative homogeneity of the jury compared to the larger
society. Outright exclusion of some groups persisted into the latter half of this century. See VALERIE
P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 52 (1986) (noting that as late as 1966, three states still
prohibited women from jury service, and several others greatly reduced the proportion of women on
juries through systems of affirmative registration or granting exemptions). The techniques used to
generate the source lists of potential jurors still fail to bring in all segments of the society in many
jurisdictions. See David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists,
65 CAL. L. REv. 776 (1977); G. Thomas Munsterman & Janice T. Munsterman, The Search for Jury
Representativeness, I JUST. Sys. J. 59 (1986). Finally, the general method of negative selection which
permits parties to eliminate those jurors perceived as likely to favor the other side renders the trial jury
more homogeneous than the jury pool and the society at large. For a discussion of this phenomenon,
see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 70-71 (1993) (and sources cited therein).
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realist belief in a single transcendent perspective from which all events appear
equally to any observer 70 and suggests the salience of the values, beliefs,
and experiences of the decision-maker to the decision-making task. For if
individual perspective were not important-if any honest and fair-minded
person willing to examine the evidence and apply the law to the facts of the
case would arrive at the same decision-there would seem to be little warrant
for using twelve jurors instead of one.
In a series of cases decided in the 1970's, the Supreme Court was forced
to address the rationale for the use of panels of lay decision-makers in
deciding constitutional challenges to the use of juries of fewer than twelve
members and to non-unanimous verdicts.' 7 ' The Court's inquiry into the
relation between group size and decision rule and jury performance brought
it to a recognition of how important diversity of perspective is to the decision-
making task. The Court acknowledged the value of the pluralist jury
grudgingly and did so only after approving changes which significantly
handicap the chances of assembling a diverse panel. 'Before fully embracing
the importance of diversity on the jury, the Court upheld the use of unani-
mous six-person juries in criminal 72 and civil 73 cases and authorized non-
unanimous verdicts in criminal cases based on a majority of as few as nine
jurors on a jury of twelve persons. 74 At least in criminal cases, however,
the Court has refused to sanction a reduction of the number of jurors who
must agree to the verdict to fewer than six.
75
In ruling on the constitutionality of smaller juries and non-unanimous
verdicts, the Court attached little importance to the fact that juries have
historically consisted of twelve persons 76 who must unanimously approve
170. See Hans Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 710,715 (1971) ("The jury system is predicated on the insight that people see and evaluate
things differently."). More generally, the adversary system can be viewed as one premised on the value
of presenting views of reality "through eyes other than [our] own" by means of the partisan presentation
of the parties. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 43 (Harold J.
Berman ed., 1971). For commentary on the different epistemological orientations of Anglo-American
adversarial procedure and the non-adversarial procedure of continental civil law, see DAMASKA, supra
note 133, at 75, 123, 160. These differences are brought out more fully in JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977), and SYBILLE BEDFORD, THE FACEs OF
JUsTIcE: A TRAVELLER'S REPORT (1961).
171. This flurry of activity on jury size and decision rule was caused by the Court's 1968 decision
in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury to criminal defendants in state courts.
The Duncan decision opened the door to a series of cases questioning the constitutionality of various
state schemes authorizing juries of fewer than twelve persons and non-unanimous verdicts.
172. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
173. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973).
174. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404,411 (1972) (upholding 10-2 majority verdicts as not violating
the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)
(upholding the constitutionality of a 9-3 majority verdict against a due process attack).
175. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (invalidating the use of majority decisions in six-
person juries); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 228 (1978) (invalidating the use of a five-person
criminal jury under the Sixth Amendment).
176. For a discussion of the origins of the tradition fixing the size of the jury at twelve, see Williams,
399 U.S. at 87-90.
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of the verdict.' 77 The Court concluded that the traditional rule of twelve
jurors was a result of "historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes
which gave rise to the jury in the first place," 78 and was similarly dismissive-
of past practice as a sufficient warrant for preserving the unanimity require-
ment. 79 Upon finding no decisive evidence of an intent on the part of the
Framers to constitutionalize the size and decision rule used at common
law,8 0 the Court concluded that the constitutionality of these innovations
must depend on whether they compromise the proper functioning of the
jury. 181
In Williams v. Florida, in which the Court held that a six-person jury in a
criminal case does not violate the Sixth Amendment, the Court reiterated that
the purpose of trial by jury is to prevent government oppression.'82 The
Court properly recognized that, in order to accomplish this objective, the jury
must be large enough to promote group deliberation free from outside
intimidation, and that assuring the independence of the jury depended in part
on "provid[ing] a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section
of the community."' 3 The Court found, however, that the concern that
reducing the number of jurors from twelve to six would significantly diminish
the cross-section is "unrealistic" as long as arbitrary exclusions of whole
classes of jurors is forbidden.'84 The Court also dismissed any relation
between jury size and factfinding reliability as self-evidently nonexistent. 85
177. For a discussion of the origins of the unanimity requirement, see Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2.
178. Williams, 399 U.S. at 89-90.
179. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. While the historical characteristics of the jury should not be
considered to be an exhaustive list of those that the modem jury should possess, the Court's treatment
of history is too dismissive. In discounting the importance of historical size, the Court emphasized the
absence of evidence of the reasons for settling on twelve as the proper number ofjurors. Williams, 399
U.S. at 87-90. Admittedly, identifying the historical reason for a rule may provide a good basis for either
accepting or rejecting it. For instance, the historical reasons for excluding women from juries are plainly
no longer accepted. Furthermore, as Justice Holmes forcefully stated, history is not itself a sufficient
basis for preserving a legal rule. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897). But as Professor Zeisel points out, there may be more wisdom in the practice of using twelve
jurors than the Court recognized:
It might be more than an accident that after centuries of trial and error the size of the jury at
common law came to be fixed at twelve. A primary function of the jury was to represent the
community as broadly as possible.... Twelve might have been, and might still be, the upper
limit beyond which the difficulty of self-management becomes instiperable under the burdensome
condition of a trial. On this view, twelve would be the number that optimizes the jury's two
conflicting goals-to represent the community and to remain manageable.
Zeisel, supra note 170, at 712.
180. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-10; Williams, 399 U.S. at 90-100.
181. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410; Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100.
182. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 ("Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.") (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 102 (citing Carter v. Jury Commissioner, 396 U.S. 320, 329-30 (1970)). The Court
attributed the absence of any difference in the representativeness of a six- versus a twelve-person jury
to the use of the peremptory challenge. Id.
185. Id. at 100-01. The Court also rejected the argument that twelve-person juries work to the
advantage of criminal defendants because of the greater possibility of a hung jury, stating that this
advantage might just as easily accrue to the State. Id. at 101. The opinion cited six "experiments"
purportedly showing that there is "no discernible difference between the results reached by [juries of
six and twelve]." Id.
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Three years after the Williams decision, in Colgrove v. Battin, the Court
gave similarly short shrift to the claim that the use of a six-person jury in a
civil case violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.'86 In the
interim the Court had upheld the use of non-unanimous jury verdicts in
criminal cases over challenges based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. In Apodaca v. Oregon,8 7 a four-Justice plurality 8 ' rejected a Sixth
Amendment challenge to the use of 10-2 majority verdicts in criminal cases
with the conclusory assertion that the unanimity requirement does not
"materially contribute" to the exercise of the common sense judgment of a
group of lay persons, and therefore does not compromise the jury's function
of preventing government oppression."8 9 The plurality interpreted the fair
cross-section requirement, then grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, as
prohibiting the systematic exclusion of identifiable groups from either the jury
panel or the jury, but not conferring a right to have every distinct voice in the
community represented on the jury.'90 If, as the Court held, the Constitution
does not confer on any segment of society the right to representation on the
jury, then it follows a fortiori that the Constitution confers no right not to be
outvoted. In any case, the Court said, there is no reason to believe that
because a minority viewpoint could be voted down it would also be ignored
during deliberations.'91
186. 413 U.S. 149 (1973). The Court quoted its statement in Williams, rejecting the notion that '"the
reliability of the jury as a factfinder... [is) a function ofjury size."' Id. at 157 (quoting Williams, 399
U.S. at 100-01), and concluding that, while much bad been written on the effect of reducing the size
of juries since the Court's decision in Williams, none of the intervening research persuaded the Court
to alter its earlier view that there is "'no discernible difference between the results reached by the two
different-sized juries."' Id. at 158-59 (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 101). For a discussion of the studies
purportedly relied on by the Court, see Hans Zeisel & Shari Siedman Diamond, "Convincing Empirical
Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1974).
187. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
188. Only three other Justices joined Justice White's opinion. Justice Powell concurred in Apodaca
on the ground that while the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity in federal criminal trials, the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the unanimity requirement against the states. See Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-77 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
189. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410-11. The Court's easy approval of the constitutionality of majority
verdicts masks its significance. As Professor Zeisel has shown, abandonment of the unanimity
requirement is but another means of reducing size, but it is "reduction with a vengeance, for a majority
verdict requirement is far more effective in nullifying the potency of minority viewpoints than is the
outright reduction of a jury to a size equivalent to the majority that is allowed to agree on a verdict."
Zeisel, supra note 170, at 722; see also Johnson, 406 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In my
opinion, the right of all groups in this Nation to participate in the criminal process means the right to
have their voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that right. Majority verdicts could destroy it.");
id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Under today's judgment, nine jurors can simply ignore the views
of their fellow panel members."). A 10% minority perspective has some chance of influencing the
outcome in 65% of ten-member unanimous juries, but that same 10% perspective will be able to
influence the outcome in only 11% of twelve-person juries permitting 10-2 decisions. Zeisel, supra note
170, at 722-23. This is true because whenever there are fewer than three minority-perspective jurors on
a nonunanimous panel, the majority can simply disregard them. Id.
190. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412-13.
191. Id. at 413. In Johnson v. Louisiana, decided at the same time as Apodaca, the Court rejected
an argument that a 9-3 majority verdict rule fails to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). The Court dismissed as implausible the notion that three votes for acquittal
precludes the nine convicting jurors from being persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding
instead that "[a] majority will cease discussion and outvote a minority only after reasoned discussion
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Both the rhetoric and the results of the Court's decisions from Williams
through Johnson displays a lack of commitment to the value of diversity as
a feature of the jury. When faced with deciding the constitutionality of a five-
person criminal jury in 1978, however, the Court adopted a strikingly different
tone.' 92 Prompted by a wealth of scholarly criticism of its earlier opinions
that demonstrated both the effect of a size reduction on the representativeness
of the jury and the role of diversity of viewpoint in the decision-making
process,' 93 the Court in Ballew v. Georgia embraced a vision of jury
functioning in which objectivity results from the interaction of diverse
elements in the group. In a complete reversal of its position in Williams that
size reduction does not materially affect representativeness, the Court
endorsed the conclusion of the Williams critics that reducing the size of the
jury from twelve members to six significantly diminishes the chance for
has ceased to have persuasive effect" because the minority persists in voting for acquittal "without
having persuasive reasons in support of its position." Id. at 361. The Court also rejected the argument
that three votes for acquittal out of twelve in itself constitutes a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt, noting that the mere fact "[that rational men disagree is not in itself equivalent to a failure of
proof by the State, nor does it indicate infidelity to the reasonable-doubt standard." Id. at 362. For an
enlightening discussion of the relation between social decision rule and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt see MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE
24-27 (1977). Professor Saks argues that instead of fixing the decision rule based on a conceptual choice
between an individual and group test for proof beyond a reasonable doubt the relevant question should
be whether reducing jury size reduces the weight of evidence needed for conviction. Since research
indicates that a thinner conviction rule raises the possibility of conviction, unanimous decisions should
be required.
192. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). The facts in Ballew called attention to the importance
of the representativeness of the jury. The defendant was tried before a five-person jury on state
misdemeanor charges of distributing obscene material. The charges were based on the defendant's
showing of a film entitled Behind the Green Door in an adult theater. In deciding whether the film was
obscene, the jury was asked to determine whether, "'considered as a whole, applying community
standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex or excretion, and utterly without redeeming social value and if, in addition, it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters."' Id. at 225 n.2 (quoting
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101 (1972)). The explicit requirement of application of community standards of
decency highlighted the need for a sufficiently large sample of jurors to be able to gauge popular
opinion. Cf Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in
Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 IND. LJ. 617 (1989) (comparing the "selection" decision
asked ofjurors in obscenity cases, in which jurors are expected to act as "delegates" of the community
by applying community standards regardless of whether those standards are their own, with the
"selection" decision made by capital sentencing juries, in which they express their own moral values).
This Article argues that there is not as great a difference between these "selection" decisions and the
categorization of decisions of determining whether a legal standard is satisfied as our jury selection
procedures assume.
193. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 231-33. Among the works relied on were SAKS, supra note 191; Shari
Siedman Diamond, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 520 (1974); Stuart S. Nagel
& Marian Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to
Convict, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 933; William R. Pabst, Jr., Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Man
Versus Twelve-Man Juries, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 326 (1972); Zeisel, supra note 170; Zeisel &
Diamond, supra note 186; Note, The Effect ofJury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation
of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 529 (1971). The Court placed greatest reliance on
Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size
Cases, 73 MICH. L. REv. 643 (1975). The Court's use of social science research has been widely
criticized. See, e.g., Bernard Grofinan, Jury Decision Making Models and the Supreme Court: The Jury
Casesfrom Williams v. Florida to Ballew v. Georgia, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 749 (1980).
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minority representation. 94 More significantly, the Court endorsed a view of
jury decision-making that regards size and diversity as central to jury
functioning. The Court cited research which demonstrated a positive
correlation between group size and the quality of decision-making. This
research noted that members of larger decision-making groups are more likely
to make critical contributions to the discussion, and that larger groups have
better collective memories. 95 Most significantly, the Court recognized that
juries face complex value-laden choices, and concluded that larger groups
enhance the possibility of accurate decision-making because the counterbal-
ancing of individual biases promotes objectivity. 96 The Court also stressed
the importance of representativeness as a defining characteristic of the jury
wholly apart from any effect minority participation might have on jury
decision-making. 9 7 Although the Court's opinion plainly indicated the
superiority of twelve-person juries, the Court reaffirmed its approval ofjuries
of six, but held that five-person juries are unconstitutional.' 9
194. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 236-37 (citing SAKS, supra note 191 and Lempert, supra note 193).
Professor Hans Zeisel used a simple statistical illustration to demonstrate that a six-person jury is much
less likely to represent minority viewpoints than a twelve-person jury. In a community in which 90%
of the population shares a given viewpoint and the remaining 10% have a different viewpoint,
approximately 72 of 100 randomly selected twelve-person juries will contain a representative of the 10%
minority, while only 47 of 100 six-person juries will include minority representation. Zeisel, supra note
170, at 716; see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 167 n.1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is,
of course, intuitively obvious that the smaller the size of the jury, the less likely it is to represent a fair
cross-section of community viewpoints."); SAKS, supra note 191, at 90 (plotting the probabilities of
minority representation on six- and twelve-member juries); Lempert, supra note 193, at 669 (conducting
a similar analysis).
An empirical investigation comparing eight- and twelve-person juries in four courts in Los Angeles
County found that the predicted effect of reducing jury size on the representation of distinctive groups
was borne out in practice. The study found that, over the run of all cases, the number of blacks and
Hispanics who were placed on juries did not differ when eight-person as opposed to twelve-person juries
were used. That is, the percentage of blacks or Hispanics on all twelve-person juries was roughly the
same as the percentage of blacks or Hispanics on all eight-person juries. The probability of black or
Hispanic representation on a single jury, however, was smaller for the eight-person juries than for the
twelve-person panels. G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN & JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN, A COMPAIUSON OF THE
PERFORMANCE OF EIGHT- AND TWELVE-PERSON JURIES 41-59 (1990).
195. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233.
196. Id. at 232-34. The Court supported these general conclusions with research on the relation
between group size and the accuracy and consistency of decisions and the frequency of hung juries. Id.
at 233-36.
197. Id. at 236-37. According to the Court, "'It is part of the established tradition in the use ofjuries
as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community."' Id. at
237 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
198. Id. at 243-44. On the inconsistency between the Court's decision and its rationale, see David
Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and the Size of the Jury,
68 CAL. L. REv. 1004 (1980). The Court seemed to base its decision to draw the line at six on a
statistical study which, according to the Court, "concluded that the optimal jury size [is] between six
and eight." Id. at 234 (citing Nagel & Neef, supra note 193, at 946-48, 956, 975). As the authors of the
study recognized, and others have pointed out, this conclusion is based on assumptions that are
ultimately somewhat arbitrary. See id. at 967; Bernard Grofman, The Slippery Slope: Jury Size and Jury
Verdict Requirements-Legal and Social Science Approaches, 2 LAW & POL'Y Q. 285,299-300 (1980);
Kaye, supra, at 1026-29. Moreover, alternative plausible assumptions produce significantly different
conclusions. See id. at 1028.
The Court subsequently held that 5-1 verdicts in criminal cases violate the Sixth Amendment,
principally on the authority of Ballew v. Georgia and the principle that "having already departed from
the strictly historical requirements of jury trial, it is inevitable that lines must be drawn somewhere."
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979).
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The opinion in Ballew demonstrates the feasibility of a vision of jury
functioning that acknowledges the inevitability of differing perspectives and
the value of diversity. 99 Though not denying the possibility of achieving
objectivity, °0 the Court seems to embrace an objectivity based on a
plurality of viewpoints. In this view, "[t]he value of consultation is enhanced
not merely by the presence of more than one mind but also by the presence
of more than one vantage point."2°1 But the Court's holding, approving the
constitutionality of six-person juries, casts doubt on the depth of the Court's
conviction. For in terms of actual effect, there is little difference between
eliminating minority viewpoints through reducing the size of the jury and
overt discrimination against minority jurors.
3. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement
In the jury size and decision-rule cases, the Court was forced to acknowl-
edge the role of diversity on juries in order to check an inchmeal obliteration
of the institution. Another line of cases, however, has affirmatively embraced
representativeness as a necessary feature of the jury. The primary doctrinal
expression of the representativeness principle is the requirement that the pool
from which the jury is drawn must reflect a representative cross-section of the
199. The view taken in Ballew approximates the model of jury function described in REID HASTIE
ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983). The authors identify a causal relation between the representative cross-
section requirement and the performance of the jury's functions of factfinding and legal decision-
making. Their research indicates that
increasing the representativeness of a jury panel, at least in a heterogeneous community, tends
to increase the variety of viewpoints represented on the panel. Increasing the variety of views,
thereby producing a counterbalancing of biases, is likely to affect fact finding. Individuals from
a variety of backgrounds are likely to attend to and remember different aspects of the trial
evidence, making the jury as a whole remember the total pattern of evidence more completely.
A similar argument can be made for the generation of reasonable inferences and the evaluation
of witness credibility. A variety of viewpoints expressed during deliberation may also improve
the individual juror's application of the beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof. Finally, all
of these factors taken together are likely to affect the jury's verdict.
Id. at 9-11.
200. In other words, the measure of jury performance implicit in the Court's opinion is a
presumptively existent guilt or innocence, external to the jury, against which the accuracy of the jury's
verdict is gauged. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 47 (1994) (commenting on the
Supreme Court's jury-size jurisprudence). This view contrasts with the view that the trial renders the
defendant guilty, or that the jury, like the ordeal that it replaced, tests the present moral status of the
accused. See Harold Garfinkel, Conditions for Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. . Soc. 420
(1956); Robert C. Palmer, Conscience and the Law: The English Criminal Jury, 84 MICH. L. REv. 787,
793-94 (1986).
In an interesting discussion of the problem of determining the ideal number of jurors and social
decision rule for maximizing accurate decision-making, some commentators propose that the standard
for verdict accuracy be the verdict at which the citizenry as a whole would arrive were the entire nation
able to decide the case. George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries and
Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1992). The authors' choice of agreement as the measure of performance
was prompted by a recognition of the practical impossibility of ever knowing what the "true facts" are,
not by an acceptance of a conventionalist epistemology, according to which the measure of truth is
consensus.
20 1. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality
of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1209 (1992).
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community. This doctrine developed gradually from several constitutional and
statutory sources and without any clear vision of the purpose that the
requirement is meant to serve. The principle has from the outset been severely
limited: It requires at most that the pool of potential jurors be representative
of the community, not that the jury itself have any particular composition.2"'
Though the Court's fair cross-section decisions have at times intimated a
broader and more substantive conception of impartiality, in its most recent
pronouncement, which rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment limits
the peremptory challenge, the Court has retreated to the more truncated view
derived from the assumptions of realist thought.
The origins of the fair cross-section requirement are now commonly traced
to Strauder v. West Virginia,"3 a case in which the Court struck down a
state statute that limited jury service to "white male persons" as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion suggested that a number
of different rights were at stake. The state law which facially excluded black
citizens from jury service violated both the jurors' rights to be free from
racial stigmatization," 4 and black defendants' rights to trial by a jury of
their peers. 0 5 The Strauder Court adopted the non-discrimination principle
contained in the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment as the mechanism
for accomplishing these objectives.20 6
The Court first began to give teeth to the prohibition against discrimination
in the selection of potential jurors in cases decided in 1935 and 1940.207 In
those cases, the Court began to scrutinize critically the explanations given for
the absence of African-American venirepersons on the jury panel and to treat
de facto underrepresentation as prima facie evidence of discrimination. This
shift away from the exclusive emphasis on the motivations of the jury
selection officials to a critical examination of the character of the group
actually assembled spurred a new understanding of the principle as one of
202. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
203. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). But see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 (1990) (stating that the
doctrine emerged fall-blown and unprecedented in 1975 with Taylor v. Louisiana).
204. The Court said:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to
participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are
citizens and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed
by the law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
205. The Court stated:
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial
by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected without
discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the law
with the former.
Id. at 309.
206. Id. at 310-11; see also Massaro, supra note 128, at 530-33 (discussing the development of the
anti-discrimination principle). On the development of the fair cross-section doctrine generally, see James
H. Druff, Comment, The Cross-Section Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1555
(1985).
207. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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representativeness rather than the purely negative anti-discrimination principle.
Indeed, it was during this period that the Court began to couch the rule as one
requiring that the jury pool be representative. In Smith v. Texas,08 the Court
stated that to be an "instrument" of "public justice," the jury must be "truly
representative of the community."2 9 Two years later, in Glasser v. United
States,10 the Court responded to allegations that government jury selection
procedures favored members of the League of Women Voters, who had
purportedly been indoctrinated in the prosecution's position, and more
strongly suggested that representativeness was a necessary characteristic of the
jury. The Glasser Court held that "the officials charged with choosing federal
jurors ... must not allow the desire for competent jurors to lead them into
selections which do not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-
section of the community. 22 '
As the notion of representativeness as a necessary characteristic of the jury
developed, the Court occasionally hinted at an alternative vision of jury
impartiality that linked jury qualifications to the requirement that the jury pool
be representative. In Ballard v. United States,2I the female defendant
challenged a jury selection regime that intentionally excluded women from the
jury lists as a violation of the federal law establishing the qualifications for
jury service.2' 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas interpreted the
federal law governing juror qualification as designed to "make the jury 'a
cross-section of the community' and truly representative of it."'2' 4 The
Court's decision invalidating the selection procedures that intentionally
excluded women was based on a belief that female jurors might bring a
different perspective to the issues of the case than men. The Ballard Court
noted that
the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one
is different from a community composed of both.... To insulate the
courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference.
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.1 5
The Court then linked its conception of a woman's perspective to the specific
issues in the case, and suggested that female jurors might have viewed the
case differently.
In Peters v. Kiff2'6 a three-Justice plurality came close to incorporating
diversity of perspective on the jury as a component of impartiality. In Peters,
208. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
209. Id. at 130.
210. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
211. Id. at 86.
212. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
213. Specifically, the petitioner relied on § 275 of the U.S. Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 411 (1940).
The statute tied the qualifications of jurors in federal court to the qualifications required by the state
where the case was tried, and also prohibited certain types of exclusions, but not exclusions of women.
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 190-91.
214. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 191 (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86).
215. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted).
216. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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a white defendant challenged his state conviction on the ground that African-
Americans were systematically excluded from the grand and petit juries in his
case. At the time the appeal was heard, this constituted a clear violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.2" But because the case was tried
before the Court had held that the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the
states, the defendant's constitutional claim was predicated on the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.2"' The question, therefore, was whether the
state could try the defendant to a jury that was illegally selected but leave the
defendant without any remedy "on the ground that he had in any event no
right to a grand or petit jury at all. 21 9 In answering that question, the Court
recited the well-established rule that due process requires that a decision be
made by an impartial decision-maker regardless of the type of tribunal, 2 °
and held that "due process is denied by circumstances that create the
likelihood or the appearance of bias. 22'
Justice Marshall responded to the State's argument that the white defendant
suffered no prejudice in the exclusion of African-American jurors by first
observing that racial issues are latent in many cases that do not display racial
prejudice on their face. 222 He then went on to rest the representativeness
requirement on the broader principle of the importance of perspective in the
decision-making process:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is
unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we
do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be present-
ed.223
Despite these intimations, the potential for a new conception of jury
qualification founded on a broad representation of viewpoints was never fully
realized. In Taylor v. Louisiana224 the Court extended the fair cross-section
requirement, by then firmly grounded in the Sixth Amendment, to criminal
juries in state proceedings. Justice White's opinion for the Court quoted the
217. Id. at 496, 500.
218. Because the Court reversed the conviction, it did not decide whether the defendant had stated
an equal protection violation. Id. at 497 n.5.
219. Id. at 501.
220. Id. at 501-02.
221. Id. at 502.
222. Id. at 503.
223. Id. at 503-04.
224. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In Taylor, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law which required women
to register to serve as jurors. This "opt in" requirement resulted in a drastic underrepresentation of
women on jury lists and jury panels. A similar Florida rule had been upheld by the Court in 1961 in
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). The facts in Hoyt should have alerted the Court to the reasons for
including women on the jury. The defendant was convicted of murdering her husband by an all-male
jury. She plausibly argued that ajury including women may have been more sympathetic to her insanity
defense, which was predicated on the effects of her learning of his adultery, and his refusal to accept
her efforts at reconciliation.
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
passages from Peters and Ballard quoted above. Justice White also quoted
from a 1946 civil case in which Justice Frankfurter, dissenting from the
majority's holding that a selection procedure which systematically excluded
day laborers violated federal law, identified the purpose of maintaining the
representative character of the jury as assuring "'a diffused impartiality. '
But the Court did not integrate these ideas into a coherent conception of jury
qualification. Indeed, it failed to explain why representativeness was required
for the jury to function properly beyond its conclusory assertion that a stacked
jury pool would undercut the effective performance of the criminal jury's
central purpose: preventing the exercise of arbitrary governmental power.226
The hope that the representativeness principle would become a vehicle for
promoting diversity of viewpoints as a central ingredient of jury qualification
became considerably more dim with the Court's decision in Lockhart v.
McCree.227 In Lockhart, the defendant claimed that allowing the prosecution
to challenge for cause jurors who expressed an unwillingness to impose the
death penalty violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair
cross-section of the community. The Court stated that, even if it were willing
to extend the fair cross-section rule to the petit jury, which it was not,
"groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or
substantially impair members of the group from performing one of their
duties ... are not 'distinctive groups' for fair-cross-section purposes.""z
The Court purported to base its decision regarding whether jurors opposed to
the death penalty constitute a distinctive group on the purposes of the fair
cross-section rule.229 It is difficult to see, however, how exclusion of a
group that results in a jury which, according to the Court's assumption, is
biased in favor of the prosecution does not undermine the central purpose of
the fair cross-section rule of "'guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary
power' and ensuring that the 'common sense judgment of the community' will
act as 'a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor." 'D Signifi-
cantly, linking the definition of a distinctive group for fair cross-section
purposes with "some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic
225. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 227 (1946)). Despite the apparent implication of the language, Justice Frankfurter's position
on the merits of Thiel, along with other parts of his opinion, contradict any conclusion that he was
affirming a principle of diversity of viewpoint as a necessary characteristic of the jury. For example, in
Thiel, Justice Frankfurter also quoted approvingly the definition of "impartiality" from United States v.
Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936), as "a state of mind." Thiel, 328 U.S. at 230.
226. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. The Court also briefly mentioned two other purposes of the fair cross-
section requirement not directly related to the functioning of the jury: the preservation of confidence in
the fairness of the criminal justice system, and implementation of our belief that sharing in the
administration of justice is a civic responsibility. Id. at 530-31.
227. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
228. Id. at 174.
229. Id.
230. Id. (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31).
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background"23 ' suggests a non-discrimination principle rather than a
conception of jury qualification.232
In its most recent decision applying the fair cross-section principle, the
Court unambiguously rejected the concept of impartiality as diversity, and the
Court re-enthroned the traditional notion of impartiality as an absence of bias.
The defendant in Holland v. Illinois233 appealed his conviction on the
ground that the State's peremptory challenges of African-American venire
members violated his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by a representative
cross-section of the community. 4 The Court, through Justice Scalia,
reiterated the rule that the fair cross-section requirement applies only to the
venire and not to the petit jury, and proceeded to reject the claim that the fair
cross-section doctrine imposes any limitations on the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 235 Justice Scalia concluded that the fair cross-section rule is not
an independent requirement, but simply serves as a means for achieving
impartiality, and furthers that aim by creating a level playing field for the
parties to exercise their peremptory challenges.236
The conclusion does not, as Justice Scalia maintains," follow ineluctably
from the fact that impartiality is the only qualification expressly mentioned
231.Id. at 175.
232. A violation of the fair cross-section requirement does not, however, require a showing of
intentional discrimination. Rather, a prima facie case is established by showing:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that
the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), marked a significant
milestone by requiring that jury lists be compiled from voter registration lists rather than through the
so-called "key man" system that was used in federal courts prior to the passage of the Act. See 28
U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993). The "key man" system allowed locally prominent individuals to
hand pick potential jurors. Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution,
6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 247 (1973); Note, The Congress, The Court, and Jury Selection: A Critique of
Titles I and I of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. REV, 1069 (1966). Though voters' lists alone
do not produce a truly representative cross-section, their use has been upheld by courts against fair
cross-section attacks. HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 169, at 53-54. For discussions of the practical
difficulties in constructing representative jury lists and proposals for their solution, see Kairys et al.,
supra note 169, and Munsterman & Munsterman, supra note 169.
233. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
234. Id. at 477-78. The defendant's decision to base his challenge on the Sixth Amendment rather
than the Equal Protection Clause was apparently motivated by doubts about whether he would have
standing, as a white person, to assert an equal protection claim. See Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV.
129, 169 n.10 (1990). The Court subsequently held that a white defendant does have standing to assert
the equal protection rights of a peremptorily challenged African-American juror. Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991).
235. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478-84.
236. Id. at 481 ("The fair-cross-section venire requirement assures... that in the process of selecting
the petit jury the prosecution and defense will compete on an equal basis."). As Professor Nancy King
points out, the playing field might not be as level as Justice Scalia assumes. See King, supra note I 11,
at 126 n.244 (citing useful authority).
237. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 483 ("The rule we announce today is... the only plausible reading
of the text of the Sixth Amendment.").
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in the Constitution,238 but from an uncritical acceptance of the assumption
that peremptory challenges promote impartiality.239 The only warrant offered
by the Court for this assumption is its dubious claim that peremptory
challenges have always been recognized.240
Although the Court never expressly defines a "constitutionally impartial
jury," the selection procedures the Court authorizes clearly imply the Court's
view of what the jury should be. In not only approving but exalting the
peremptory challenge as a mechanism for assembling a qualified jury, the
Court unmistakably rejects a conception of impartiality grounded in the
interaction of a diversity of perspectives.24' For, as the Court recognizes, the
selection procedures it approves routinely operate to diminish the representati-
veness of the jury.242 Rather, the central role the Court assigns to the
peremptory challenge in achieving impartiality suggests that an impartial jury
is one made up of the theoretically neutral middle.243 For, according to the
Court, the purpose of the peremptory challenge is "'eliminat[ing] extremes of
partiality on both sides ... assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased
jury."'244 In equating impartiality with an absence of bias, the Court plainly
238. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the fair cross-section requirement was not directed
toward assuring that the jury be impartial but that the tribunal qualify as a "Jury." Id. at 493-94
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
239. Holland, 493 U.S. at 482 ("One could plausibly argue... that the requirement of an 'impartial
jury' impliedly compels peremptory challenges.') (emphasis in original).
240. Id. at 481 ("The constitutional phrase 'impartial jury' must surely take its content from [the]
unbroken tradition [of recognition of the peremptory challenge]."). But see id. at 518 n.1 5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (disputing the majority's claims about the long lineage of the peremptory challenge); Richard
D. Friedman, An AsymmetricalApproach to the Problem of Peremptories?, 28 CrIM. L. BULL. 507,508-
10 (1992) (stating that prosecution peremptories only recently became the rule in this country during
the nineteenth century).
241. See Brown, supra note I 11, at 129-30 (arguing that Holland marks a change from prior Sixth
Amendment doctrine, according to which impartiality results from a mix of perspectives); Leading
Cases, supra note 234, at 169, 175 (criticizing the Court's "truncated vision of impartiality" and
advocating a more "substantive" ideal ofjuror qualification in which "a group's distinctive perspective
is not a 'bias' but a constitutive aspect of the 'commonsense judgment of the community'"); Burt
Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and yllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary
Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 445 (1992) (tracing Justice Scalia's views in Holland to
his belief that "jurors, like judges, hunt for an objective factual reality"); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 114 (1993) (describing Justice
Scalia as "heir to the positivistic legal tradition" and "optimistic about the possibility of value-free
factual knowledge").
Justice Rehnquist, who joined the Holland majority, has elsewhere expressed a derisive attitude
toward the very idea of perspective as an ingredient of legal decision-making. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 542 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('This smacks more of mysticism than
of law. The Court does not even purport to practice its mysticism in a consistent fashion-presunably
doctors, lawyers, and other groups, whose frequent exemption from jury service is endorsed by the
majority, also offer qualities as distinct and important as those at issue here.").
242. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480.
243. See Brown, supra note 11I, at 130 (noting the Holland Court's failure to recognize that jurors
who remain after the exercise of peremptory challenges also have biases); King, supra note 11, at 126
(observing that the Holland majority seems to imply that elimination of in-group bias would enhance
the accuracy of factfinding).
244. Holland, 493 U.S. at 484 (emphasis in original) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91
(1986) and Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)). The Court's characterization of the
peremptory challenge as the means for eliminating partial jurors does not capture its meaning for
lawyers, whose aim is "to remove prospective jurors who are perceived as being less favorable in the
hope of getting jurors who are more favorable." William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the
Disease but Killing the Patient, 98 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 126 (1987).
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assimilates the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section doctrine into the
traditional realist conception of impartiality as blank indifference.
4. Group-Based Peremptory Challenges
The Holland Court refused to interpret the Sixth Amendment as imposing
limits on the unrestricted exercise of the peremptory challenge. Instead, the
Court exalted the peremptory challenge as the mechanism by which the
constitutional requirement of impartiality is achieved. Four years earlier,
however, in Batson v. Kentucky,245 the Court had imposed limitations on the
exercise of the peremptory challenge identical to the limitations requested in
Holland, but under the Equal Protection Clause. At the time Batson was
decided, the case seemed to signal a shift toward a more inclusive conception
of jury qualification. By limiting the power to exclude minority jurors, the
rule fashioned in Batson seemed designed to increase the level of minority
participation. Subsequent decisions extending Batson, however, clearly
indicate that the Batson rule's principal purpose is to protect affected jurors
from invidious stereotyping, rather than to promote a broadly representative
jury.246 In shifting the rule's emphasis in favor of the jurors, the Court has
rejected the notion that legai decision-making is an inescapably public and
social process, and has instead embraced the traditional definition of juror
qualification as individual and psychological.
In Batson, an African-American defendant challenged his state burglary
conviction on the ground that the prosecutor's use of four of six available
peremptory challenges to remove all prospective jurors who were African-
American violated his Sixth Amendment rights.247 The Court chose to
review the prosecutor's conduct under the Equal Protection Clause rather than
the Sixth Amendment,24 and found that race-based peremptory challenges
245. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
246. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (extending the rule to gender-
based challenges); McCollum v. Georgia, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (extending the rule to challenges made
by a criminal defendant); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (extending the rule to prosecutorial
challenges of black jurors in cases involving a white defendant); see also Barbara D. Underwood,
Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 725
(1992).
247. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83-84.
248. Batson predicated his claim on the Sixth Amendment because the Court's decision in Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), seemed to foreclose a successful challenge on equal protection grounds.
In Swain, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges, but only if the challenge is exercised simply to keep blacks off the jury, rather than to seat
jurors favorable to one's cause. Under Swain, to rebut the presumption that a prosecutor had used
peremptory challenges for legitimate trial-related reasons and to make out a prima facie case of a
constitutional violation, a litigant was required to show that the prosecutor used the peremptory
challenge to exclude all blacks from all juries in all cases. Id. at 226-27. The fact that this burden was
rarely, if ever met, was no doubt influential in persuading the Court to reconsider the issue. See Stephen
A. Saltzburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group
Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 345 (1982). The use of the Equal Protection Clause, with its
emphasis on finding a discriminatory purpose for a constitutional violation, contributed to the
transformation of the rule. For an argument that the Sixth Amendment is the better basis for the
prohibition against race-based peremptory challenges, see Wendy L. Trugman, The Representative Jury
Standard: An Alternative to Batson v. Kentucky, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 403 (1986).
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exercised by the State in criminal cases are unconstitutional. The Court held
that once the defendant has established a prima facie case that the prosecutor
has struck jurors because of their race, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
come forward with a racially neutral reason for challenging those jurors.249
Like many of the Court's other jury selection cases, the Batson decision
suffered from a certain indeterminacy of objective. At one point in the
opinion, the Court explained the new limitations on the peremptory challenge
in terms of the defendant's right to the non-discriminatory selection of the
jurors who will decide his or her fate.250 The Court quoted Strauder v. West
Virginia251 to support its proposition that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body
... composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine 2 52 and reiterated that the central purpose of the
jury is to guard against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.253
Accordingly, the Court held that limitations on race-based peremptory
challenges are necessary "to secure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to 'protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice. "254
In another part of its opinion, however, the Court said that the purpose of
the right is to protect the excluded juror: "Competence to serve as a juror
ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability
impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial. '255 Denying a person
the opportunity to participate on a jury because of race "unconstitutionally
discriminate[s] against the excluded juror. 2 56 Finally, the Court also stated
that the harm from discriminatory selection "touch[es] the entire community"
because "[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of jus-
tice. 257
The initial ambiguity over the purpose and ownership of the Batson right
has given way to a constricting certainty. Subsequent applications of the rule
clearly indicate that it is now intended for the protection of the excluded
juror.2 5' The Court first signaled the secondary importance ofjury functioning
249. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
250. Id. at 85-86.
251. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
252. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
253. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
254. Id. at 87 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309).
255. Id. (citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)).
256. Id.
257. Id. (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)).
258. See Underwood, supra note 246, at 742-50 (advocating this interpretation of the rule). A number
of commentators have criticized the Court's shift in emphasis away from the litigant in favor of the juror
and the engrafting of the color-blind principle onto the Batson rule. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme
Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511;
Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the
Jury, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1807 (1993); Johnson, supra note 169; Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage:
Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1993). Needless to say,
I agree with this view.
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to the Batson rule in Allen v. Hardy,259 which held that Batson does not
have retroactive effect. En route to that result, the Court stated that "[b]y
serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury selection procedures, the
rule in Batson may have some bearing on the truthfinding function of a
criminal trial," but that its "impact on the integrity of factfinding" is not
sufficient to compel retroactive application of the rule.260 A more decisive
statement regarding the ownership of the rule came in Powers v. Ohio,26'
in which a white defendant invoked Batson to challenge the State's peremp-
tory exclusion of blacks from his trial jury. In extending the Batson rule, the
Court unambiguously identified the right as belonging to the juror and, upon
determining that criminal defendants have standing to assert the constitutional
rights of jurors who hear their cases, held that the Batson rule applies
regardless of the race of the defendant.
Commentators have suggested several reasons for the Court's decision to
emphasize the rights of the excluded juror.262 In my view, the decision to
rest the, result in Powers on a violation of the juror's equal protection rights
stems at least in part from an inability or unwillingness to articulate how the
composition of the jury affects the jury decision-making process. 263 In the
course of finding a sufficient connection between the defendant and the
challenged juror to sustain third-party standing, the Court affirmed that
discriminatory peremptory challenges cause "a cognizable injury" to the
defendant.2 In explaining this harm, however, the Court refused to relate
its nondiscrimination rule to jury performance. Indeed, the Court expressly
rejected the notion that the injury to the defendant resulted because the
wrongfully excluded juror "may have been predisposed to favor the defen-
dant. 265 Any juror who harbors such a predisposition, the Court reasoned,
259. 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam).
260. Id. One commentator has interpreted the holdings in Allen and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (holding that any possible Sixth Amendment limitation on peremptory challenges is prospective
only) as a clear rejection of "the theory that race-based jury selection denies equal protection to black
defendants by producing biased juries and unreliable verdicts." Underwood, supra note 246, at 731.
261. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
262. Barbara Underwood argues that irfterpreting the Batson doctrine as extending rights to jurors
is the best interpretation of equal protection doctrine because defendants have no significant equal
protection interest in nondiscriminatory jury selection. Underwood, supra note 246, at 726-36. Professor
Underwood's argument, which proved self-fulfilling when the Court cited her article in McCollum v.
Georgia, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1993), is persuasive from the perspective of legal analysis. But her
argument fails to defend this development of constitutional doctrine in terms of social or political theory.
One possible explanation for the turn the doctrine took in Powers is that the Court was simply
anticipating and deciding a question that it believed would inevitably present itself as soon as the Court
was faced with the issue of the applicability of the rule to defense peremptories: whether to prefer the
rights of jurors or defendants. Professor Susan Herman has suggested that the Court has embraced
Batson and emphasized non-discrimination in jury selection as a palliative for its unwillingness to
address seriously racism in the criminal justice system. Herman, supra note 258.
263. The Court's difficulty in perceiving that significant interests of the defendant were implicated
when the defendant and the excluded jurors were not of the same race may be based on a simplistic
understanding of the relation of race to jury performance, according to which the only relevance of race
is that racial groups tend to hang together.
264. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411.
265. Id. It was, of course, precisely because the defendant believed that the jurors he challenged were
more likely to favor the prosecution than other jurors available on the venire that the defendant struck
them. I believe that the Court would produce more sensible jury selection rules if it took seriously the
participants' understanding of the process.
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would be biased and subject to challenge for cause.266 Instead of resting its
finding of harm on the effect of exclusion on jury factfinding, the Court
located the harm of discrimination in its effect on "'the integrity of the
judicial process."'267 The logic of the Court's exclusive reliance on process
values in finding harm to the defendant suggests that any juror qualities that
would influence performance are likewise a proper basis for exclusion, and
makes sense only in the context of a theory of juror decision-making
according to which juror identity should be irrelevant.26
Once the Court decided in Powers that the juror's rights were a sufficient
basis for extending the rule, the applicability of Batson to civil cases,
addressed in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,269 depended primarily on
the existence vel non of state action.270 Upon finding state action, the Court
held that a civil litigant's peremptory exclusion of African-American venire
members from the jury pool violated the equal protection rights of the
excluded jurors. Likewise, in McCollum v. Georgia,27 ' when the Court
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
268. Professor Burt Neubome analyzes Powers and Edmonson from the same perspective and reaches
a different conclusion. Neuborne, supra note 241, at 443-48. He concludes that the reason the Court
stretched the third-party standing rules to permit criminal defendants to assert the constitutional rights
of jurors is a "recognition of the contingent and subjective quality of much of what passes for judicial
fact-finding and the correlative degree of creativity such a vision bestows on jurors." Id. at 444. While
that is a reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the Court's holding prohibiting race-based peremptories
despite an absence of racial identity between the defendant and the juror, it is not consistent with either
the Court's stated reasons for the result or the mechanisms the Court created for enforcing the rule. As
Professor Neuborne points out, the only language in the Powers opinion that supports his interpretation
is the Court's recital that discriminatory jury selection impugns the integrity of the judicial process. Id.
at 445. He argues that "the only reason the community would lose faith in a system that excluded jurors
of one race from the trial of defendants of another is that such behavior fatally taints the reliability of
the verdicts," because the community is aware that "exclusion inevitably distorts the contingent reality
[the jury] is supposed to construct." Id. Plainly, if the Court was in fact saying something about the
contingent nature of social reality, it chose a very awkward way of expressing itself. It seems more
likely that the Court was in fact vindicating process values, as it said. This interpretation is not only
more faithful to the language of the opinion, but also comports with the primary reliance our law places
on procedural regularity as the test for the validity of the outcome. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
853 (1993) (holding that actual innocence is not a basis for invalidating a death sentence if the
defendant has received a "fair trial"); DAMASKA, supra note 133 (arguing that an orientation toward
dispute resolution and an emphasis on procedure characterizes common law as compared to civil law
criminal procedure); Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and
the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decision Making, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57 (1993) (explaining the
rule against use of juror testimony to impeach jury verdicts as the manifestation of a procedural test of
the validity of the verdict). More importantly, perhaps, if the Court in Powers was in fact motivated by
a conviction that a jury verdict from which racial minorities had been excluded was "a morally and
descriptively unacceptable mirror/construct of democratic reality," Neubome, supra note 241, at 445,
it would have found a constitutional violation upon a finding of actual exclusion, rather than limiting
the scope of the rule to only those situations where the exclusion is based on an invidious intent. See
infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text.
269. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
270. In addition, the extension of Batson to civil cases also required a finding that the civil litigant
had standing to assert the rights of the excluded jurors. Given its conclusion in Powers that a private
party to a criminal action had standing, 499 U.S. at 410-16, the Court had little difficulty finding that
the civil litigant had standing as well. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628-30.
271. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). Whether the Batson rule should be extended to criminal defendants
depends in part on whether trial by jury generally and the peremptory challenge in particular is regarded
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considered whether a defendant's race-based peremptories are unconstitu-
tional, there was no real question about the existence of the harm, since the
purpose of the rule was to prevent indignity to the juror arising from being
judged according to a racial stereotype.272 The Court addressed the relation
between defense peremptories and the qualifications or performance of the
jury in responding to the defendants' claims that the rights of the excluded
jurors were outweighed by the rights of the defendants-specifically their
right to an impartial jury. In rejecting the claim that proscribing race-based
peremptory challenges is incompatible with the ideal of an impartial jury, the
Court chose not to defend the rule as one which promotes impartiality by
enriching the diversity of the panel. Rather, the Court said that prohibiting
race-based exclusions does not abridge the defendant's right to an impartial
jury because "assumptions of partiality based on race" are not valid.273 By
negative implication, if a juror's racial identity were relevant to her
performance, then race would be an acceptable basis for challenge in order,
presumably, to assemble a jury in which the racial identity of the decision-
maker plays no role in the result.
274
The Court's view that, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, juror identity
is not relevant to juror performance became clearer when the Court addressed
the applicability of the Batson rule to gender-based challenges in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex reL T.B.275 Acting on behalf of the mother of a minor child, the
as a right for the protection of the criminal defendant. See id. at 2357-59. For contrasting views on the
wisdom of extending the Batson rule to defendants, compare Friedman, supra note 240, Leading Cases,
supra note 234, and Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REv. 808 (1989) (all
opposing extension) with Joel H. Swift, Defendants, Racism and the Peremptory Challenge: A Reply
to Professor Goldwasser, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177 (1991) and J. Alexander Tanford, Racism
in the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1015
(1990) (both favoring extension).
272. The Court observed that "[regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can
be no doubt that the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial
discrimination." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353. The Court also reiterated its argument from Powers that
"[o]ne of the goals of our jury system is 'to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community
as a whole that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law by persons who
are fair."' Id. (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 413). The Court also determined that a defense attorney in
a criminal case qualifies as a state actor, id. at 2354-55, and that the state had standing to assert the
constitutional rights of excluded jurors. Id. at 2357.
273. Id. at 2359.
274. This view was not shared by all members of the Court. Justice Thomas, who concurred in the
judgment, acknowledged that the racial composition of the jury may affect the result. Id. at 2360
(Thomas, J., concurring). He expressed his objection to placing any constitutional limitations on the
exercise of peremptory challenges, and intimated that the Court's ruling would eventually lead to
preventing black defendants from peremptorily removing white jurors and, perversely, reduce minority
representation on juries. Id. at 23 60-61. Likewise, Justice O'Connor predicated her dissent in part on
the recognition that "conscious'and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive
minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or
innocence." Id. at 2364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). For Justice O'Connor, the majority
opinion raised the fear that the Batson rule would be extended to cover peremptory challenges to white
jurors. Id.
275. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). The question of the applicability of the Batson doctrine to gender-based
challenges was widely debated before the decision in J.E.B. For a bibliography of articles on the issue,
see Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1139, 1160 n.77 (1993).
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State of Alabama sued the putative father for child support. During jury
selection, the State used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to remove male
jurors, resulting in a jury made up entirely of women. 6 The defendant
preserved his claim that the State's gender-based strikes violated the Equal
Protection Clause and appealed on that ground after the jury found him to be
the biological father.
In the first case to address the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause
to the peremptory exclusion of groups not protected by the most rigorous
"strict scrutiny," the Court in J.E.B., for the first time in the Batson line of
decisions, actually applied standard equal protection analysis. The Court asked
whether "discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection substantially
furthers the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial
trial."27 Consistent with its tendency to equate any influence that the juror's
social identity may have on the performance of her role with disqualifying
"bias," the Court held that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for
juror competence and impartiality. '27 8 Because assumptions based on gender
are presumptively false, the Court found that eliminating jurors based on such
assumptions does not further the goal of seating jurors who are impartial.279
Of course, by the Court's own logic, the wholesale exclusion of either men
or women from jury service would likewise not impair jury impartiality,
although there is a blatant inconsistency between that view and the principle
underlying the fair cross-section cases.280 The Court held that gender-based
peremptories are unconstitutional because "[s]triking individual jurors on the
assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is
'practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their
276. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422. The defendant had used all but one of his peremptory strikes to
remove women. Id.
277. Id. at 1425.
278. Id. at 1421. The Court cited two secondary sources on the use of gender as a predictor ofjuror
performance: HASTIE Er AL., supra, note 199, at 140 (stating that while social science research has not
found a correlation between juror sex and performance in all types of cases, female jurors are more
conviction-prone in rape cases), and HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 169, at 76 (concluding that
investigation of the conviction-proneness of women had reached contradictory conclusions). J.E.B., 114
S. Ct. at 1426 n.9. For a discussion of social science research on juror identity and juror performance,
see infra part III.C.
279. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426-27.
280. See id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the contradiction between the Court's holding and
the fair cross-section jurisprudence). Indeed, the majority expressly stated that "strikes based on
characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender [such as military service or nurses]
could be appropriate, absent a showing of pretext." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429.
The Court also rejected as a basis for distinguishing the problem of gender-based peremptories from
race-based peremptories: the comparative unlikelihood that gender-based strikes might be used to
eliminate all persons of one gender from the jury. Id. at 1428 n.13. The opinion in Batson made it clear
that part of the rationale for the decision was putting an end to the practice of keeping African-
Americans off juries through peremptory challenges. Given the fact that men and women are equally
represented in society, and ideally in the jury venire, it would not be possible in most cases to obtain
ajury made up entirely of either men or women. The Court labeled this argument for exempting gender-
based peremptories from scrutiny "beside the point" because "the right to non-discriminatory jury
selection belongs to the potential jurors, as well as the litigants." Id. at 1428 n.13.
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inferiority,"'281 and because state enforcement of discriminatory behavior by
attorneys clouds the legitimacy of the process.
The dissenters emphatically rejected the majority's conclusion that gender-
based peremptories violate the Equal Protection Clause. But on the issue of
the relation between group identity and juror impartiality, the dissenters and
the majority were in fundamental agreement. Concurring on the aims of jury
selection, the dissent took issue only with the majority's conclusion that
assumptions based on gender are invalid. Crediting the "perceptions of
experienced litigators who have had money on the line"2 ' that men and
women do perform differently as jurors, Justice Scalia lamented the majority's
crippling of the only workable mechanism for eliminating the "biases that go
along with group characteristics" 2 83-the truly peremptory challenge. Thus,
the rule first announced in Batson which prohibits group-based peremptory
challenges, though initially intimating a movement toward a model of diffused
impartiality, has come to be understood in terms that are consistent with the
negative conception of impartiality as a group purged of biased extremes." 4
The Court's turn in these decisions toward a focus on the rights of the
excluded jurors is not without practical significance. The mechanisms the
Court has established for enforcement of the Batson rule are consistent with
an understanding of the Court's purpose of protecting the excluded jurors, but
are deficient as a vehicle for promoting diversity on the jury.285 Since the
purpose of the rule is to send a clear message that the State does not
countenance racial discrimination, what is offensive is the racially motivated
challenge,286 not the wholesale exclusion of racial groups. As the Batson
281. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). As
Justice Scalia emphasized in his dissent, this statement borders on the ludicrous given that the factual
posture of the case involved a challenge to the peremptory exclusion of men. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). While the Court is certainly correct that it is offensive to be assimilated into a stereotype,
the Court's statement is hyperbole. Certainly, the attorneys who challenge women or men do not do so
because they believe them to be unqualified to serve as jurors. Rather, the thinking behind such strikes
is that the juror is too well qualified for the opponent.
282. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1438.
284. A number of state courts that have imposed comparable limitations on the exercise of race-based
peremptory challenges have grounded their rules in the jury trial right and have explicitly articulated
a vision of jury qualification based on a diverse array of perspectives. In Commonwealth v. Soares,
black defendants accused of murdering a white college student argued that the prosecutor deprived them
of their right to an impartial jury by peremptorily challenging black jurors solely on account of race.
387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979). The court held that the prosecutor's actions denied the defendants of a
jury that was a representative cross-section of the community. The court emphasized the need for
diversity on the petit jury (although firmly rejecting any type of quota system) and the perceived fairness
or acceptance of the trial by the community. Id. at 510-16. In People v. Wheeler, two black defendants
accused of murdering a white grocery store owner claimed that the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude black jurors denied them a trial by their peers. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978). The
court found that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all blacks from the jury violated
the defendants' rights under the California Constitution to a jury composed of a representative cross-
section of the community. Id. at 895-907.
285. See Brand, supra note 258, at 584 (concluding, based on an exhaustive review of federal cases,
that the Batson rule has failed to eliminate the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
286. The Court's premise that an attorney's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a black juror
amounts to a statement that the attorney does not regard blacks as qualified for jury service, Batson, 476
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Court said, the "'invidious quality' of governmental action claimed to be
racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.' 28 7 And, as the Court noted in a different opinion, "'[d]iscrimina-
tory purpose' ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness
of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." '288 This conception of the
harm invites acceptance of any reason for striking a juror that is not explicitly
racial as a "racially neutral" reason. As Justice Marshall in his Batson
concurrence and others have subsequently argued, this exclusive focus on the
motivation for the challenge opens the door to acceptance of reasons that are
either pretextual or simply a proxy for race. 89 On the narrow view of the
rule taken by the Court, what is offensive is the exercise of peremptory
challenges on the basis of race. Thus, so long as the publicly stated reason for
challenging the juror is something other than race, the juror's exclusion will
not have caused any harm to the excluded juror-the harm with which the rule
is primarily concerned.29
U.S. at 87, is dubious. Professor Alschuler's assessment of a prosecutor's likely reasons for striking a
black juror is probably more accurate. He says:
A prosecutor ordinarily might explain his or her use of race as a predictor by saying:
I do not doubt that black jurors can fairly try a case against a black defendant. My goal,
however, is to secure a jury that will prove as receptive to the state's case as possible. I must
exercise my peremptory challenges on the basis of limited information; and my experience has
been that, although both blacks and whites are generally fair-minded and conscientious, whites
tend to be more favorable to the state's position in this sort of case than blacks.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court & the Jury: Voir Dire Preemptory Challenges and the Review
of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 153, 168 (1989).
287. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)); see also
Herman, supra note 258, at 1830 (commenting that "[a] defendant may not challenge a prosecutor's
practices simply on the ground that those practices will result in an all-white jury or, apparently, on the
basis that the prosecutor is attempting to disadvantage the defendant by selecting jurors with racist
attitudes."); Steven A. Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 1365, 1416-20 (1987) (observing that the Batson rule makes the prosecutor's motive dispositive
of the defendant's constitutional claim and that wholesale exclusion of members of the defendant's race
is not in itself prohibited by the rule).
288. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
289. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring); Alschuler, supra note 286, at 173-76; Brand,
supra note 258, at 584-96, 599-603; Herman, supra note 258, at 1829-31; Nunn, supra note 258, at 90-
91; Reiss, supra note 287, at 1416-20; cf. Pizzi, supra note 244, at 134-38 (arguing that Batson created
an "enforcement nightmare" in attempting both to permit the peremptory challenge which is by its
nature not susceptible to explanation and to require an explanation for challenges that fall within the
ambit of the rule).
Moreover, courts face substantial difficulties in discerning the "true" motives behind an attorney's
challenge, especially since attorneys, like other members of our society, are not necessarily aware of
how race influences their perceptions or of their reasons for wanting to exclude a juror. See Batson, 476
U.S. at 106-07 (Marshall, J., concurring).
The requirement that the moving party make out a prima facie case of discrimination presents an
additional obstacle to enforcement of the prohibition against discriminatory peremptory challenges. See
Alschuler, supra note 286, at 170-73. Professor Brand's survey of federal cases applying the Batson rule
found that courts have tended to bypass the question of whether a prima facie showing has been made,
moving directly to the issue of whether the challenge was based on race. Brand, supra note 258, at 583
n.380.
290. The Court's only pronouncement on what counts as a racially neutral reason to rebut a
presumption of discriminatory purpose confirms the anemic character of the Batson rule as a vehicle
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The Batson rule is a decidedly soft blow against the practice of peremptory
exclusion of non-median views,291 and there is no reliable evidence that the
Batson limitations on the peremptory challenge have reduced or eliminated the
underrepresentation of minority groups on juries. A recent survey of federal
cases applying the Batson rule concluded that the great majority of benign
explanations proffered by attorneys are accepted by the courts as genuine.292
Nevertheless, the rule has likely had a positive impact in improving jury
diversity. Most attorneys probably take the prohibition against race- or
gender-based peremptories seriously,293 and, even though it is fairly easy to
for achieving greater diversity. In Hernandez v. New York, the trial prosecutor defended his decision to
strike two Hispanic jurors on the ground that, because they spoke Spanish, he doubted their ability to
follow the trial judge's instruction to rely entirely on the English translation of Spanish language
testimony. 500 U.S. 352 (1991), A divided Supreme Court sustained the trial court's acceptance of this
explanation as racially neutral. Both Justice Kennedy's opinion for a four-Justice plurality and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion stressed the prosecutor's subjective intent to discriminate because of race
as the sine qua non of an equal protection violation. And, because there is no violation absent such an
intent, the effect of the prosecutor's actions on the makeup of the jury is irrelevant except insofar as it
circumstantially bears on intent. As Justice Kennedy noted, "While the prosecutor's criterion might well
result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact does not
turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 361 (italics
in original). For two highly critical discussions of Hernandez, see Brand, supra note 258, at 600-05, and
Johnson, supra note 169, at 52-59.
291. A number of critics of the Batson decision have suggested alternative doctrinal foundations for
taming the peremptory challenge and/or proposed different solutions which are not dependent on a
showing of discriminatory intent. Professor Douglas Colbert, for example, has offered the novel proposal
that the proper constitutional provision for addressing race and juries is the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibition against involuntary servitude. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1990). Wendy Trugman argues that the Sixth Amendment is a better basis for achieving more
representative juries and proposes that a constitutional violation should be recognized if (1) a distinctive
group (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented on the jury in comparison to its representation on the
venire and (3) the group's underrepresentation is due to the use of peremptory challenges. Trugman,
supra note 248, at 414-17; see also Babcock, supra note 275, at 175-80 (proposing a reduction in the
number of challenges and an expansion of voir dire); Johnson, supra note 169, at 90-92 (advocating
emphasis on discriminatory impact over discriminatory motivation for challenges and suggesting a
bright-line rule against any combination of challenges that increase the likelihood that racial bias will
influence the outcome); Nunn, supra note 258, at 113-17 (advocating the prohibition of peremptory
strikes against black jurors whenever there is a significant likelihood that racial issues might affect the
trial). Professor Herman argues that "process-based" strategies are inadequate to address the problem
of racism in the criminal justice system and calls for review of jury verdicts to determine if they are
infected with racism and for education of jurors on the effects of racism. Herman, supra note 258, at
1846-52.
292. Brand, supra note 258, at 584-96. Professor Brand reviewed all federal district and circuit court
cases available in the Westlaw database through May of 1993. Id. at 584. He found discrimination in
at most seven percent of all cases. Id. at 588. Moreover, he found that discrimination was found even
less often in more recent cases. The reason for this result, Brand asserts, is that "[h]ighly subjective,
vague, and unsubstantiated prosecutorial claims are routinely accepted." Id. at 592.
Though not specifically addressing the question of the effect of a ban on race-based peremptory
challenges, another study produced results suggesting that the California equivalent of the Batson rule
may have a more positive effect on jury diversity. The researchers compared the racial composition of
juries to the panels from which they were drawn in four Los Angeles County courts. While individual
juries did not necessarily mirror the venire, the overall racial makeup of all the juries did not differ
significantly from the venire from which they were drawn. MUNSTERMAN & MUNSTERMAN, supra note
194, at 41-46. The researchers also found that racial minorities were no more likely to be peremptorily
challenged than other prospective jurors. Id. at 53-55.
293. Herman, supra note 258, at 1834.
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concoct pretextual race- or gender-neutral reasons, not all attempts by
attorneys to justify their challenges are accepted.294
Even if the Batson rule has had the (unintended) effect of increasing the
diversity of juries, the process of selection through elimination reinforces a
view of juror qualification that delegitimizes the role of perspective in the
decision-making process. The peremptory challenge system, even with the
Batson modifications, is based upon a concept ofjuror qualification according
to which fitness is defined in terms of what jurors lack.295 Jurors are
qualified if they are impartial, unbiased, and without preconceptions or
prejudices. Accordingly, a qualified jury is constructed by eliminating from
the panel those who lack these qualities. The whole structure is premised on
and reinforces an epistemology that disparages "perspective" as "bias" and
thereby recreates the myth of transcendent neutrality.29 Indeed, the expositors
of the Batson rule now explicitly deny the relevance of personal identity to
legal decision-making. 297 This belief in the existence of a wholly neutral
perspective inevitably results in the privileging of some partial point of view
as objective and thereby delegitimizes the claims of those asserting that their
voices are missing from the judicial process.298
294. See, e.g., Newton, supra note 26, at Al (reporting the court's rejection of the defense's reason
for striking an African-American juror in the federal trial of the police officers accused of violating
Rodney King's civil rights).
295. There is, moreover, an affinity between this negative selection mechanism and a theory of belief
formation in which the evidence is thought to induce beliefs directly. A focus on the evidentiary
stimulus as the exclusive cause of conviction naturally encourages a discounting of any positive
attributes of the ideally qualified decision-maker. What is sought in a juror is someone upon whom the
evidence can work. Against this background it makes sense to think ofjuror qualification as an absence
of positive impediments. Similarly, the negative definition ofjuror qualification suggests that jurors who
pass the test can be regarded as entirely fungible. For if evidence causes beliefs directly, it will have
an identical effect on anyone not possessed of positive disabilities.
296. Cf. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10 (1987) (discussing
the tendency to treat unstated points of comparison as neutral).
297. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
298. The case of Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell dramatically illustrates how the ideology of neutrality
renders invisible the perspective of some groups but not others. 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). One
of the parties in this employment discrimination case sought to disqualify Judge Constance Baker
Motley from hearing the case because, as a black woman, she would identify with those who had
suffered race or sex discrimination. Id. at 4. In refusing to disqualify herself, Judge Motley said:
[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds for
removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that
all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law firm or public service
backgrounds.
Id. Similarly, Judge Leon Higgenbotham rejected a motion to disqualify him from a race discrimination
case based on his status as an African-American. Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974). It would hardly have occurred to the parties
making these recusal motions to seek dis4ualification of a male judge from a sex discrimination case
or a white judge from a race discrimination case. The point demonstrated by these cases is that, despite
the common assumption that only women have a gender and only minorities have a race, everyone's
perspective is shaped by his or her experiences. This general theme is developed in Minow, supra note
296, at 13 n.15, where the cases discussed above are cited. See also Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But
Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 953, 971 (1993) (observing that "[o]nce an individual is identified as white, his distinctively racial
characteristics need no longer be conceptualized in racial terms").
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5. The Exception That Proves the Rule:
Death-Qualified Juries
Another line of cases that has attempted to plumb the meaning of jury
impartiality are that group of cases dealing with dismissal of prospective
jurors in capital cases based on the jurors' confessed opposition to the death
penalty. The practice of "death-qualifying" juries by permitting exclusion for
cause of any juror who states an unwillingness to impose the death penalty
was originally a by-product of a mandatory sentencing scheme in which the
death penalty was an inevitable consequence of conviction for a capital
crime.299 It was believed that, if permitted to serve, such jurors would refuse
to convict even though they were convinced of the defendant's guilt in order
to avoid the imposition of a death sentence. As mandatory death penalty rules
were replaced by discretionary sentencing systems in the twentieth century,
the rationale for death-qualification became less compelling, since a death
sentence no longer invariably followed a finding of guilt. Nonetheless, the
advent of discretionary capital punishment did not eliminate death-qualifica-
tion, and most courts continued to permit prosecutors to challenge jurors who
were opposed to the death penalty in capital cases. °°
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,30° the Supreme Court addressed the constitu-
tionality of an Illinois statute which permitted a challenge for cause in a
capital trial of any prospective juror who had "conscientious scruples against"
or was "opposed to" capital punishment. 30 2 The Court held that allowing
exclusion of prospective jurors "who stated in advance of trial that they would
not even consider returning a verdict of death" could plausibly be defended
as producing a jury that "was simply 'neutral' with respect to penalty. 30 3
But excluding "all who expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
capital punishment and all who opposed it in principle ... crossed the line of
neutrality"304 and, according to the Court, therefore violated the defendant's
constitutional right under. the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to be
sentenced by an impartial jury.
The conception of impartiality that underlies the outcome in Witherspoon
is very different from that which was the basis -for the pretrial publicity cases.
Neither the jurors who were excluded nor those actually seated under the
Illinois statute were unqualified in the sense of being unable or unwilling to
decide according to the facts and the judge's instructions on the law. As the
Witherspoon Court stated, "A man who opposes the death penalty, no less
than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment [regarding the
appropriate sentence] entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath
299. Welsh S. White, Death-Qualifed Juries: The "Prosecution-Proneness" Argument Reexamined,
41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 353, 354 (1980).
300. Id. at 355-56.
301. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
302. Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
303. Id. at 520.
304. Id.
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he takes as a juror. '  But a jury composed of admittedly impartial jurors,
all of whom favor the death penalty, is not impartial because it represents a
skewed sample of community views regarding the death penalty,0 6 and
therefore cannot perform its central function of "express[ing] the conscience
of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." ' 7
In subsequent cases applying the Witherspoon standard, the Court has
attempted to reformulate the rule in terms which are consistent with the more
traditional definition of impartiality. In Wainwright v. Witt,3"' then-Justice
Rehnquist explained the Witherspoon formulation of the death-qualification
rule in light of the capital sentencing scheme in effect in Illinois at the time
Witherspoon was decided. Under Illinois law in 1968, jurors were afforded
complete discretion over whether to sentence the defendant to death. 0 9
Following Furman v. Georgia,31 ° in which the Court held that such unguided
discretion violated the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment, states rewrote their death penalty statutes to require specific
findings by the jury before a sentence of death could be imposed.3"' Justice
Rehnquist asserted that, under Illinois' reformulated death penalty law in
which the jury's discretion is not unbounded, the Witherspoon rule which
allowed the state to exclude only those jurors who "made [it] unmistakably
clear.., that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment" '3 12  no longer "ma[d]e sense."'3 13 Accordingly, the Court
reiterated the definition of a constitutionally impartial juror as one "who will
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts." '314 The Court also
reformulated the Witherspoon standard for when a juror may be excluded
based on the juror's views about capital punishment as "whether the juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."'3t5
305. Id. at 519.
306. Id. at 519-20 ("[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury
composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community!").
307. Id. at 519.
308. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
309. Id. at 421.
310. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
311. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's law).
312. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
313. Witt, 469 U.S. at 422. In an earlier case, Adams v. Texas, Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent
that the changed role of the jury in death penalty sentencing following Furman required a reexamination
of the doctrinal underpinnings of the Witherspoon rule since there was no longer any "plausible
distinction between the role of the jury in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and its role... in the
sentencing phase." 448 U.S. 38, 54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In its most recent pronouncement
on the subject, a majority of the Court, sans Rehnquist, reaffirmed that the Witherspoon principle
survived the abolition of wholly discretionary death penalty laws. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222,
2231 n.6 (1992).
314. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423.
315. Id. at 424 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45). The majority in Witt criticized the dissent's
description of Witherspoon as "a latter-day version of a 'fair cross-section' theme" that was largely
missing from the actual case. Id. at 424 n.5. Most recently in Morgan v. Illinois, the Court held that the
defendant in a capital trial has a constitutional right to ask jurors if they would automatically impose
the death penalty on a guilty defendant. 112 S. Ct. 2222. The entire Court took the view that this case
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Even in its watered down version, and despite the Court's protests to the
contrary, there is still a fundamental difference between the Witherspoon line
of cases and the cases that define when a juror is constitutionally unqualified
because of the juror's exposure to pretrial publicity. The Witherspoon rule
does not define juror qualification negatively by identifying disqualifying
characteristics. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the Witherspoon case
is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror, but a limitation on the
state's power to exclude.3 6 As such, the Witherspoon rule recognizes, at
least in the context of capital sentencing, constitutionally cognizable
differences among jurors, all of whom are able and willing to decide the case
based on the law and the facts.
The Court has sought to deny the suggestion that its reformulated death-
qualification rules are in any way different from traditional constitutional
impartiality standards. The Witt Court said that "Witherspoon simply held that
the State's power to exclude did not extend beyond its interest in removing
[jurors who had general objections to the death penalty]. '3 7 But the Court
in Witherspoon did more than that-it said that a jury from which those jurors
had been excluded is not impartial.
At about the same time the Court was trying to harmonize the Witherspoon
rule with the traditional definition of juror impartiality in cases challenging
the constitutionality of the defendant's sentencing jury, it was eagerly
distinguishing the special conception of impartiality underlying that rule in
cases dealing with challenges to the guilt-determining jury. In Witherspoon,
the Court rejected the defendant's claim that the selection procedure which
eliminated prospective jurors opposed to capital punishment resulted in a jury
that was partial because it was unusually disposed to convict. 38 The Court,
however, did not preclude such a challenge in principle; it merely held that
the data adduced by the defendant in support of the argument were too
tentative and fragmentary to establish his claim.3 9
Eighteen years later in Lockhart v. McCree,32 ° the Court considered the
same issue but had at its disposal additional empirical evidence that death-
qualified juries were more inclined to convict than juries that included both
opponents and proponents of the death penalty. Though the Court expressed
was resolvable under the traditional individualistic conception of impartiality as a willingness to decide
based on the law and the evidence. The majority concluded that the so-called "reverse Witherspoon"
inquiry was constitutionally required because a juror who would automatically vote for death regardless
of mitigating evidence is not impartial. Id. at 2232 n.8, 2234-35. Justice Scalia argued in dissent that
the questions should not be required because the decision whether any given evidence or any evidence
at all should mitigate the defendant's sentence is entirely within the juror's discretion. Id. at 2237-39
(Scalia, J., dissenting). It cannot be said, therefore, that a juror who does not regard any evidence as
mitigating is constitutionally unqualified. Id. at 2235-36.
316. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423; Adams, 448 U.S. at 47-48.
317. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423.
318. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18.
319. Id. at 517.
320. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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concern with the methodological validity of the studies,32' it assumed for
purposes of its decision that death-qualified juries are somewhat more prone
to convict than juries that are not death-qualified.322 It nonetheless held that
a jury so selected violated neither the requirement that the jury be drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community nor the requirement that the jury be
impartial.2 3
With regard to the defendant's SixthAmendment impartial jury claim, the
Court said that its cases had consistently rejected a view of impartiality
predicated on a balancing of predisposition of various individual jurors.
Quoting Witt, the McCree Court said that "an impartial jury consists of
nothing more than 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the
facts.' ' 324 But having thus adduced Witt in support of this traditional view
of impartiality, the Court went on to distinguish the Witherspoon line of cases
on the ground that they "dealt with the special context of capital sentencing,
where the range of jury discretion necessarily gave rise to far greater concern
over the possible effects of an 'imbalanced' jury. '325  Because of the
discretionary nature of the jury's task in making sentencing decisions, "'a
juror's general views about capital punishment play an inevitable role"' 3 6
in that context. But, the Court continued, in the performance of its more
traditional role of finding facts and determining guilt or innocence, the jury's
discretion is more limited, and the considerations that underlie the sentencing
cases are not applicable.327 In this arena the jurors' attitudes are not
relevant. According to the Court:
[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section
of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual
viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can
321. The Court articulated various criticisms of the studies relied on in the defendant's challenge.
The Court noted that of the 15 studies cited by the defendant, only six attempted to measure the central
issue in McCree's case-the effect of the removal of Witherspoon excludables on guilt determination.
Id. at 169. Three of those six studies were before the Court when the same challenge was made in
Witherspoon. Since they were found inadequate to establish that death qualification biased the jury in
favor of conviction, they were clearly not adequate 18 years later. Id. at 170-71. The Court dismissed
the three post-Witherspoon studies because the participants in the studies were not actual jurors; because
the studies were not "able to predict to what extent, if any, the presence of one or more Witherspoon-
excludables on a guilt-phase jury would have altered the outcom6 of the guilt determination"; and
because only one of the three studies attempted to account for jurors who, because of their opposition
to the death penalty, would be unable to decide impartially a capital defendant's guilt or innocence. Id.
at 171-72. The Court concluded that "[s]urely a 'per se constitutional rule' as far reaching as the one
McCree proposes should not be based on the results of [a single] study." Id. at 172-73 (italics in
original). Thus, the Court seemed to take the view that a legal rule predicated on a confessed ignorance
about the effect of death-qualifying juries stands on firmer ground than a rule based on evidence that
was less than 100% certain.
322. Id. at 173.
323. Id. at 177, 183-84.
324. Id. at 178 (emphasis in original) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423).
325. Id. at 182.
326. Id. (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519).
327. Id. at 183.
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conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to
the facts of the particular case.
328
The premise of the Court's decision, that juror attitudes and beliefs are less
relevant to determining guilt than to fixing punishment, is not as certain as the
majority's conclusory assertions suggest.329 Empirical investigations of the
effect that death-qualifying juries has on conviction proneness show more than
a correlation between death penalty attitudes and disposition to convict; they
suggest explanations for the correlation which highlight the salience of juror
beliefs to the factfinding task.
A juror's attitudes toward the death penalty are not translated into verdict
preferences directly. Rather, the juror's views on the death penalty are
typically associated with a constellation of meaningfully related beliefs and
attitudes which affect the way he or she interprets the evidence.33 ' Accord-
ing to one commentary on the issue, "Attitudes toward the death penalty are
thus a clue to the perspective a juror has on the criminal justice system, and
that perspective, rather than the death penalty attitudes themselves, colors
jurors' interpretation of evidence and influences their threshold of convic-
tion."'33' Among the beliefs and attitudes that correlate with views on the
death penalty are opinions on the relative credibility of different types of
witnesses, level of trust in prosecutors or defense attorneys, and prior theories
about police, crime, and criminals.332 These beliefs shape the juror's
interpretation of the evidence by defining what is important, filling in gaps,
and suggesting inferences from facts.333  Because of their differing
328. Id. at 184. The supposed qualitative difference between the jury's task in evaluating guilt and
fixing punishment has been used to justify special rules in other contexts. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (explaining the capital defendant's greater need to probe possible prejudice
during voir dire on the ground that "the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in capital sentencing
hearing [offers] a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected'). The Court
rejected the dissent's argument that "the opportunity for racial bias to taint the jury process is ...
equally a factor at the guilt phase of a bifiucated capital trial," id. at 41 (Brennan, J., dissenting), by
stating that "the decisions that sentencing jurors must make involve far more subjective judgments than
when they are deciding guilt or innocence." Turner, 476 U.S. at 38 n.12.
329. Justice Marshall's dissent was predicated in part on a rejection of the Court's distinction
between the role of the jury at the guilt phase and in determining the sentence:
At the penalty stage of his trial, Adams' jury may have been called upon to do something more
than ascertain the existence eel non of specific historical facts. Yet the role assigned a jury at
a trial's culpability phase is little different, for there the critical task of the jury will frequently
be to determine not whether defendant actually inflicted the fatal wound, but rather whether
his level of culpability at the time of the murder makes conviction on capital murder charges,
as opposed to a lesser count, more appropriate. Representing the conscience of the community,
the jurors at both stages "unavoidably exercise a range of judgment and discretion while
remaining true to their instructions and their oaths."
McCree, 476 U.S. at 197 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (italics in original) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38, 46 (1980)). In fact, the jury's task is more thoroughly normative than Marshall's illustrations
indicate.
330. William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes & Conviction Proneness, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 95, 110 (1984).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 110-11.
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perspectives, "two well-intentioned jurors' reconstruction of the facts and
implications of those facts may be surprisingly dissimilar. 334
The ramifications of these conclusions reach beyond their significance for
the practice of death-qualifying juries in capital trials. The important general
implication of the research in this area is that the mental baggage jurors bring
with them to their task influences their factfinding role in much the same way
it is believed to affect their decisions on questions of sentencing.
III. JUROR DECISION-MAKING
I have argued that the rules governing judicial factfinding, including our
conception of juror qualification and rules governing jury selection, are
predicated on assumptions about the nature of reality and truth that developed
during the Enlightenment. The definition of juror impartiality as detached
objectivity has its source in the Enlightenment beliefs in the fundamental
separability of the external realm of fact and the internal realm of ideas and
in the possibility of immediate apprehension of the external world by the
internal mind. Because the realms of objective fact and subjective mind are
postulated to be wholly discrete but mutually accessible, an external, objective
point of view is regarded as both possible and desirable.
Recent theorizing on human cognition, however, contradicts the assumptions
that underlie the legal system's definition of the ideal juror. This research
asserts that direct access to the external world is not possible and that all of
our contact with reality is mediated by the assumptions and expectations we
have about it. These assumptions or knowledge structures are used to filter,
order, and interpret the world that presents itself to our senses. As a result,
we are constantly constructing reality as we apprehend it. Because the only
world we know is in part a product of our prior expectations about it, one
cannot say that mind and matter are discontinuous in the way realist
philosophy assumes.
Using the assumptions of cognitive theory, researchers investigating the
process by which jurors store and organize information have raised doubts
about whether the legal system's modeling of the decision-making task
corresponds with the way in which jurors actually go about deciding cases.
Contrary to the legal system's assumption that the process of belief formation
is essentially passive, this research concludes, consistent with current
cognitive theory, that decision-makers actively construct representations of the
trial evidence based on their prior expectations about what constitutes an
adequate explanation of the litigated event. Furthermore, these representations,
rather than the original "raw" evidence, form the basis of the jurors' final
decision. Thus, the jurors' prior assumptions about the nature of the social
world are an important ingredient of the jury's verdict. Because jurors' beliefs
about the world inescapably influence the way they perform their function,
334. Id. at 111.
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those beliefs cannot be ignored in the process of formulating rules for jury
selection.
A. The Role of Knowledge Structures in Cognition
Recent theories of human cognition developed by linguists, phenomenolo-
gical sociologists, and cognitive psychologists have come to regard informa-
tion acquisition and processing as an inherently constructive process.335
According to this view, the qualities of objects in the world never simply
imprint their image on a receptive mind. Rather, cognition is a process of
filtering, categorizing, organizing, and interpreting information according to
previously held mental models or knowledge structures. According to Nisbett
and Ross, "[O]bjects and events in the phenomenal world are almost never
approached as if they were sui generis configurations but rather assimilated
into preexisting structures in the mind of the perceiver.
' 336
On the most general level, knowledge structures are simply beliefs or
expectations about the world. The most immediate and easily recognized type
of knowledge structure are the categories of language. 337 Through the
classificatory scheme embodied in words, we are able to distinguish objects
and events in the world. Indeed, it is only on the basis of such distinctions
that those objects or events come into being.338 That is, we recognize a dog
by distinguishing it from a bird, a rabbit, a cat, and a rat.339 In the absence
of linguistic differentiation, there is no distinction in perception or experience.
335. Among those often mentioned in connection with this view are JEROME S. BRUNER, BEYOND
THE INFORMATION GwEN: STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWING (Jeremy M. Anglin ed., 1973)
(psychology); ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE
(1974) (sociology); and ALFRED SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (1970)
(sociology).
336. RICHARD NisBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 36 (James J. Jenkins et al. eds., 1980) (italics in original); see also JEROME S.
BRUNER, Going Beyond the Information Given, in BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN: STUDIES IN THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWING, supra note 335, at 219.
337. NIsBETT & Ross, supra note 336, at 32-33.
338. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1160-65 (1985)
(explaining that signification is not the result of a positive connection between the conceptual referent
and the thing to which one refers, but is the product of a negative differentiation from other concepts).
339. The contingent nature of any linguistic classificatory scheme is amusingly illustrated in the
preface to Michel Foucault's book, The Order of Things:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read
the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought--our thought, the thought that bears the
stamp of our age and our geography-breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes
with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing
long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same
and Other. This passage quotes a "certain Chinese encyclopedia" in which it is written that
'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking
pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (b) included in the present classification,
(i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (I) et cetera,
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies:' In the
wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing that we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that,
by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the
limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.
FOUCAULT, supra note 64, at xv (italics in original).
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For instance, the quality of being "gruel" ("i.e., examined before a given date
and green, or not so examined and blue"34 ) is no less real than green or
blue, but when was the last time.you saw it?
34
'
For purposes of this Article, more important than the function of language
in sorting reality is the role it plays in filling in the details of reality. 42 The
categories of language provide a stock of information about the phenomena
it labels. Any linguistic classification of an object or event simultaneously
provides a basis for inference about the attributes of the thing classified. The
capacity to draw inferences results from the fact that a linguistic label
identifies a category. In applying that label to a particular instance, we "go
beyond the information given" by clothing the instance with the attributes of
the category. 43 Thus, for example, when we decide based on appearance
that an animal is a "dog," we round out what it is we are seeing with a whole
set of expectations that derive not from this particular animal but from our
beliefs about what dogs as a category are like. Because of the stock of
information contained in the concept "dog," we are able to infer on the basis
of what seems like a simple act of identification (that is, putting the correct
label on what it is we see) a range of unseen expectations, "that it is trainable,
capable of loyalty, able to bark, and likely to chase cats but is unlikely to
climb trees, purr, or wash its coat."
3
"
Concepts such as "dog" exemplify the simplest sort of knowledge structures
which highlight a fairly limited set of characteristics. Cognitive psychologists
have extended and refined the concept to include more complex structures and
to distinguish among types of knowledge structures. Though there is no single
agreed upon terminology or classification,345 one commonly used term for
a set of beliefs more elaborate than the linguistic concept of "dog" is the
"schema. ' 34 6
A schema is a cognitive structure that represents some stimulus domain.347
Schemata are distinguished from the simplest concepts in that they are mental
340. GOODMAN, supra note 70, at 10.
341. To take another a well-worn example, Eskimos distinguish more than a dozen kinds of snow,
but have no word for government. J.C. Smith, The Unique Nature of the Concepts of Western Law, 46
CAN. B. REV. 191, 196 (1968), reprinted in COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTuRES 8 (Casaba Varga ed.,
1992).
342. BRUNER, supra note 336, at 219, 219-20; NIsBETT & Ross, supra note 336, at 17.
343. BRUNER, supra note 336, at 219, 219-20.
344. NissETrr & Ross, supra note 336, at 33.
345. Nisbett and Ross observe that there is "a growing list of terms, including 'frames,' 'scripts,'
'nuclear scenes,' and 'prototypes."' Id. at 28 (citations omitted). George Lakoff, a cognitive linguist, has
added "idealized cognitive models" to the list. LAKOFF, supra note 63, at 68.
346. See generally NISBEIT & Ross, supra note 336, at 33; William F. Brewer & Glenn V.
Nakamura, The Nature and Functions of Schemas, in I HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 119 (Robert
S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas SnaIl eds., 1984); Reid Hastie, Schematic Principles in Human Memory, in I
SOCIAL CGNmON: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 39 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1981); Shelly E. Taylor
& Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information Processing, in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, supra, at 89; Aaron Ben-Zeev, The Schema Paradigm in Perception, 9 J. MIND
& BEHAV. 487 (1988); Moore, Trial by Schema, supra note 116, at 279.
347. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 346, at 91.
[Vol. 70:405
POST-POSITMST JURY
structures that have a dynamic or relational aspect.3 48 The schema consists
of beliefs about the stimulus domain, including specification of relations
among its attributes and concrete examples of the domain.34 9 Like simple
concepts, schemata are used to "chunk" the social world into meaningful
units.35 As Taylor and Crocker note, "When a stimulus configuration is
encountered in the environment, it is matched against a schema, and the
ordering and relations among the elements of the schema are imposed on the
elements of the stimulus configuration. 35'
Schemata also enable us to fill in missing details by directing a search for
data or supplying "default options" when information called for by the schema
is missing.352 If told: "John sat down in a restaurant. He ordered roast beef
for dinner," we know on the basis of our restaurant schema that he also
consulted a menu and gave his order to a waiter or waitress. 353 Because
schemata enable us to "read between the lines" in this way, "our under-
standing of any social situation is considerably richer than would be given by
any mere transcript of the proceedings.
Two commonly recognized types of schemata are event-schemata (or
"scripts") and person-schemata (or "personae").355 Scripts are social
occurrences that extend over time in which the related elements are social
objects or events that involve the individual as actor or observer.356 They
348. NiSBET & Ross, supra note 336, at 33.
349. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 346, at 91.
350. Id. at 93.
351. Id. at 94. For instance, our "office party schema" enables us to comprehend a scene in which
a group of men and women are standing in a room talking and drinking and includes the identification
of the older man in the corner, talking at length to a group of deferential listeners, as the boss. Id.
352. Id. at 103-04; cf. Ben-Zeev, supra note 346, at 487-88 (contrasting the naive common sense
view that "[t]he act of perceiving does not change the properties of the perceptual environment, but
merely reveals them as they exist independently outside the perceiver" with the view that perception is
"constructive (or nonpure) [because] it contains information and features absent from the given physical
stimulus").
353. John B. Black et al., Comprehending Stories and Social Situations, in 3 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
COGNITION, supra note 346, at 45, 50.
354. Id. at 47. Researchers studying cognition and decision-making have also investigated the
mechanisms by which people make use of schemata to arrive at judgments about real world events.
They have concluded that people use schemata to interpret information in much the same way that a
scientist uses a theory or hypothesis to understand scientific data. That is, people understand the
relationship between schemata and events as one of probability in the same way that a scientist
understands the relation between data and a hypothesis as presenting a continuum according to the
degree of congruence or quality of fit. Hastie, supra note 346, at 43. In studying the process by which
these probability assessments are reached, investigators have concluded that decision-makers employ
a number of simplifying strategies or heuristics that prevent them from considering all available
information in an evenhanded manner. For example, the "representativeness" heuristic involves the use
of resemblance to solve problems of categorization. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BiAsEs 3, 4 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Salient features of the object are compared to
presumed characteristics of the category to decide whether the object is an instance of the category.
NSBErr & Ross, supra note 336, at 24.
355. Nisne=T & Ross, supra note 336, at 34-35. Alternative categorizations make additional
distinctions among schemata. For instance, Taylor and Crocker distinguish three types of schemata:
person-schemata, role-schemata, and event-schemata. Taylor & Crocker, supra note 346, at 91.
356. NISBETr & Ross, supra note 336, at 34.
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are distinguished from other types of schemata in that the sequence of events
is understood to be causally related. Nisbett and Ross explain that "[e]arly
events in the sequence produce or at least 'enable' the occurrence of later
events." '357 Scripts range from the abstract and culturally ubiquitous, such
as the set of norms and expectations that guide behavior in ordering food at
a restaurant,358 to the concrete and idiosyncratic, such as the scripted
household routines of people who have lived together for a long period of
time.359 Scripts also differ in the extent to which they have their source in
direct personal experience or are learned vicariously from the larger
culture.
360
Personae are "cognitive structures representing the personal characteristics
and typical behavior of particular 'stock characters."' 36' Like scripts,
personae vary with respect to generality, pervasiveness, and source. Some
personae are relatively simple and well-defined. Occupational personae-
doctor, firefighter, and secretary-fit in this category. Others are more
elaborate and suggestive, like the Don Quixote image. Even the simplest
personae, though, often evince a broader spectrum of expectations than one
consciously realizes. 3
62
B. Research on Juror Decision-Making
The assumption of cognitive theorists that the use of subjective knowledge
structures is necessary for all perception and cognition363 has obvious
357. Id.
358. ROGER C. SCHANK & ROBERT P. ABELSON, ScRiPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING:
AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE STRucTuRES 42 (1977).
359. NiSBETT & Ross, supra note 336, at 34.
360. For a useful illustration of how schemata enable cognition by helping people give meaning to
the present, remember the past, and anticipate the future, see Moore, Trial by Schema, supra note 116,
at 279-81. Professor Moore poses the situation of a person in a convenience store when a man with a
stocking cap over his head rushes through the door, points a gun at the clerk, and runs out with the
contents of the till. The observer's preexisting mental construct of a robbery allows her to match the
features of the script with her observations to organize the series of events into a meaningful whole.
More importantly, it guides the focus of the observer's attention and provides a basis for inferring other
events and circumstances not observed. For instance, the observer might deduce that a getaway car was
parked outside or afterward describe the clerk as nervous during the robbery even though the observer
had her eyes on the gun throughout the incident. Finally, the observer's robbery schema serves as a
mnemonic for recollection. As unorganized stimuli from the environment, the events constituting the
robbery might be difficult to recall. The script that brings them all together and specifies the causal
connections that relate them to each other helps in the process of reconstructing those details. Id.
361. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 336, at 34.
362. This point is illustrated by the confusion with which many people respond to the following
story: A young man was rushed to the hospital after an automobile accident in which his father was
killed. When the man was taken into the operating room, the surgeon, upon seeing the patient, declared,
"I can't operate on this man, he is my son." The frequency with which this riddle stumps its listeners
demonstrates that our store of expectations about the attributes of surgeons includes, in addition to
function and dress, gender.
363. See Ben-Zeev, supra note 346, at 491 (noting that "a priori forms [that] constitute the
conceptual framework [are] necessary for empirical knowledge"). Ben-Zeev contrasts the operation of
inferential processes with the working of a perceptual schema. Unlike "the inferential paradigm
[wherein] reasoning processes precede and produce a finished perceptual product separate from the
processes themselves[,] ... [a perceptual] schema is constantly participating in the ongoing state of
perceiving because it is the way the perceptual system is 'tuned."' Id.
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implications for the decision-making tasks ofjurors, and sharply conflicts with
the model of jury decision-making implicit in the rules of evidence and the
specifications of juror qualification. In contrast to the traditional conception
of the legal decision-maker as a comparatively passive receptor, "[t]he central
characterization of the performing organism in the cognitive view is as an
active, goal-seeking, purposive creature."'36 Whereas the legal model
regards the relation between the evidence and the proof categories as
relatively direct, the cognitive model presupposes that all knowledge is
mediated through the subjective mental structures of the individual. In contrast
with the legal system's "copy" theory, which regards mental representations
as literal reflections of the properties of the thing represented,365 schema
theories assume large differences between the structure and content of a
stimulus and its mental representation.3 66 In contrast with the legal system's
assumption of the fungible character of legal decision-makers, "[a] key
ingredient in every current cognitive theory is a mental model of the current
'subjective world' of the information processor and a set of goals and
associated plans that are executed to act on the current environment to change
this environment toward a more highly valued state. 367
Researchers applying the assumptions that underlie current approaches to
cognition have developed models ofjury decision-making that sharply diverge
from the model implicit in legal rules. Political scientists Lance Bennett and
Martha Feldman were drawn to the .question of juror decision-making
processes through their efforts to identify the links between the formal
criminal justice process and commonly held understandings of social
judgment.3 6' They began with the observation that the witnesses, spectators,
jurors, attorneys, and judges who participate in the justice system have vastly
different relationships to the law and possess widely divergent understandings
of formal justice processes. 369 For these individuals to be able to communi-
cate with each other, there must exist some common denominator by which
the process could be rendered accessible to all, a device for translating the
language of formal dispute resolution into everyday understandings.30 After
conducting a year long ethnographic study of criminal trials in King County,
Washington, Bennett and Feldman concluded that the link which connects
popular understandings of the terms for social judgment with the formal
364. Hastie, supra note 346, at 44 (citations omitted).
365. Id. at 42.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 44 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the relation between the
cognitive assumptions of British empiricism and schema theory, see Brewer & Nakamura, supra note
346, at 126-36.
368. W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCMNG REALITY IN THE COURTROOM:
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981).
369. Id. at 11.
370. Id. at 3-4.
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processes of the criminal justice system is their common understanding and
use of stories.37'
A story, as Bennett and Feldman use the term, is a symbolic model of social
action defined in terms of a limited number of elements and kinds of
structural relations among those elements. They use Kenneth Burke's five
social action elements-scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose-to define the
components of a story.372 Every story will include a central action,37 3
which is the element with the most connections to other elements and which
answers the question of what the story is about.374 The story elements are
linked through direct observational or "empirical" connections;3. through
the stock of information that makes up the categories of language or
"language category" connections; 376 through "logical" connections, meaning
invariant relations between types of phenomena or events;3 77 through
"normative" views about proper behavior in particular circumstances; 37 8 and
through "aesthetic" connections based on a sense that some types of symbolic
relationships seem more "acceptable, familiar, pleasing, or satisfying than
others. '379 The structural model of a story provides a "frame" for system-
atizing and simplifying social action that is both polysomic and far too
complex for exhaustive description.380 By specifying "the types of symbols
that can be assigned together, the connections that can be drawn between
various symbols, and the features of a situation that have to be symbolized to
produce a complete and interpretable account, '38' the story form enables
371. Id. at 3, 11. The story form, according to Bennett and Feldman, is an ideal mechanism for
linking the criminal justice system and common sense understandings of the world because it is a
universally shared interpretive context by which social life is organized and communicated. "In everyday
social situations people use stories as a means of conveying selective interpretations of social behavior
to others." Id. at 7-8. Recognizing the way stories are used to translate social judgments into legal
outcomes permits a wholesale reconceptualization of the justice process. Rather than regarding the
process as one in which a socially exogenous and essentially alien interpretive standard-"the law"--is
the central dynamic, the formal justice process can be seen as the "means of mobilizing dominant
models of social reality as standards for judging behavior." Id. at 162.
372. Id. at 62.
373. Id. at 47.
374. Id. at 79.
375. Id. at 50. The authors provide an eyewitness' account of the defendant husband adding rat
poison to a hot drink he later gave to his wife as an example of an empirical connection. The witness'
observation links the husband's motive and opportunity to kill his wife with her death. Id.
376. Id. at 52. For example, in a passage that reads, "The baby cried; mommy picked it up," it is
commonly understood that "mommy" is the mother of the baby. Id.
377. Id. at 56. As the term is used here, "logic" allows one to conclude from the statement, "We
were waiting for our contact to deliver the drugs when a car drove up," that the engine of the car was
running, because "driving" presumes a variety of constituent conditions including a running engine. Id.
378. Id. at 57. For instance, Patty Hearst "should" have tried to escape on one of several occasions
when she was left unguarded if she was, as she claimed, being held against her will. Since she did not,
there was no link to support a connection to her alleged status as a kidnap victim, and the story relying
on that link was therefore deficient. Id. at 57-58.
379. Id. at 59. Jurors may, for example, accept a link between working as a prostitute and committing
a robbery on aesthetic grounds even though empirical or categorical grounds for such a connection are
weak. Id. at 61.
380. Id. at 66-67.
381. Id. at 67.
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decision-makers to present social action in an unambiguous form making that
presentation susceptible to judgment for its completeness and consistency.382
The significant implication of Bennett and Feldman's theory is that the
credibility of a story depends on its structural adequacy rather than its
evidentiary validation. The authors tested that hypothesis with an experiment
designed to identify the criteria by which people judge the truth of stories.
They employed forty-nine graduate students and instructed each student to tell
the other forty-eight a story about "things that people do" or "things that can
happen to people." '383 A randomly selected and disguised portion of the
group recounted false stories to the audience, while the remainder of the
group told stories that were true.3" 4 The members of the audience rated the
truth of the story based solely on the storyteller's account.385 Bennett and
Feldman defined and operationalized a test for structural coherence in terms
of the number of ambiguities38 6 in the story weighted according to the
complexity of the story, the number of structural connections, and the
proximity of the ambiguities to the story's central action.38 7 The researchers
then measured both the correlation between the actual truth of the story and
the audience guesses and the correlation between the audience's assessment
of the truth of a story and its structural adequacy.
The results showed a lack of correlation between audience guesses about the
truth or falsity of a story and its actual status,38 but a strong correlation
between structural coherence and story credibility.3 9 The researchers also
measured the correlation between credibility and various other features of the
story-length, number of actions, number of pauses by the storyteller, and
duration of pauses-and found none of the other correlations to be statistically
significant.39 ° Moreover, the correlation between structural ambiguity and
credibility was just as strong when each of the other story variables was
controlled.39'
The results of the study support the authors' central claim-that the
credibility of a story depends largely on its structural plausibility. The
inherent implausibility of one of Bennett and Feldman's illustrations provides
additional intuitive support for this point. The defendant was seen entering a
house from which the occupants had just driven away. The police arrived and
found the family silver assembled on the dining room table. After searching
the house, the police captured the defendant as he stepped out onto the roof
382. Id. at 66-67.
383. Id. at 73.
384. Id. at 70.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 71. The researchers defined ambiguity in three ways: as an absence of an interpretive rule
connecting two story elements; many possible connections but no basis for selecting among them; and
connections among some elements that were inconsistent with the connections among others. Id.
387. Id. at 84.
388. Id. ("iThere is no intrinsic quality in true or false stories that telegraphs accurate impressions
to interpreters").
389. Id. at 85 ("As structural ambiguities in stories increase, credibility decreases, and vice versa.").
390. Id. at 86-88.
391. Id.
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from a second floor window. The defendant admitted that he had entered the
house, collected the silver, and was leaving through the window, but he
denied having committed a burglary. He claimed that he entered the house to
find someplace to sleep, took the silver and stacked it on the table to admire
it, went upstairs in search of a bed, and stepped out onto the roof because the
room was stuffy. 92 Though one can imagine circumstances in which such
a story would be credited, most people would conclude that it is probably
false without any extrinsic clues regarding the defendant's credibility. The
story, using Bennett and Feldman's terms, is structurally deficient in that the
connections between the events are not plausible according to accepted rules
of interpretation. 93
Bennett and Feldman's conclusions are at odds with the assumptions that
underlie the legal system's modeling of the factfinding process. The proof
rules treat a fact as proven when it is shown by the evidence to be probably
true. Underlying these rules is the realist assumption that truth consists in a
correspondence relation between ideas and the external world. To be proven
at trial, a proposition of fact must be connected to the real world by evidence.
The implication of Bennett and Feldman's theory is that the test for the
truth or adequacy of a story does not consist exclusively of its connection
with an external referent but depends in large part on its internal coherence.
Jurors will accept a party's presentation at trial if it passes the test of
structural sufficiency according to a priori standards of what constitutes an
adequate account of the litigated event.
Another pair of researchers, Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, has reached
similar conclusions using more rigorous empirical methods.394 According to
their "explanation-based" model of evidence evaluation, decision-makers begin
by constructing a "causal explanation" of the evidence 391 made up of three
components: the evidence, "related world knowledge," and "expectations
392. Id. at 103-04.
393. Id. at 104.
394. The results of Pennington and Hastie's empirical studies are reported in Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 242 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation]; Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); and Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based
Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgement, 14 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 521 (1988) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Effects of Memory
Structure]. The results of their empirical studies are summarized in Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991)
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory]. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision-
Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981) summarizes prior research
on juror decision-making, and Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Theory of Explanation-Based
Decision Making, in DECISION MAKIG IN ACTION: MODELS AND METHODS 188 (Gary A. Klein et al.
eds., 1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making] contains a general description of the
theory of explanation-based decision-making. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Practical Implications
of Psychological Research on Juror and Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 90 (1990) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Practical ImplicPtions] outlines some of the
implications of the authors' conclusions for jury trial practice.
395. Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 188; Pennington & Hastie, Effects
of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 521.
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about what constitutes an adequate explanation in the decision domain."3 96
From these three components the decision-maker constructs "a mental
representation of the evidence that constitutes an interpretation of what the
evidence is about, incorporating inferred events and causal connections
between events in addition to relevant evidentiary events. 397
What distinguishes Pennington and Hastie's explanation-based approach
from traditional decision-making models is "the hypothesis that decision
makers construct an intermediate summary representation of the evidence, and
that this representation, rather than the original 'raw' evidence, is the basis
of the final decision. '398 Whereas earlier algebraic models emphasized the
computation of evidence, 39 9 the explanation-based approach regards "reason-
ing about the evidence to be a central process in decision making. 4 0
Like Bennett and Feldman, Pennington and Hastie propose that jurors use
stories as their model. 40 ' According to Pennington and Hastie, a story is a
general knowledge structure in which a sequence of events is represented as
connected by relationships of physical and intentional causality.4 2 The types
of relationships that connect story elements include "initiation" of psycholo-
gical states or goals by prior physical states or other story episodes.
Psychological states and goals provide the "reasons" for the actor's actions,
which in turn "result" in certain outcomes or consequences.
4 3
396. Pennington & Hastie, Effects of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 521; see also Pennington
& Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 192 (arguing that in addition to the evidence presented
at trial, jurors apply two different kinds of knowledge: expectations about what makes a story complete
and knowledge about events similar in content to those that are the topic of dispute).
397. Pennington & Hastie, Effects of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 521.
398. Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 188; see also Pennington & Hastie,
Effects of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 523 (comparing other models ofjuror decision-making
and distinguishing the researchers' own approach).
399. See, e.g., Hastie, supra note 124, at 84; Kaplan, supra note 124, at 198.
400. Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 189 (emphasis in original).
401. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 525-26; Pennington & Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 243. According to the authors' more general theory, the
structure of the causal model the decision-maker uses will depend on the decision domain. Pennington
& Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 190; Pennington & Hastie, Effects of Memory Structure,
supra note 394, at 521. For instance, a medical internist employs a "'model of the patient'." Pennington
& Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 197 (quoting William J. Clancey, Acquiring,
Representing, and Evaluating a Competence Model of Diagnostic Strategy, in THE NATURE OF
EXPERTISE 343 (Michelene T.H. Chi et al. eds., 1988)). The knowledge structures of an economic
forecaster "are modeled as a graph of directed signed connections between economic quantities."
Pennington & Hastie, Decision Making, supra note 394, at 198 (citations omitted).
402. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 525; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence
Evaluation, supra note 394, at 243.
403. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 525; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence
Evaluation, supra note 394, at 243. For a slightly different version, see Tom Trabasso & Paul van den
Broek, Causal Thinking and the Representation of Narrative Events, 24 J. OF MEMORY & LANGUAGE
612, 625-26 (1985). Stories typically do not consist of a single human action sequence but instead
include a number of hierarchically embedded "episodes," each of which has the basic story structure.
The highest level episode characterizes the most important features of "what happened." The component
parts of this episode may themselves be story episodes. For instance, a lower level episode may
constitute the initiating event for a higher level episode. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra
note 394, at 526-27; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 244.
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A juror's general knowledge about the structure of stories serves several
important functions. First, expectations about what constitutes a story help the
juror organize information by defining what kinds of information are
necessary and by defining the types of connections between events. Second,
the hierarchical character of the model guides a juror's assessment of the
relative importance of various pieces of evidence. The highest level episode
represents the most important sequence. Finally, the model provides a basis
for making judgments about the completeness of the evidence. A story is
complete when all necessary parts are present.
A: sequence from Pennington and Hastie's experimental stimulus illustrates
how this abstract model maps onto an actual human action sequence. 40 5 Two
men, Caldwell and Johnson, are in a bar. Caldwell's girlfriend, Sandra Lee,
approaches Johnson and asks for a ride to the race track the next day. This
initiates a psychological state in Caldwell, who then becomes angry.
Caldwell's anger provides the reason for his action of brandishing a razor and
threatening Johnson. This action results in Johnson backing off, a conse-
quence. The entire episode is an initiating event for one version of a
subsequent homicide: Caldwell's threat causes Johnson to be angry, causes
him to want revenge against Caldwell, and causes him to stab and kill
Caldwell.
In the second stage of the jurors' decision-making process, jurors learn of
the decision alternatives from the judge's instructions on the law.40 6 This
information takes the form of a category label-for example, murder,
manslaughter, self defense-with a list of features that are required for that
category. The types of features specified in the category include identity,
actions, the mental state accompanying those actions, and circumstances
present when the actions are taken.4 7 The juror's actual decision results
404. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 527; Pennington & Hastie, Effects
of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 522. Pennington and Hastie identify two "certainty principles"
that govern the acceptance and level of confidence in a story. A story's "coverage" of the evidence
refers to the extent to which the story accounts for all the evidence. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive
Theory, supra note 394, at 527-28. The greater the coverage, the higher the level of acceptability of the
story as the correct explanation. Id. at 528. The second certainty principle, "coherence," has three
components. Id. A story is' "consistent" to the extent that it is free of internal contradictions,
contradictions in the credible evidence, or contradictions in parts of the explanation. A story is
"plausible" to the extent that it is consistent with the decision-maker's beliefs about what typically
happens in the world. And a story is "complete" to the extent that all structural elements are present.
The combined value of the story's consistency, plausibility, and completeness yields its overall
coherence and affects the degree of acceptance of and confidence in the story. If only one story is
coherent, this unique account will be accepted as the explanation for the evidence. If there is more than
one coherent explanation, "belief in any one of them over the others will be lessened." Id.
405. This sequence appears in Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 526.
406. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 529; Pennington & Hastie, Effects
of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 522; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note
394, at 244. Not surprisingly, juror beliefs about the law are not derived exclusively from the judge's
instructions, but are also influenced by jurors' exposure to extra-judicial sources of information in the
larger culture. Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and the Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the
Law, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 507 (1993).
407. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 529; Pennington & Hastie, Effects
of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 522; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note
394, at 244. Not mentioned by the authors is the "result" required by the definition of some crimes, such
as homicide.
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from matching the accepted story with a verdict category.0 8 The relatively
close correlation between the features of the verdict category and the elements
of a story facilitate this matching.
40 9
What is significant about the claims of Bennett and Feldman as well as
those of Pennington and Hastie is that they both suggest that "the structure of
a story," how well it conforms to an a priori model, "can be just as important
as its documentation" in assessing its truth.410 This claim presents a direct
challenge to the legal system's modeling of the decision-making task, which
places exclusive emphasis on evaluation of the probative strength of the proof.
Acceptance of the centrality of stories in the evaluation of evidence does not
mean that validation of individual items of evidence is of no consequence, nor
that judgments of fact are based purely on their structural properties.41
Most obviously, a story will be deemed structurally incomplete if a necessary
element is lacking because it has not been proven to exist. The centrality of
stories in evaluating evidence does mean, though, that normative expectations
about how the world works play a central role in determinations of what is
true. Although our factfinding procedures are supposedly designed to establish
connections between legal facts and real world events, "symbolic representa-
tions on which verdicts are based may have little to do with what 'really'
happened."4" 2 As Bennett and Feldman conclude,
[T]he stories that trial participants construct represent capsule versions of
reality. In the process of taking incidents from one social context and
placing them in another, the actor selects data, specifies the historical
frame, redefines situational factors, and suggests missing observations. In
short, he or she can re-present an episode in a version that conforms with
his or her perspective both during and after the incident. This does not
mean that the storytellers have complete freedom to create reality. It simply
reflects the importance of the choice of symbols and the structure of
relations among them in a story format.413
C. Juror Difference and Juror Performance
The story model contradicts the legal system's modeling of the proof
process according to which proof consists of the validation of propositions by
connecting them to "real world" events. The significant implication of the
408. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 530-31; Pennington & Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 244-45.
409. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 530-31; Pennington & Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 245. Pennington and Hastie tested their theory with a number
of empirical investigations based on high fidelity simulations. The results supported the conclusions that
(1) the mental representations of evidence constructed by jurors conform to story structure, and (2) that
juror verdict preferences are associated with distinct story structures. Id. at 245-53.
410. BENN=TT & FELDMAN, supra note 368, at 67.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 65.
413. Id. (footnote omitted); see also Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am, supra note 111 (illustrating
through analysis of sexual assault and harassment cases that the truth of stories is determined by
evaluating how the story is constructed).
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story model is that the coherence of a story-the relation of the elements to
each other rather than to an external referent-is a principal criterion for
acceptance of the truth of the story.
The main focus of the research discussed above is on the way in which
jurors evaluate evidence, rather than on the roots of juror disagreement.
Indeed, one of the central findings of this research is that in one respect all
jurors respond to the evidence in the same way. At least for criminal trials,
the story form is universal; all jurors fit the evidence into the basic story
format of purposive action sequences.
Although not explicitly concerned with the relation between jurors and their
verdicts, one important subsidiary conclusion from the research is that
different jurors construct different stories. This finding is consistent with the
findings of other research that jurors disagree on the first ballot in about two-
thirds of all cases,4 14 and with the collective judgment of generations of trial
lawyers that jury composition matters.1 5 In explaining that different jurors
construct different stories, Pennington and Hastie observe that the factors that
will have the most influence on which story the jurors construct "have to do
with assumptions they make about the way the social world 'works.'
41 6
This background knowledge about the world is the third ingredient, along with
case-specific information presented during the trial and generic expectations
about the structure of stories, that jurors use in constructing stories. 417 This
background knowledge includes such "common sense" notions as: "A person
who is big and known t6 be a troublemaker causes people to be afraid";
41 8
"[s]ometimes when people drink they get nasty";4 19 and "[n]ormally a
person wouldn't carry a big knife in their ... front pocket. '420 Jurors use
such assumptions, along with the information introduced into evidence and
analogies to similar experiences and imagined events, to arrive at the
intermediate conclusions that make up the events of their stories.42 '
To illustrate how jurors reason from world knowledge and the evidence
presented at trial to construct story elements, Pennington and Hastie present
the following example:
414. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 487-88 (1966).
415. One study that attempted to systematically investigate whether attorney efforts to seat favorable
juries influence outcomes-by reconstructing the jury as it would have existed without peremptory
challenges--concluded that while the exercise of peremptory challenges does not necessarily influence
the outcome in every case, cases in which peremptory challenges do have an impact occur with some
frequency. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 134, at 5 18-19. For an intriguing examination of how jury
selection affected the result in one particular high-profile case, see Hans Zeisel & Shari Siedman
Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 151
(1976).
416. Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications, supra note 394, at 97; see also HASTIE ET AL.,
supra note 199, at 130.
417. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 521-22; Pennington & Hastie, Effects
of Memory Structure, supra note 394, at 522.
418. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 524.
419. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 247.
420. Id.
421. See Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 524.
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A typical deduction from world knowledge consists of the following
premise (P1-P3) and conclusion (C) structure: P1 = A person who is big
and known to be a troublemaker causes people to be afraid. P2 = Caldwell
was big. P3 = Caldwell was known to be a troublemaker. C = Johnson was
afraid.... [Thus], the juror matches features of Caldwell from evidence
(P2) and from a previous inferential conclusion (P3) to world knowledge
about the consequences of being confronted with such [a] person (P1) to
infer that Johnson was afraid (C).422
As the authors point out, this reasoning process involves a representativeness
judgment in which the features of the concrete facts about Caldwell are
matched to a prototypic situation-a personae schema. The certainty of the
juror's conclusion is a function of the quality of the match.423 The conclu-
sion that Johnson, the homicide defendant, was afraid of Caldwell, the victim,
is thus dependent on a nonevidentiary assumption about the effect large-sized
troublemakers have on other people; this conclusion also forms a crucial
component of the story in which Johnson acted in self-defense. Different
jurors possessed of different beliefs about the social world arrive at different
conclusions. For example, another subject in the experiment decided that
Johnson was embarrassed by Caldwell's threats and concluded on that basis
that Johnson went to the bar intending to kill Caldwell.424
Though never explicitly developed, this description suggests that knowledge
structures operate at two levels of abstraction in the interpretation of evidence
in criminal trials. At the highest level, the basic story structure provides the
map for organizing comprehension of all human action sequences. All jurors
in criminal trials fit the evidence into the basic story form. Schemata, less
abstract knowledge structures that represent some defined area of social life,
operate at a lower level. They are employed in constructing the "local"
linkages which establish the intentional and causal connections that make up
the story.425 The diversity and richness of these domain-specific schemata
produce "great flexibility in the inferences we can make, and thus in the range
of possible ways in which we comprehend social behavior.
426
422. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 524; see also Pennington &
Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 254 (discussing the Johnson hypothetical).
423. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 394, at 254. The authors conclude that
judgment heuristics actually comprise only a subset of the conditions that affect certainty of judgment,
and refer to a broader range of "certainty conditions" including "(a) typicality of the instances of their
categories ... ; (b) base rates of the properties under consideration ... ; (c) variability in the
knowledge from which the general premise arises ... ; (d) dissimilarity between the instance and the
most similar group that behaves in a discrepant manner." Id. (italics in original). Full consideration of
the complexity of this process is beyond the scope of this Article.
424. Id.; see also Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 394, at 524-25.
425. Cf Black et al., supra note 353, at 48-52 (discussing "causal inferences" and "goal-related
inferences" in story construction). The authors distinguish between "coherence inferences [which]
provide 'local' linkages between pairs of statements in a story or actions in some social situation" and
"memory-unit inferences [which] are 'global' linkages that tie together packages of story statements into
memory units at a higher level." Id. at 48. Causal and goal-related inferences provide examples of
coherence inferences.
426. Id. at 46; see also Moore, Trial by Schema, supra note 116, at 273-81. In an extended
discussion of a thoroughly unexceptional hypothetical criminal trial, Professor Moore shows how
schemata and the representativeness heuristic crucially influence jurors' attention to and interpretation
of the evidence. For instance, in one of Professor Moore's minor examples, a juror's evaluation of a tort
plaintift's claim that she was especially careful in approaching the intersection where the auto accident
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Other researchers who have directly addressed the process by which
differences among jurors are translated into different verdicts have reached
complementary conclusions. This research has shown that the traditional
assumption of a category of "evidence" standing in opposition to subjective
juror attitudes is untenable, and that what the evidence is in any given case
will be a function of the beliefs and attitudes of the decision-makers.427
Research on the relation between death penalty attitudes and juror perfor-
mance shows that such attitudes are not narrow beliefs directly influencing
correspondingly narrow aspects of the juror's performance. Rather, as
discussed above,428 attitudes toward the death penalty are associated with a
whole constellation of beliefs and attitudes that comprise a locally coherent
ideology about the criminal justice system. That ideology, moreover,
indirectly shapes the evidence in the case through the juror's perceptions of
the plausibility of prosecution and defense witnesses and the availability of
different scripts or stories for understanding the crime.429 As a result, two
conscientious jurors exposed to the same evidence may develop reconstruc-
tions of the facts and implications of those facts that are "surprisingly
dissimilar. ' '430
The experimental stimulus used in one of the death penalty studies
illustrates how jurors' prior beliefs about the nature of the social world
influence their interpretation of trial evidence. 43  The stimulus was a
videotaped simulation of the testimony of a white police officer and a black
defendant regarding an incident that led to the arrest of the defendant for
assault. The officer testified that he was on crowd-control duty at a large
auditorium when the defendant tried to break through a line of police. The
defendant became belligerent, then struck the officer on the chin when the
officer tried to take him aside to explain the need for dispersing the crowd.
The defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was moving against the
flow of pedestrians to reach friends from whom he had become separated.
When he tried to explain this to the officer, the officer pulled him aside,
verbally abused him with racial slurs, and then beat him without provoca-
tion.432
occurred because she had seen an accident at that very location one week earlier might be influenced
by the juror's having had the same experience of exercising care when approaching the scene of an
earlier accident. Id. at 276-77.
427. See John R. Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury
Selection, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1980) ("The data suggest that the strength of the evidence
is relative, influenced by case-relevant juror attitudes. Attitudes toward those issues which constitute the
basis for the case and toward those social groups which testify during the trial influence one's perception
of the evidence presented by prosecution and defense.').
428. See supra part II.B.S.
429. Thompson et al., supra note 330, at 110; see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between
Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra
note 124, at 61.
430. Thompson et al., supra note 330, at 110-11.
431. Id. at 101-02.
432. Id.
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The researchers found that death-qualified and excludable jurors reached
significantly different conclusions on a variety of evidentiary issues presented
by the testimony. The death-qualified and excludable jurors differed on their
assessment of the credibility of the officer and the defendant; the plausibility
of various factual claims (e.g., whether the defendant struck the officer and
whether the officer used racial slurs); inferences from the facts (such as who
initiated the struggle and whether the officer was too rough); and attributes
of the witnesses (whether the officer had racial bias or the defendant was
unduly hostile to police).433 In explaining these differences, the researchers
concluded that the jurors used prior beliefs about the typical behavior of
police officers and young blacks to construe ambiguities and fill in missing
details in the evidence. The researchers observed that
[t]he death-qualified subjects may have been more likely than the
excludables to believe the defendant threatened.., and struck the
officer... because these actions are consistent with their beliefs about
how young blacks are likely to behave when restrained by a police officer,
while excludables are more likely to expect brutality by the officer.434
D. "Perceptual Fault Lines"
In assessing the implications of these findings for the debate over jury
reform, it might be deemed necessary to resolve the question of whether the
nonevidentiary assumptions that shape constructions of social reality are
distributed randomly in the population or break along racial, ethnic, gender,
or class lines. Although the case for a more aggressive commitment to
inclusive jury selection techniques does not stand or fall on whether jury
composition affects jury performance,435 demonstrating that the group
identity of jurors is associated with particular evidence constructions and
verdict choices would seem to make the argument for reform compelling.
Certainly, if juror decision-making is systematically related to race, gender,
433. Id. at 103.
434. Id. at 105. Another group of researchers has attempted to address directly the interactive
influence of juror characteristics and the trial evidence in producing the verdict. Jonathan D. Casper &
Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making
in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING,
supra note 124, at 65; Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight
Bias, 13 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 291 (1989). Using a statistical technique called "path analysis," which
is designed to measure the mutual influence among members of a set of causally related variables, the
researchers investigated the effects of several different juror beliefs and attitudes on the size of juror
damage awards in civil actions for illegal police searches. This methodology enabled them to test
whether the individual differences among jurors influenced the verdict directly when juror recall and
interpretation of the evidence was controlled, or whether the juror variables influenced the size of the
award indirectly through their influence on the jurors' interpretation of the evidence. Based upon two
mock juror studies, the researchers concluded that the jurors' recall and interpretation of the evidence
was the strongest determinant of juror decisions, but that attitudinal variables and knowledge about the
outcome of the search strongly influenced the reconstructions of the evidence. Casper & Benedict, supra,
at 77, 81.
435. For instance, public confidence in the jury's decision will depend in part on the composition
of the jury, irrespective of the decision.
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income, or other identifiable juror attributes, to tolerate the exclusion of
groups possessing beliefs and attitudes which are relevant to the jury's task
would be inexcusable.
Just how far juror performance correlates with juror group identity is very
difficult to determine. It is probably true that most of the nonevidentiary
assumptions that influence jury verdicts are either altogether haphazard or
understandable in retrospect, but difficult or impossible to predict in
advance.436 On the other hand, it seems highly likely that, at least in some
types of cases, the group identity of jurors does influence juror performance.
Some indication of the extent to which beliefs relevant to juror performance
are associated with group identity can be gleaned from systematic empirical
investigations of the relation between juror identity and verdict preferences.
This research, which has been thoroughly reviewed elsewhere, 437 has
produced somewhat inconsistent results and does not support the broad
conclusion that juror attributes can be used to predict performance across all
categories of cases.438 This failure of social science to identify strong
predictors of juror decisions in stable juror attributes may in part be the result
of the predominant research strategy of seeking to identify people who would
be either conviction- or acquittal-prone regardless of the kind of case.439
Those characteristics may not necessarily translate into predictable decision
436. See Ellsworth, supra note 429, at 42 ("The process by which a juror comes to a decision about
the right verdict may resemble Brownian motion more than it does the Galilean laws of cause and
effect."). While a skillful and well-prepared attorney might sometimes be able to identify jurors with
relevant experiences through probing voir dire, (see, e.g., the mock voir dire reported in Spence, supra
note 121, at 51, in which the attorney more or less stumbles on the fact that one of the potential jurors
developed a physical deformity as a result of a childhood disease, an experience which the attorney
believes might influence the juror's acceptance of the defense claim that the defendant developed
schizophrenia as a result of childhood abuse), there must be many occasions in which the pretrial
identification of jurors with beliefs or experiences that will prove relevant to the case is impossible.
437. For comprehensive reviews of the social science literature on the relation between race and jury
verdicts, see Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1625-43
(1985), and King, supra note 111, at 82-99.
438. See RrrA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 445-46 (1980) (finding "only
slight and not consistent differences in the verdicts of jurors with different class, ethnic, and sexual
characteristics"); Ellsworth, supra note 429, at 45-46 (asserting that the only juror characteristics that
have been reliably shown to correlate with juror verdicts are gender in rape cases and juror attitudes
toward the death penalty); Norbert Kerr, Stochastic Models of Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 124, at 116, 121-33 (summarizing
and analyzing research); Hepburn, supra note 427, at 90 ("Although the relationship between
demographic factors and jurors' verdicts has been substantiated, it is evident that there is no uniform
set of predictor variables that can be applied universally.").
One recent article found a clear correlation betweenjuror ethnicity and jury decisions with Caucasian
and Hispanic jurors. Dolores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors on Jury Decisions, 23
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1249 (1993). The article reported on a mock juror study involving 480
subjects who saw videotaped trials of Caucasian or Hispanic defendants and deliberated in six-member
juries. The results were analyzed for the effect of the ethnicity of the jurors and the defendant on the
decision. The authors found that the ethnicity of the defendant had no effect on the conviction rate:
Hispanic defendants were convicted 62% of the time and Caucasians were convicted 59% of the time.
Id. at 1256. They also found, however, that Caucasian-majority juries were significantly more likely to
convict (79%) than Hispanic-majority juries (52%). Id. Consistent with the argument advanced here, the
authors explain their results in terms of juror use of stereotypes in the attribution of personal
responsibility. Id. at 1258-59.
439. See Ellsworth, supra note 429, at 45 (criticizing this approach).
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preferences because juror characteristics influence performance mediately by
shaping the intermediate interpretation of the evidence, rather than by shaping
the decision directly." Thus, it is possible that group-specific assumptions
frequently influence jury decision-making but that in many cases their effect
is nondirectional. That is, diversifying the jury's standards for describing the
social world may enrich the factfinding process generally without systemati-
cally orienting it toward conviction or acquittal. In any case, while research
into the relation between jurors and their verdicts does not establish a
correlation between juror attributes and decisions in all cases, there is a
demonstrated correlation between race and decision in at least some
cases."'
One category of decisions that would seem to call for frequent invocation
of assumptions that are likely to correspond with cultural communities are
decisions about the interior mental states and proclivities of other persons-
parties, witnesses, and lawyers. Jurors in all kinds of trials, but especially in
criminal cases, are constantly called upon to make judgments about the
intention or motivation of the actors and to draw conclusions about the
likelihood of some action that either never materialized or was not witnessed.
Apart from the obvious case of deciding the mens rea of the accused, jurors
must also attribute motives to others based on external cues when evaluating
440. Hepburn, supra note 427, at 98 ("lIt is apparent that... attitudes contribute to the juror's
verdict only indirectly. The direct causal effects of case-relevant attitudes do not account for a significant
amount of the explained variation in verdict. Verdict is directly affected by the perceived strength of
evidene.... yet the perceived strength of evidence is related to juror's case-relevant attitudes."); see
also Ellsworth, supra note 429, at 61 (observing that accumulated slight differences among jurors are
sometimes (though not always) "sufficient to move ajuror across the line from one verdict to another').
441. See Johnson, supra note 437, at 1625-43 (concluding that jurors tend to convict other-race
defendants under circumstances in which they would acquit same-race defendants); King, supra note
111, at 80-91 (concluding from a survey of social science literature that black and white juries assess
guilt differently when the defendant or victim is black, when the evidence is close, and when the case
involves racially charged issues). But see Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Comment, Reviewing the Empirical
Evidence on Jury Racism: Findings of Discrimination or Discriminatory Findings?, 69 NEB. L. REv.
230, 241-50 (1990) (disputing the conclusions of research which shows the impact of race in mock jury
studies).
Anecdotal evidence further supports the view that frameworks of interpretation that correspond to
cultural communities are mechanisms by which differences among jurors are translated into different
decisions. For instance, Valerie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar quote the following account of a black juror
who served in Los Angeles to demonstrate how "race-dependent context and knowledge may sometimes
be crucial":
"It seemed like the only reason that they arrested the [black] defendant [who was charged with
auto theft) was that someone in the gas station across the street looking out into the light in
the dark could identify the run-of-the-mill black man from 90 to 100 feet away. They arrested
him in the area of York Boulevard [a white neighborhood near Occidental College and
Pasadena]. Well, we all know what being black is on York Boulevard. I was raised and born
in Los Angeles so it is nothing new to me. If you are black and you're on York Boulevard at
four o'clock in the morning, they are going to pick you up. They will pick me up on York
Boulevard walking at four o'clock in the morning. This was the only thing that they seemed
to have against the man, so we acquitted him."
HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 169, at 50 (quoting Ralph Davis, Black Jurors, 30 GUILD PRAc. 112-13
(1973)) (citations omitted).
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circumstantial evidence 2 or when assessing the credibility of witnesses." 3
In many cases, jurors are required to decide what some actor would have done
had an event unfolded in some other way than it actually did. For instance,
in deciding whether Bernhard Goetz acted in self-defense when he shot four
young African-American men on a New York subway,"4 cultural beliefs
about the violent propensities of young black men inevitably played a
role." 5
In attributing mental states or predicting unfulfilled possibilities, jurors are
largely articulating their view of the way the world works, rather than simply
implementing the construction of reality proscribed by the legal system." 6
Many of the decisions jurors make are based on standards of describing the
world that are either prescribed by the legal system or are so universally
shared that it is fair to say the only judgment to be made is whether the fact
is or is not true. For example, in a homicide case the law prescribes that the
victim must be dead, and, for the most part, consensus over when someone
is dead leaves little room for the imposition of the juror's own construction
of the situation. But the decision whether a trial witness who testifies that the
victim is dead is telling the truth, or is careful, perceptive, or insightful, is
manifestly guided by the juror's framework for understanding others.
Normative expectations about what type of people are truthful, careful,
perceptive, or insightful, or how such a person behaves, are used to single out
from the total environment certain features of the witness' biography or past
or present behavior that our culture associates with truthfulness or accuracy.
We do not know, nor could we ever determine, how far or how frequently
the beliefs used in making such judgments correspond to certain ethnic, racial,
or gender communities. To be sure, the area of agreement over cultural
standards for describing reality is vastly more extensive than the area of
disagreement. 44 7 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that race, gender, and
442. For instance, does evidence that the victim broke off a romantic relationship with the accused
support a conclusion that the defendant had the motive to kill the victim?
443. Cf. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REv. 1157 (1994) (arguing that judgments of
credibility from common cultural cues are of little value in assessing actual truth of witness testimony).
444. New York v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (1986).
445. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. Rv. 781 (1994) (discussing the moral and legal implications
of considering the race of the victim in self-defense claims). As Professor Armour observes, "Virtually
every person in our society, especially if white, consciously or unconsciously compiles a mental library
of black stereotypes over the course of her life. The belief that blacks are prone to commit violent
assaults is among the most powerful and frightening myths in this library." Id. at 813.
446. Cf Lawrence Rosen, Intentionality and the Concept of the Person, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
NOMOS XXVII 52, 68 (1985) (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) ("[Mlotives and
intentions are neither wholly private nor independently causal: they are culturally characteristic
ascriptions by means of which the situations in which people find themselves and the kinds of people
they encounter are made more or less comprehensible.").
447. For instance, no adult in our society would answer the question "How was your day?" with a
description of having passed three red cars in a row in the office parking lot. Kim Lane Scheppele, The
Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1095, 1107 (1987). Universal assumptions about what
features of the environment are relevant rule out that response as inappropriate. Likewise, in Nelson
Goodman's famous example, there is universal agreement that a guard who, upon being told to shoot
any prisoner who moved, immediately shot them all because they were moving rapidly around the sun,
missed the point. GOODMAN, supra note 70, at 121.
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ethnicity are highly salient categories of social understanding in our society
and have been for a very long time." 8 Moreover, given the longstanding
social separation between the two gender communities, and the geographic
and social separation between racial communities," 9 it is not plausible that
this differential treatment has not resulted in members of these groups holding
different assumptions and having different experiences.45
To take one common, simple, and extremely important example, whites and
nonwhites have very different experiences with police.4"' Among other
differences, it is not the experience of most whites that police often lie or
conceal their true intentions. For many nonwhites, however, police deception
is accepted as a part of their social reality.45 2 As a result of the different
attributes included in white and nonwhite schemata for police officers, the two
races are likely to approach police testimony very differently. 453 Whether
or not the witness is telling the truth, white jurors may find it hard to believe
that police officers would intentionally lie, while black jurors are likely to
approach the testimony skeptically.
454
448. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (describing different styles of moral
reasoning for girls and boys); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,330 (1987) (arguing thatracism in America
"arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well
as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities'); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism,
and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 584-94 (1977)
(observing that race and sex in our society are much more than superficial physiological characteristics,
affecting both the way the individual looks at the world and the way the world looks at the individual).
449. See JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1980) (describing the
persistence of racial segregation); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63
U. COLO. L. REv. 325, 336-38 (1992) (containing a similar discussion of racial segregation). Though
the sexes are not geographically separated like the races, they are often socially and culturally
segregated.
450. See sources cited supra note 438. Notably, even some defenders of the current jury selection
procedures have recognized that groups which tend to be excluded might contribute useful insights to
the factfinding process, but these defenders minimize those contributions or suggest unrealistic solutions.
See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 248, at 369-70 (acknowledging that minority jurors might be
helpful in interpreting the significance of evidence that a young black defendant fled from police but
proposing that the same information could be presented through expert testimony). Just one of several
problems with this approach is the difficulty of anticipating what type of information would be helpful,
especially given that attorneys on whom that responsibility devolves are themselves a comparatively
homogeneous group.
451. See King, supra note Ill, at 88 and sources cited therein; Tracy Maclin, "Black and Blue
Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?,
26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243, 250-62 (1991).
452. Wasserstrom, supra note 448, at 598.
453. See id.; Jeff Rosen, Jurymandering: A Case Against Peremptory Challenges, NEW REPUBLIC,
Nov. 30, 1992, at 15-16 (citing the high acquittal rate among predominantly minority Washington, D.C.
juries as evidence that minority jurors are suspicious of police); Jerome H. Skolnick, The Jury Was
Never Meant To Be Rational, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at B7 (attributing the outcome in the King
beating case to the fact that the suburban, prosperous, and unicultural jurors who acquitted the officers
did not perceive police brutality in the beatings and noting that urban multicultural jurors tend not to
believe police officers).
454. The much-publicized trials of the four Los Angeles police officers accused of using excessive
force in arresting Rodney King involves a more complicated set of racially-based assumptions. Though
the beating that was the subject of the charges was recorded on videotape by an onlooker, what
happened on March 3, 1991, was, it appears, anything but clear. And what one saw was deeply
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Finally, the thesis that the fundamental assumptions which shape our
constructions of reality are not randomly distributed in the population but
follow ethnic, gender, racial, and class lines is supported by a large body of
literature, much of it written by women and racial and ethnic minorities whose
main message is that the standard account of life in the United States does not
comport with how they experience it.4s5 Though not about legal factfinding
per se, this literature teaches that there are "perceptual fault lines" in our
society and that these fault lines "occur at the boundaries between social
groups, between whites and people of color, between the privileged and the
poor, between men and women."45 6 Despite the fact that in some sense we
all inhabit the same culture,5 7 there are some areas of disagreement
influenced by one's beliefs about the typical or expected behavior of police officers and young black
males. Jurors whose actual or vicarious experience with police officers includes arbitrary harassment and
even violence would invariably interpret the images on the tape through the belief that police officers
frequently mistreat arrestees (or black or minority arrestees) and therefore would see a gratuitous
beating. On the other hand, if the images on the tape are viewed through the lens of a belief that young
underclass black males are violent, the officers' argument that they were simply protecting themselves
seems more plausible. Mark Cammack, Multicultural Justice: Diversity of Jurors Gives New Meaning
to Fair Trial, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 15, 1993, at A6; see also Lawrence Vogelman, The Big Black Man
Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 571 (1993) (explaining the verdict as the result of the jurors use of the stereotype of the Big
Black Man preying on whites); Anna Quindlen, Across the Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 4, at
17 (noting that the white jurors in the state prosecution of the officers accused of assaulting Rodney
King "walked into that [jury] room with the baggage most of us carry, the baggage of stereotypes and
ignorance and pure estrangement from African-Americans"); cf. Brian Stonehill, Facts, Lies and
Videotape, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at B7 (arguing that filmmakers invariably interpret the reality
they present).
One much-discussed recent example of divergent interpretations of the same event that have their
source in gender as well as race grew out of the hearings held on the nomination of Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas. Many observers attributed the all-male Senate Judiciary Committee's seeming
inability to comprehend Professor Anita Hill's allegations that Thomas sexually harassed her to the
Senators' lack of any conceptual framework for understanding her claims. Kim A. Taylor, Invisible
Woman: Reflections on the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 443,450 (1993);
see generally Symposium, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The Import
of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1992) (criticizing the male-
dominated Senate Judiciary Committee's inability to comprehend Anita Hill's allegations of sexual
harassment). Routine prosecutions for acquaintance rape provide a more pedestrian example of the
principle that culturally dependent standards for describing reality can produce divergent accounts of
the same event. Thus, a woman might discern compulsion in a variety of subtle forms of intimidation
and a latent potential for injury based on her smaller size and beliefs about the frequency of male
violence toward women. These perceptions, however, would be wholly invisible to a man whose concept
of force is more closely tied to actual or threatened physical violence. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE
60-68 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 183 (1989).
455. The literature sounding this theme is far too extensive to cite. However, for a useful treatment
of this issue, see Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). For a comprehensive
bibliography of one branch of this literature, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Critical Race
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
456. Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073, 2083 (1989).
457. As cultural anthropologists have pointed out, "members of a single society, though sharing in
a broad set of cultural assumptions, may nevertheless possess diverse interpretations of reality."
Lawrence Rosen, The Negotiation of Reality: Male-Female Relations in Sefrou, Morocco, in WOMEN
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 561 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978).
A widely used illustration of how members of the same society can hold different assumptions that
yield varying interpretations of reality is Susan Glaspell's short story, A Jury of Her Peers. SUSAN
GLASPELL, A JURY OF HER PEERS (1927). The story describes the visit of three men and two women
to a remote farmhouse in a turn-of-the-century farm community to investigate a homicide. The victim
was strangled to death with a rope while in bed. His wife was in the bed with him when he died, but
she claimed that her husband was killed by an intruder and that she did not awaken. The story, told
[Vol. 70:405
POST-POSITIVIST JURY
sufficient to produce "multiple 'true' descriptions [of the same reality] that
are not identical with or translatable into each other.
458
Constitutional rhetoric has long recognized the central place of jury service
in full participation in public life. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, jury
service is second only to voting in the implementation of a participatory
government.459 But our bloodless understanding of what jury service entails
has produced correspondingly anemic mechanisms for its protection. The
conviction that "[a] person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as a
juror" 46° enjoins a salutary prohibition against disqualification on racial
grounds. But cultural patterns that frequently correlate with race are relevant
to jury service, since those cultural factors are an important ingredient of what
through one of the women, demonstrates how during the visit the men and women focus on different
features of the environment, and how their different observations lead them to different constructions
of what happened. The women's attention is drawn to household details that figure in their own
experience. They notice a half-filled measure of sugar, clumsy stitches in an otherwise finely sewn quilt
patch, a broken latch on a door to a bird cage, and, finally, a dead canary concealed in a sewing basket.
By fitting these observations into their general beliefs about a farm wife's daily routine and their more
specific beliefs about the character of the homicide victim and his wife, they construct a story of what
happened and why. They conclude that the wife strangled her husband because he broke the neck of her
pet canary. Moreover, they imagine that it was the wife's intense loneliness, on an isolated farm with
an emotional miser for a husband, that led her to acquire the canary in the first place, and that her sense
of helplessness to improve her life led her to strangle her husband after he killed her bird. The men
notice none of the details observed by the women and eventually drop the investigation against the wife
for lack of proof of any motive for the killing. Id. at 38.
Glaspell's story illustrates several points about the role of beliefs in the generation of knowledge. It
shows how beliefs guide our selection of what features of the environment to attend to and also give
meaning to those features that we do notice. It was the women's prior knowledge about baking that
caused them both to notice the partially-filled container of sugar and to infer that the occupant of the
house was interrupted while she was cooking.
The story also shows how one's mental apparatus imposes limits on what it is we are able to
perceive. The men, who had gone to the farmhouse with the express purpose of finding evidence
establishing the wife's motive for killing her husband, were unable to discern the motive discovered by
the women. The story suggests that even if the men had been apprised of the facts known to the women,
they would not have been able to draw the same conclusion, because nothing in their experience enabled
them to recognize the wife's condition.
Finally, the story shows how interpretive frameworks can correspond to cultural communities. The
different perspectives of the men and the women in the story are traceable to their differing experiences,
actual and vicarious, which in turn result from their inhabiting sharply divided male and female worlds
in a rural farming economy. The author shows how the observations and interpretations of the characters
are shaped by their own experiences. For instance, the woman narrator discerns from the half-filled
sugar container in the suspect's kitchen that the wife had been interrupted by the occurrence of
something out of the ordinary because the narrator herself had left her flour half-sifted when she was
suddenly called away to accompany the men on their visit to the scene of the crime. Id. at 19.
458. Scheppele, supra note 447, at 1104. The belief that members of minority groups can contribute
otherwise unrepresented perspectives and experiences has been the basis for other programs to enhance
diversity. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding an affirmative action
program to increase the number of minority-owned radio and television stations); Regents of the Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1979) (approving the principle of increasing classroom diversity).
Acknowledging the salience of group identity does not, however, entail a racial or gender essentialism.
As Justice Brennan stated in Metro Broadcasting, it does not require a belief "that members of a
particular minority group share some cohesive, collective viewpoint" to conclude "that as more
minorities gain ownership and policymaking roles in the media, varying perspectives will be more fairly
represented." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 582.
459. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
460. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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the jury does. In addition, the guarantee against nondiscrimination in selection
is not enough to implement the right to jury participation if participation
means a voice for one's perspective.46' Once it is recognized that exclusion,
even benign exclusion, has real effects, actual representation is the only way
that the promise of full participation can be realized.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that our ideas about the proper qualifications for
jurors and the procedures for selecting them are traceable to and implement
Enlightenment beliefs about the possibility of objective knowledge grounded
in the world as it really is. The philosophical underpinnings of those beliefs,
however, are now widely discredited. Furthermore, the assumption that there
exists a universal perspective from which the true nature of reality can be
discerned, which is the starting point for current definitions of jury qualifica-
tion and the guiding principle of our jury selection rules, no longer comports
with our understanding of how jurors actually make decisions. It now seems
more plausible that all knowledge is shaped by the interpretive perspective of
the observer.
Unfortunately, interpretivism does not resolve the question of the proper
qualifications of decision-makers as readily as realism does, and I will not
attempt to trace its implications here beyond some very general comments. At
the outset, recognition that everyone has a point of view does not require that
every point of view be recognized as equally valuable.462 There is wide-
spread consensus in our society that some kinds of connections to the parties
or the issues are clearly and indisputably disqualifying. No one involved in
the debate over jury selection is urging that jurors who have a financial or
personal involvement in the outcome, or who have acquired firsthand
information about case-specific aspects of the controversy, should be
permitted to serve. These types of bias are presently recognized in rules
regarding challenges for cause,463 and these rules should be retained.
But rejection of the belief in a single universal perspective does mean that
having a perspective on the issues is not ipso facto disqualifying. To the
contrary, the presence of multiple perspectives enriches the inquiry and offers
the best hope of attaining a de-centered objectivity. Recognition that claims
to objectivity "bear the imprint of those making the claims"'4 64 and that
"although we can alter the theory we use to frame our perceptions of the
461. See Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 531 (1970) ("Jury service should not
... be viewed as mere catharsis for the masses; lay participation is a creative process by which
community standards are injected into the legal system to guard against possible harshness, arbitrariness,
or inaccuracy in the administration of justice.").
462. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992
Wis. L. REv. 131 (arguing that "perspectivalism" or nonfoundationalism does not entail the loss of
moral certainties).
463. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE Standard 15-2.5 commentary at 58-59 (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1986).
464. Minow, supra note 296, at 14.
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world, we cannot see the world unclouded by preconceptions "'4 5 requires
that a qualified jury must include a broad array of experiences and perspec-
tives.
In addition to seeking a wide array of attitudes and beliefs, we should also
strive to empanel jurors who are willing to suspend judgment, to attempt to
see things from another perspective, and to learn. 466 For while reliance on
perspective is unavoidable, no perspective need be inescapable. A juror's
experience may lead her to see events in a particular way. But a willingness
to try to see them from another perspective may put those same events in a
completely different light.
Precisely how a vision of "diffused impartiality" could be oIerationalized
in reformed procedures for selecting jurors is, again, a complex question that
will not be elaborated upon here. Any fundamental alteration of jury selection
procedures would almost certainly run up against deep-seated cultural values
and administrative costs. It is not true, however, that implementing a view of
impartiality based on a commitment to inclusion is impossible.
There are a variety of means either proposed or in use to remedy the
problem of underinclusion of traditionally excluded groups during the early
stages of jury selection. Some of these techniques are thoroughly noncontro-
versial, such as expanding the source list from which the venire is chosen to
include, in addition to voter registration lists, driver's license lists, tax rolls,
welfare rolls, and other sources.467 The only explanation for the failure to
take such simple steps is an insufficient commitment to achieving more
diverse panels. Other techniques involve conscious efforts to ensure minority
representation in the master lists. Georgia law, for example, takes advantage
of the fact that Georgia voter registration lists identify the race of all
registered voters and requires that local jury commissioners use that
information to create lists that mirror the demographic makeup of the district
as closely as possible. 46' These techniques acknowledge the salience of
group identity to the jury decision-making task, and are accordingly scorned
by those committed to the ideal of blank neutrality.469
465. Id. at 46; cf. Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1597
(1990) (exploring the meanings of context in legal judgment); Catharine P. Wells, Improving One's
Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on the Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323 (1992)
(arguing that "every legal judgment is made from a particular perspective.... [And] if judging is a
situated activity, then judges should attend to their situation").
466. See Minow, supra note 296, at 76 ("The solution is not to adopt and cling to some new
standpoint, but instead to strive to become and remain open to perspectives and claims that challenge
our own.).
467. See Kairys et al., supra note 169; Munsterman & Munsterman, supra note 169.
468. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-40(a)(1) (1994) (Michie); see also Nancy J. King, Racial
Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 719-29 (1993) (containing a comprehensive review of this and other race-conscious
selection methods).
469. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Racial Justice: Trial by Cross-Section, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 30, 1992,
at 17, 18 (criticizing the Georgia scheme). For an analysis concluding that race-conscious jury selection
methods would pass constitutional strict scrutiny under some circumstances, see King, supra note 468,
at 729-74.
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The simplest way to eliminate discrimination at the challenge stage is to
eliminate the peremptory challenge and seat the first twelve jurors who
survive the parties' exercise of their challenges for cause. The late Justice
Thurgood Marshall advocated such a change in his Batson v. Kentucky
concurrence. 70 While random selection of twelve jurors from a representa-
tive venire would not ensure a completely representative jury, it would
achieve more diversity than do the current procedures. In addition, random
selection has the advantage of administrative simplicity47 and avoids the
dilemma of exacerbating negative meanings of race or gender identities
through the use of remedies that consciously rely on them.
While a system of random selection has strong appeal,472 the benefits of
the peremptory challenge cannot be ignored.473 The most persuasive argu-
ments in 'favor of peremptory challenges include the inadvisability of
entrusting the selection of jurors entirely to the judge, and preserving a role
for the litigants in the process of jury selection so as to have "'a good opinion
of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert [them].' 4 4 The view
of the jury as a group of "arbiters '471 whose decision is accepted because
the parties have agreed to be bound by it may go back to the time when trial
by jury was regarded as an innovation and therefore could not be forced upon
an unwilling litigant. 76 Whether or not the origins of the tradition of party
470. 476 U.S. 79, 107-08 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Various commentators have likewise
advocated the abolition of the peremptory challenge. See Alschuler, supra note 286, at 199-211; Akhil
R. Amar, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.. 1283, 1287-89 (1984); Raymond
J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.Q. 369 (1992); Brent
J. Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARe. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 227 (1986); see also VAN DYKE, supra note 139, at 168-69 (discussing various attempts
to abolish peremptory challenges).
471. See Alschuler, supra note 286, at 229-33.
472. Both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are apparently now rare in England. HANS
& VIDMAR, supra note 169, at 48-49. But the benefit of disuse of challenges in admitting greater
diversity of viewpoint into the deliberation may be lost by the fact that English criminal juries can
convict on a 10-2 vote. Id. at 172.
473. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 120-21 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 218-21 (1965); Babcock, supra note 275, at 1175-76; Babcock, supra note 134, at 552-55;
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 248, at 355-57; Underwood, supra note 246, at 768-73.
474. Babcock, supra note 275, at 1176 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1714 (3d
ed. 1894)); see also Underwood, supra note 246, at 771-72. I am less impressed with the other general
category of defenses of the peremptory challenge, all of which are related to its asserted role in "the
elimination of bias." Id. at 771. It is said that permitting attorneys to challenge jurors without
articulating a reason prevents the public articulation of the "core of truth" in stereotypes, facilitates the
elimination of jurors who will not admit or are unaware of their biases, and provides a shield for the
exercise of the challenge for cause by giving an attorney the means for striking a juror whom the
attorney has alienated by trying to explore possible bias on voir dire. Babcock, supra note 134, at 553-
55. These arguments are obviously predicated on a view of the nature and function of bias that this
Article rejects.
475. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 623 (2d
ed. reissued 1968).
476. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 30, at 125-26. This doctrine led to the gruesome practice of
compelling submission of the cause to jury under "peine et dure" through piling rocks on the unwilling
litigant until he either agreed to jury trial or expired. Id.
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choice in the composition of the jury are as old as the jury itself,477 it still
has strong appeal, and to some degree is an obstacle to elimination of the
peremptory challenge.478
A system of affirmative selection represents a bolder approach which
acknowledges both the salience of perspective and the commitment to party
choice. Tracey Altman's student note includes one proposed version of such
an approach.479 Altman proposes a procedure in which twenty-four venire
members are chosen randomly from the jury pool and examined by the
attorneys during voir dire. After both sides have exercised their challenges for
cause, each would list, in order of preference, twelve jurors. The judge would
first select any juror whose name appeared on both lists, regardless of how the
juror was ranked. Then, alternating between the lists, the judge would take the
highest rated juror from each until a complete panel had been assembled.480
So long as the parties' interests are in conflict and those interests inform their
choices, the jury would contain a broader array of perspectives than that
which results from the use of either peremptory exclusion or random
selection.48'
A number of commentators have gone further, calling for adoption of
mechanisms to ensure minority participation on juries.482 For example,
Professor Sheri Johnson, using social science research on attribution of guilt
in cross-racial decision-making, proposes that a criminal defendant be given
the right to a minimum of three "racially similar jurors" on the panel that tries
the case.483
While these proposals for affirmative selection strike many as radical
innovations, they are neither historically unprecedented nor without contempo-
rary parallel. The use of specially qualified juries of various types has a long
477. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (observing that "the role of
litigants in determining the jury's composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury
system and its verdicts.").
478. Others suggest that we could enhance the representativeness of the jury and give at least token
recognition to the tradition of party control by drastically reducing the number of peremptory challenges
currently allowed to between one and three. See Pizzi, supra note 244, at 147-49 (discussing the
advantages of reducing the number of peremptories for both prosecution and defense to two or three);
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 248, at 376-78 (defending peremptory challenges as necessary to obtain
an impartial jury but approving of a reduction in the number of challenges). Though less than ideal,
these proposals are a considerable improvement over current procedures, which accord parties many
more peremptory challenges, see VAN DYKE, supra note 139, at 282-84, and accordingly diminish the
representative character of the jury.
479. Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge
Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781, 806-11 (1986); see also Babcock, supra note 275, at 1179-80 (labeling
Altman's proposal "attractive"); Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining the Harm of Peremptory
Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1062-64 (1991) (endorsing a variation on affirmative
selection).
480. Altman, supra note 479, at 806.
481. Id. at 807.
482. Colbert, supra note 291, at 124-25; Johnson, supra note 437, at 1695-1700; Diane Potash,
Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J 80 (1973); Note, supra note
461.
483. Johnson, supra note 437, at 1695-1700.
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lineage in Anglo-American law.48 4 To take one isolated example, Oregon
law in the 1920's required that in all cases involving minors, either as
defendants or complaining witnesses, at least half of the jury had to be
female."' Current unapologetic calls for the use of handpicked juries in
complex civil cases 4 6 have not been received with horror, even though they
are based on the same principle underlying proposals for affirmative selection
in criminal cases-that potential jurors are differentially qualified to assess
the factual issues of the case depending on their experiences. Much of the
appeal of arbitration as an alternative to litigation lies in the fact that
disputants have the power to select as a decision-maker someone who will be
able to understand and sympathetically evaluate their claims."
There are, to be sure, significant practical and theoretical problems with any
system of affirmative selection. Virtually any system of affirmative selection
would entail greater administrative inconvenience and expense. Additionally,
affirmative selection would almost certainly result in more hung juries,4 8
and might also reduce the number of guilty pleas, since defendants might rate
their chances of success at trial more favorably if they had more control over
the composition of the jury or a better assurance of peer participation on the
jury. The inertia of long-standing jury selection procedures weighs against any
significant reform. Finally, belief in the possibility of a transcendent neutrality
is still strong. This is reflected in, among other things, the opinion of many
that recognizing cultural differences to solve social divisions is wrongheaded,
and that the way to overcome the differences that divide us is to eliminate
race, ethnicity, and gender as categories of distinction.4 9
484. See Richard C. Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35 IowA L. Rnv. 409 (1950);
Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 841 (1976); William V. Luneburg
& Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for
Coping with the Complexities ofModern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 901-09 (1981); R. Justin
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No one, including myself, believes that fundamental change in the
qualifications or selection of jurors is imminent.49 ° But the assumptions on
which the current system operates are increasingly being questioned. Given
the symbolic and practical importance of juries in our political and civic life,
we should begin to consider how our changing views should affect our
practice.
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committee in favor of more modest measures of adding state income tax and homestead rebate
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